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1-1994 On  25  January  1993  the European Parliament's Committee on External Economic 
Relations  decided  to  organise  a  Public  Hearing  with  the  aim  of  improving its 
understanding of  the  ongoing process  of  economic  interdependence in the world 
and  its consequences  for  the European  Union's  economy  and  trade policy.  The 
information gathered should help the Committee  in setting out its future policy 
lines.  The  hearing was  held  in Brussels  on  28  September  1993.  In  order to 
provide  the  Members  with  valuable  background  material  and  to  serve  as  a 
reference for future debate on the issues involved,  the Directorate General for 
Research has  been requested to publish the proceedings of  the hearing. 
The  present document  includes the papers of experts and policy makers on the 
basis of  which  the discussions  were  organised.  It consists of  the following 
parts:  (I)  An  introduction,  in which the Chairman of the Committee sets out the 
purpose  and  the  framework  of  the  Hearing,  and  introduces  speakers  and 
discussants  invited  to  the  meeting;  (II)  A discussion  paper  prepared  by  the 
Commission  taking  stock  of  the  issue  and  presenting  its  views  on  policy 
implications  for  the  European  Union;  (III)  The  proceedings  of  the  Hearing, 
including the presentations of speakers and the interventions by discussants and 
Members;  (IV)  Submissions  by  representatives of  interests groups. 
It  should  be  noted  that,  due  to  technical  problems  during  the  afternoon 
session,  not all parts of  the discussion could be reproduced. 
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139 I.  INTRODUCTION 
BY MR  WILLY  DE  CLERCQ,  CHAIRMAN 
OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIC  RELATIONS 
- 11  -It may  be asked why  there should be a  public hearing on the globalization 
of  the  economy.  During  this legislature,  our  committee,  which  is responsible 
for  the Community's  external  economic  relations,  has dealt with  the different 
aspects  of  this  phenomenon  from  various  angles,  inter  alia  as  part  of  the 
parliamentary  proceedings  relating  to  the  Uruguay  Round  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  in the  GATT,  textiles,  commerce,  the environment,  social  clauses-
and anti-dumping policy and the implementation of the common  trade policy.  All 
the reports drawn up by  our colleagues on  these subjects deal with the problems 
of  economic  interdependence and its repercussions on  trade policy,  but none of 
them has made  an overall detailed analysis of the globalization of the economy. 
Our  committee therefore decided to hold this hearing in order to sound out 
the  views  of  leading  academics  and  politicians  on  this  subject  which  affects 
trade policy as  a  whole.  Given the quality of  the experts among  us today,  I  am 
sure  that  our  debates  and  discussions  will  enable  us  to  have  a  greater 
understanding of this subject.  Naturally,  it will be up  to the Members  of  the 
European  Parliament  elected  for  the  next  legislature who  will  be  able  to  act 
upon  this  information.  Nevertheless,  the  European  Parliament  must  draw 
conclusions  therefrom  in  the  form  of  an  own-initiative  report  by  the  REX 
committee which will be debated in plenary sitting. 
What  is  economic  interdependence  or,  to  use  another  term,  the 
globalization  of  the  economy?  Initially,  our  answer  can  be  based  on  the 
following  facts:  since the second  world  war,  the  growth rate of  international 
trade  has  been  consistently  higher  than  the  GDP  growth  rate  of  the 
industrialized countries through trade in goods.  Direct foreign investment has 
been constantly on the increase.  More  recently,  strong links have been  forged 
between undertakings established in different countries as  a  result of  growing 
trade.  Multinational  companies  have  been  set  up  and  today  there  is  a  real 
network  criss-crossing  the  whole  world  or  at  least  all  the  older  and  newly 
industrialized countries and a  number  of developing countries. 
This  trend has  been encouraged or at least made  possible by  the  opening 
up  of  markets  between  the different  countries  under  the multilateral  trading 
system established by  GATT.  In the course of successive rounds of multilateral 
negotiations customs duties,  the main obstacle to ~rade in the post-war period, 
have been substantially reduced.  Over  the last two  decades,  this strategy of 
opening up the markets has proved to be both increasingly insufficient and also 
unadapted to circumstances  - insufficient in that it does  not  take account  of 
other obstacles to trade and  investment and unadapted to circumstances because 
the political consequences of opening up markets without any accompanying policy 
have  sometimes  been  open  to  criticism,  particularly  the  adverse  effects  of 
unfair competition,  whether real or imagined. 
The  total qr near-total absence of  international harmonization of social 
and environmental policies means  that a  successful  (in strictly economic terms) 
exporter  may  be  accused  of  'social  dumping',  if labour  legislation  in  the 
exporting  country  does  not  correspond  to  that  of  the  importing  country,  or 
'environmental dumping'  if the products manufactured  in the exporting country 
- 13  -do not comply with the environmental protection standards used in the importing 
countries.  A tendency  towards protectionism is apparent  almost  everywhere. 
The  guests  on  our  first  panel,  in  particular  the  first  two  speakers, 
Professor TSOUKALIS,  Professor of Economics at the University of Athens and the 
College  of  Europe  in  Bruges,  and  Professor  DORNBUSCH,  Ford  International 
Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  (Cambridge, 
United States)  who,  despite his university commitments,  has  agreed to  come  to 
Europe  for  several  hours  and  give  us  his  views  on  the  globalization  of  the 
economy,  will  lead  us  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  matter,  as  viewed  from  a 
European and an  American perspective respectively. 
After we  have heard these  two  speeches,  the next  speakers will be: 
Mr  Michel  ALBERT,  Executive Chairman of Assurances Generales de France in 
Paris,  who  will  comment  on  these  two  controversial  speeches  from  the 
standpoint of  a  European businessman; 
Mr  Noel  G.  SINCLAIR,  Deputy  Permanent  Secretary of  the Sistema Econ6mico 
Latinoamericana  (SELA)  in Caracas  (Venezuela),  who  will analyze  the  two 
positions from the standpoint of the developing Latin American countries; 
Mr  Hai-Hyung  CHO,  Executive  Chairman  of  Nara  Corporation,  Seoul  (South 
Korea),  who  will  comment  in his  capacity  as  a  businessman  from  a  newly 
industrialized country  in the most  dynamic  region of  the world. 
What  are  the  policy  consequences  of  economic  interdependence?  The 
increasing globalisation of  economic activities has  made  traditional concepts 
of national economic policy more  and more  obsolete.  Governments which were slow 
or reluctant to recognise these facts have nowadays  a  common  responsibility to 
promote  the  interest of  their populations and  to pursue their objectives  in a 
way  which does  not  undermine  the  interests of  their neighbours.  Globalisation 
has thus placed severe limitations on the effectiveness of national policies and 
regulations.  This holds true as well for the Community  even though among  Member 
States  the  relevant  part  of  legislation has  been  harmonised.  But  an  economic 
entity as big as the EC  cannot rely exclusively on its own.  It is embedded  into 
the wider transglobal economic context.  The  active role the EC  is playing in the 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round  is a  proof that EC  policy makers are very much 
aware of  these facts. 
Our  afternoon  session  will  be  devoted  to  discuss  these  policy 
consequences.  Great or industrial policy decisions  which  fail  to  take  account 
of  economic  globalisation by  which  foreign  trade is often replaced by  foreign 
direct  investment  or  that  both  can  be  substituted  by  so-called  networking 
arrangements  are  unlikely  to  prove  effective.  Equally,  trade  or  investment 
related decisions can be heavily affected by  developments  in the international 
monetary  system.  Even  the  largest  economies  are  finding  it  increasingly 
difficult to steer a  genuinly  independent policy course.  Autonomous  economic 
- 14  -growth is no  longer possible for anyone.  It is,  therefore,  increasingly urgent 
to develop more effective mechanismn for macroeconomic policy coordination than 
those currently available. 
Such  a  cooperation  is  still  lagging  behind  the  pace  of  economic 
development while substantial steps had been taken in developing a  multilateral 
trade  regime  which  should  be  further  enhanced  when  the  Uruguay  Round 
negotiations,  as we  all hope,  will be completed by  the end of this year.  We  are 
still far  from  establishing a  multilateral  framework  for  international policy 
coordination which would be adequate to today's economic reality. Therefore,  the 
development of multilateral rules for the other forms of international economic 
activity  must  be  envisaged  as  the  next  step  before  us.  They  concern  more 
convergent competition policy rules,  a  comprehensive regime  for  foreign direct 
investments,  as  well  as  trade related and environmental  measures. 
The  process of globalisation calls for  a  radical  adjustment  of  thinking 
and  policies  on  the  part  of  decision  makers.  A  more  collaborative,  less 
adversarial  approach  to multilateral activities  is required  for  a  successful 
management  of  an  increasingly interdependent world economic  system. 
On  this question the contribution of Vice-President Sir Leon  BRITTAN  who 
will  speak to  us  this afternoon will  be  focussed.  The  comments  of  our primary 
discussants will deal with this problem  from  the point of  view of 
a european industrialist: Mr  Ton  VAN  HEESCH,  Managing Director of PHILIPS, 
Eindhoven  (NL); 
a  representative of  the most  successful exporting country,  namely Japan, 
Mr  Kazuo  CHIBA,  former  Ambassador  of  his  country  to  the  U.K.  and 
Counsellor  of  Mitsui  & Co.  Ltd.,  Tokyo; 
a representative of the interests of workers,  Mr  Denis MACSHANE,  Secretary 
of the International Metal  Workers  Federation,  Geneva. 
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- 17  -EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
In today's increasingly multipolar world,  economic  issues are ga1n1ng in 
relative significance.  It is important,  therefore,  to understand  the radical 
changes which are occurring in the world economy.  Economic  interdependence has 
always existed to a  certain degree.  However,  the technological advances of the 
last forty years or so and the ensuing increasingly global nature of production 
have resulted in a  quantitative and qualitative change in the degree and nature 
of  this  interdependence.  Sustained  economic  growth  has  become  increasingly 
dependent on freedom  to engage in economic exchange and other activities across 
national boundaries.  · 
Foreign  direct  investment  and  the  emergence  of  multinational  and, 
increasingly,  global  private  enterprises  have  played  a  key  role  in  these 
developments.  The trend has also been reinforced by the proliferation of other, 
often  more  complex,  forms  of  international  alliances  and  link-ups  between 
economic operators seeking to reduce costs, customise their products  and spread 
the  risks  of  producing  goods  or  providing  services  in  a  rapidly  changing 
technological  and  economic  environment.  This  type  of  "networking"  can  be 
expected  to  gain  in  momentum  with  the  further  evolution  of  computer  aided 
production techniques  and  of  communications  and  information transfer systems. 
It  is  suggested  that  there  is  a  need  for  a  deeper  examination  of  the 
significance of newer forms of transnational economic activity based on various 
forms of networking and the implications of these developments in policy terms, 
both for  the Community  and at the international level. 
Foreign trade has also developed rapidly over the last few  decades,  at a 
higher rate than the growth of world output,  contributing to and reflecting the 
self-reinforcing  process  of  globalisation.  Its  structure  has  undergone 
substantial  changes.  Trade  in  manufactured  intermediate  goods  represents  an 
important  part  of  the  trade  of  industrialised  countries,  illustrating  the 
increasing internationalism of production.  Furthermore,  a  large part of world 
trade now  consists of  trade within multinational  companies. 
The  increasing  globalisation  of  economic  activity  has,  in  practice, 
invalidated traditional concepts of national interest,  a  fact that governments 
have  been  slow  or  reluctant  to  recognise.  Governments  increasingly  have  a 
shared responsibility to promote  the  interests they have  in common  and pursue 
their objectives  in a  way  which  does  not  undermine  the latter.  Globalisation 
has also placed severe limitations on the effectiveness of national policies and 
regulations.  Moreover,  traditional  policy  delimitations  are  becoming 
increasingly  meaningless  as  the  forms  of  activity  undertaken  by  economic 
operators and the motives underlying these become  more  complex.  Thus  trade or 
industrial policy decisions,  for example,  which fail to take account of the fact 
that  foreign  direct  investment  often  replaces  trade  or  that  networking 
arrangements  can be  a  substitute  for  both  forms  of  activity,  are unlikely  to 
prove  effective.  Equally,  trade  or  investment  related  decisions  can  be 
overwhelmed  by  international monetary developments,  and so on. 
The  extensive and increasingly pervasive interlinkages between economies 
or regional entities have created multiple channels for the rapid transmission 
of  economic  effects across  national  borders.  Even  the  largest  economies  are 
finding  it  increasingly  difficult  to  steer  a  genuinely  independent  policy 
course.  Autonomous  economic  growth  is  no  longer  possible  for  anyone:  the 
welfare  of  any  country  or  entity  is  intricately  bound  up  with  that  of  its 
- 19  -partners.  It  is,  therefore,  increasingly  urgent  to  develop  more  effective 
mechanisms for macroeconomic policy coordination than those currently available. 
The  case  for  broad  based  economic  liberalisation  and  for  developing 
multilateral  cooperation  in  the  face  of  the  de  facto  changes,  brought  about 
largely by private sector activity,  is overwhelming.  Yet  such cooperation has 
tended  to  lag behind  the  pace  of  developments.  While  substantial  steps  have 
been  taken  in developing  a  multilateral  trade  regime,  which  should be  further 
enhanced when  the current Uruguay Round negotiations are completed,  we  are still 
far  from  establishing  a  multilateral/international  framework  equal  to  the 
requirements of today' s  economic reality.  The development of multilateral rules 
governing the other rapidly growing forms of economic activity is the next step 
in  the  process.  In  particular,  this  paper  suggests  that  competition  policy 
rules,  a  rationalised and  comprehensive  regime  for  foreign direct  investment, 
as well as trade-related environmental measures are the three priori  ties for the 
post-Uruguay Round  agenda. 
The  development  of  a  global  financial  market  of  massive proportions  has 
further intensified economic  interdependence.  Many  aspects of  interdependence 
are largely restricted to the western industrialised world.  Although the group 
of  industrial  countries  has  been  enlarged  with  the  emergence  of  new  dynamic 
economies,  particularly  in  S.E.  Asia,  a  substantial  part  of  the  third  world 
remains marginalised,  in absolute or relative terms.  Similarly,  the centrally 
planned economies,  former  and  actual,  have  been  cut off  from  the developments 
in  the  rest  of  the  industrialised  world.  However,  other  forms  of 
interdependence,  economic,  political,  environmental  etc.,  link  the 
industrialised and  the developing economies.  This disequilibrium in the world 
economy  prevents the realisation of its full potential,  as well as engendering 
political and social instability.  The industrialised countries, therefore, have 
an interest in promoting the economic growth  in these countries and their full 
integration into the world economic  system. 
The  process  of  globalisation  calls  for  a  substantial  adjustment  of 
thinking and policies,  on  the part of  decision makers.  A more  collaborative, 
less  adversarial  approach  to  multilateral  initiatives  is  required  for  the 
successful management  of an increasingly interdependent world economic system. 
- 20  -I.  INTRODUCTION 
(i.)  Towards  a  Global  Economy 
The  end of  the  cold  war  put  an  end  to  the bi-polar  world of  the  super 
powers.  It has become commonplace  to speak of the new world order,  even if few 
people would still define this new order in the same optimistic spirit in which 
the  phrase  was  originally  coined.  Nevertheless,  few  would  contest  that  an 
important feature of the new order is its multipolarity.  The  observed parallel 
trend  towards  greater  political  and  economic  multipolarity  calls  for  a 
reassessment  of  concepts,  policies  and  institutions,  which  developed  in 
earlier and substantially different conditions.  In  the new  context,  economic 
issues  have  gained  in  relative  importance  as  traditional  geopolitical  and 
security concerns have receded.  It is,  therefore,  particularly important  that 
we  recognise and understand the changes that are occurring in the world economy 
and,  hence,  develop  appropriate policies which will assure global stability and 
economic prosperity. 
Economic  interdependence  between  states  is  not  a  new  phenomenon. 
Differences in terms of  factor endowments,  particularly natural resources,  and 
other comparative advantages  have  always  meant  that  individual  economies  have 
been dependent,  to a  greater or lesser extent,  on international trade.  However, 
in  the  course  of  the  last  forty  years  this  interdependence  has  undergone  a 
qualitative change  and  reached  an  unprecedented  level,  largely driven  by  the 
steady progress of scientific knowledge  and  the ensuing technology. 
The  technological  advances  of  recent  decades  years  have  revolutionised 
telecommunications  and  transport  and  have  opened  up  new  possibilities  with 
respect  to distribution of  goods  and  factors  of  production,  handling of data, 
automation,  etc.,  which  have  attenuated  or  even  severed  the  links  between 
location  of  production  and  markets  or  sources  of  raw  materials,  and  have 
resulted in a  complete revision of  traditional notions  of  economies  of  scale, 
of business organisation and delimitation of markets.  Even more important,  they 
have resulted in the rapid expansion of service-related activities, based on the 
expansion of information networks,  whose  contribution to the national economies 
of the industrially advanced countries has become predominant.  These trends are 
set to continue and  even intensify. 
Sustainable  growth  has,  accordingly,  become  increasingly  dependent  on 
access  to an  expanding  and,  ultimately,  a  global,  albeit non-uniform,  market. 
This period has  seen a  steady  increase  in international economic  exchange,  in 
a  self-reinforcing process  of  transnational  interlinkage  and  interdependence 
between economies.  Not  only has  there been a  steady increase in the volume  of 
goods  and  services  traded  on  an  international  level  but  flows  of  short-term 
capital  and direct  investment  have  come  to be directed with decreasing regard 
to national boundaries.  The  development  of an  international financial  market, 
and  the  rapid  growth  of  international  portfolio  investment,  as  well  as  the 
spread of  multinational or transnational -companies,  have  been  instrumental  in 
deepening and extending the  linkages and dependencies between countries. 
Equally,  transnational cooperation - state or private sector initiated -in 
research and development,  production and marketing,  in infrastructure projects 
etc.,  has  been  expanding.  Indeed,  qualitatively  new  forms  of  international 
alliances  or  link-ups  have  developed  whereby  value-creating  activities  are 
carried out jointly by different operators acting across national borders.  This 
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prevalent in services {banking,  transport etc.) as well as in certain high-tech 
industries.  The  introduction of  computer-aided design,  production,  marketing 
and  maintenance  systems  can  be  expected  to  promote  the  spread  of  economic 
networking  into  more  traditional  areas.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the 
expansion  of  transnational  economic  activity,  which  is  becoming  increasingly 
globalised,  has  created  a  substantial  and  growing  degree  of  interdependence 
between  economies.  Moreover,  the  forms  of  interdependence  have  become  more 
complex  and often more  intangible and  less easy  to quantify than in the past. 
(ii)  Policy Interdependence 
Private  initiative has,  generally,  been  at  the  forefront  of  the  above 
changes,  which  have  taken  place despite  the  existence  of  various barriers  to 
international  economic  activity.  Governments  have  in general  been  slower  to 
recognise  and  respond  to  the  new  reality.  They  have  tended  to  cling  to 
traditional notions of national interest and to yiela to pressure from specific 
interests groups  threatened by  change.  Understandably  enough,  they  have  been 
unwilling to admit  that their  freedom  of  action with  respect  to macroeconomic 
policy making has been eroded.  They  have also been slow to recognise that most 
of the global challenges which they have to face if their prosperity,  political 
stability and  ecological equilibrium are to be  maintained  cannot be  addressed 
by  any single government,  however  rich and powerful. 
Although  valuable  efforts  have  been  made  to  co-ordinate  macroeconomic 
policies  and  substantial  steps  have  been  taken  to  multilateralise  rules  and 
regulations in some  areas of  international activity,  most  notably trade,  these 
have  tended to lag behind the rapid pace of the new  deve,lopments.  Furthermore, 
the  rationale  for  these  efforts  has  still  in  large  measure  been  based  on  a 
"national" concept of interest which is becoming less relevant as globalisation 
proceeds.  Consequently,  the  institutional  means  available  for  managing 
international  economic activity,  for  addressing its social,  environmental  and 
other consequences  and  for assuring the  international  cooperation,  public  and 
private,  necessary  to  make  the  most  of  the  new  possibilities  offered  by 
scientific and technological progress,  are not in general adequate to the task. 
The emergence of regional integration/cooperation initiatives reflects an 
implicit or explicit recognition of  interdependence and of the consequent need 
for liberalisation of economic activity and plurilateral collaboration.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  it is  becoming  increasingly  acknowledged  that  helpful  as 
regional cooperation initiatives may  be,  the expansion of transnational economic 
interchange requires greater cooperation at the multilateral/international level 
not only to promote liberalisation but also to develop the necessary structures 
for  the management  of  an  increasingly globalised economy. 
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(i)  Foreign Trade 
General trends 
Foreign  trade  is  the  oldest  manifestation  of  international  economic 
interdependence.  However,  the rapid expansion of world trade in recent decades, 
at  a  rate  higher  than  that  of  world  output  growth,  and  the  changes  in  its 
relative composition and geographic distribution have contributed to and reflect 
the qualitative difference in the nature and degree of interdependence which has 
occurred over this period. 
According to GATT  estimates,  world trade increased by  67%  in volume  terms 
during the seventies and by  a  further  49%  during the following decade,  against 
48  and  34%  in world production respectively  (Table 1).  This was  accompanied by 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  countries  engaged  in  world  trade.  Shifts  also 
occurred  in  the  international  division  of  labour  as  production  of  labour 
intensive products increasingly moved  from  the industrialised to the developing 
countries,  particularly the newly industrialised economies.  Thus,  the share in 
world  trade  of  manufactured  products  exports  from  the  developing  countries 
(including the NIEs)  rose steadily in value  terms,  from  5.4%  in  1970  to  15.7% 
in 1990.  However,  the share of total developing country exports in world trade 
(including energy products)  has,  after a  short lived upsurge in the period 1979-
84  remained at around  20%  throughout most  of  the last three decades. 
For  their  part,  the  industrialised  countries  continue  to  dominate 
international  trade  activity,  accounting  for  more  than  two  thirds  of  world 
trade,  while  trade  among  the  group represents  around  half  of  the  total.  The 
bulk  (two  thirds)  of  developing  countries'  exports  continues  to  be  directed 
towards  the  industrialised  countries,  although  trade  among  the  former  has 
increased in the two  decades in question,  accounting for 5.8%  of world trade in 
1990,  as against  3.5%  in  1970  (with  some  fluctuations  in between). 
Merchandise trade now  represents  30%  of world GOP  as against  19%  in 1960 
(Table 2).  If services are included,  the corresponding figures are nearly 40% 
today compared to 20%  in 1960. 
The  product  structure of  world trade has also changed over this period. 
The  volume  of  trade  in manufactured  products  has  grown  faster  than  the  other 
main product categories as defined by  GATT  (agricultural and mining products  -
the latter includes  energy  products),  in almost  every  year  in  the  last three 
decades.  This  has  been  mirrored  by  a  more  or  less  steady  increase  in  the 
contribution,  in  value  terms,  of  manufactured  products  trade  to  total 
merchandise trade from  around 50%  in 1960  to around  70%  by  the beginning of the 
nineties.  The  period has  also seen a  rapid development  in trade in services, 
which  have,  generally,  also  been  growing  faster  than  the  national  product. 
Although in overall terms growth in services trade did not exceed the growth in 
trade  in  goods,  particular  service  sectors  did  outpace  the  latter.  In  the 
eighties,  commercial  services  as  a  whole  grew  on  average  2  percentage  points 
faster than world merchandise trade,  according to GATT  figures  (Table  3). 
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Perhaps  the most significant development  in interdependence terms is the 
growth  of  intra-industry  trade  and  trade  in  intermediate products  (parts  and 
semi-finished products)  in general.  This phenomenon,  which characterises trade 
between  the  industrialised  countries,  reveals  the  high  degree  of 
internationalisation  of  production  through  foreign  direct  investment  and 
economic networking operations. 
A  recent  OECD  study
1  shows  that  direct  imports  of  manufactured 
intermediate inputs accounts for between 50-70%  of all manufactured imports into 
the  five countries examined  (Canada,  France,  Germany,  the  UK  and  the US),  and 
the  rate  of  growth  of  these  intermediate  imports  as  higher  than  the  rate  of 
growth  of  domestic  sourcing  over  the  period early  seventies  to  mid  eighties. 
The  ratio of  foreign  to domestic  sourcing  in  these  countries  ranged  from  50% 
(Canada)  to  7%  (Japan).  The use  (direct and indirect)  of imported intermediate 
inputs  was  found  to  be  particularly  high  in  petroleum  refining,  textiles, 
clothing  and  footwear,  motor  vehicles,  computers,  aerospace,  communication 
equipment  and semiconductors. 
EC  trade  flows  with  Japan  and  the  US  also  confirm  the  growing 
interdependence  between  the  production  processes  of  the  Triad  countries  and 
similar links with other important  economic partners.  Approximately one-third 
of  EC  imports  and  over  40%  of  EC  exports  from  and  to  the  US,  Japan  and  EFTA 
consist of  intermediate manufactured  goods. 
A  large part of  trade  in  intermediate products  is  the  result  of  intra-
company  movements  of  such  inputs  within  multinational  enterprises.  It  is 
estimated that intra-firm trade accounts for around 30%  of exports and up to 40-
50%  of  imports  of  the  US,  Japan and  the  UK
2
•  Overall,  the share of  intra-firm 
trade  in  world  trade  is  estimated  at  25%3.  The  role  of  multinationals  in 
promoting the expansion of trade is seen to be even greater if one looks at the 
total  trade  generated  by  these  companies.  The  same  sources  estimate  that 
multinationals generate exports accounting for at least 50%  of exports  from the 
US,  40%  of  Japanese  exports  and  as  much  as  80%  of  UK  exports.  Overall, 
multinationals  generate  at  least  40%  of  all  world  trade.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  to the extent that their target is  local market  sales,  they are also 
substituting  potential  trade  flows  by  local  production.  Thus,  it  has  been 
estimated  that  local  sales  of  us  subsidiaries  in  some  of  its  major  trading 
partners  are  greater  (up  to  four  or  five  times  as  great)  than  US  exports  to 
these countries.  Similarly local sales of  foreign  subsidiaries  in the  US  are 
1.5  times higher  than total  US  imports. 
The above developments highlight the limitations of an approach to trade 
policy  which  is  too  compartmentalised  and  which  relies  too  heavily  on 
traditional, overall tr:ade balance considerations and ignores the structure of 
trade and other important economic indicators. 
2 
The  International  Sourc1ng  of  Intermed1ate  Inputs:  By  Canada,  France Germany,  Japan,  The 
UK  and  the US,  DSTI/STII/IND(92)1/Rev(1),  OECD,  March  1992. 
C.MICHALET,  The Activities of Mu1t1nat1ona1  Enterprises and  their Effects on  Internat1ona1 
Trade,  OECD,  July  1991,  TD/TC/WP9(91)43. 
3  World  Investment  Report  1992,  Transnat1ona1  Corporations  as  Eng1nes  of Growth- United 
Nat1o~s,  1992. 
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A ~otor of globalisation 
Foreign  direct  investment  ( FDI)  has  become  an  increasingly  important 
activity over  the last twenty  years or so.  World.FDI  outflows  in the previous 
decade-grew at an annual average rate of almost  30%
1
,  more  than three times the 
rate of world  exports and  four  times  as  fast  as world  gross domestic product. 
This  trend,  which will  almost  certainly be maintained,  has  led to a  situation 
where  annual direct investment  flows  in 1989  stood at $196  bn as compared  to a 
level of world exports of $3039 billion.  Furthermore, if  one takes into account 
the  contribution  to  world  trade  of  multinational  companies  described  in  the 
preceding section, the importance of this form of international activity becomes 
even more evident.  To  quote the  u~'s World  Investment Report  1991  " ... in much 
the same  way  that burgeoning trade linkages drove international economic growth 
and  integration in the  1950s  and  1960s,  FDI  is fuelling growth and integration 
in the  1990s." 
The  motivation behind corporate decisions to undertake foreign investment 
is diverse  but  can  be  grouped  under  the  two  broad  categories  of  cost  and/or 
market considerations,  including trade substitution and import barrier evasion. 
Foreign  investment  decisions  in  the  period  in  question  were  founded  on  both 
types  of  motivation.  The  economic  growth  of  the eighties,  coupled  with  the 
trend  towards  greater  liberalisation  and  deregulation,  particularly  in  the 
services  sector,  gave  FDI  an  additional  impulse.  As  with  other  forms  of 
international exchange,  the bulk of FDI  activity occurs among  the industrialised 
countries. 
The  main actors 
Japan,  the  UK,  the United States,  France and  Germany  are  the main  source 
of foreign investment.  In the period  1986~1990 this group accounted for  70%  of 
the world average outflow.  Developed  countri_es  in total  accounted  for  96.8%. 
One  interesting recent  development  is  the  entry of  the  newly  industrialised 
economies,  notably the Asian NIEs,  on  the  FDI  scene.  As  a  result,  FDI  flows 
from  developing  countries  have  increased  more  than  sevenfold  in the  space  of 
five years  although they still represent only  3%  of  world  FDI  outflows. 
As  host countries also,  the developed economies attract the lion's share 
of FDI  inflows- more  than  80%  of the total in 1990  (Table  4}.  For their part, 
the developing countries·have lost ground,  with their share falling from  25%  of 
world inflows in the early eighties to  17%  by  the end of the decade.  More  than 
half of this subtotal is directed to South and South-East Asia,  a  third to Latin 
America and the Caribbean,  while Africa attracts less than a  tenth.  The  econo-
mic marginalisation of much  of the developing world is reflected in these figu-
res.  For others,  chiefly the NIEs  of S.E Asia and certain Latin American coun-
tries, foreign investment,  motivated by  global strategy rather than local sales 
considerations, has been instrumental in promoting their export-led development. 
This  and  most other figures  in this section are  from: 
World  Investment  Report:  the  Triad  in  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  United  Nations,  1991 
and  World  Investment  Report  1992,  United  Nat1ons,  1992. 
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increasing its share  of  the  total  stock of  foreign  investment.  While  Europe 
(i.e.  UK,  F,  D,  NL  and  I),  has  maintained  its share  at  around  36%  (largely 
through the rapid expansion of intra-EC investment), Japan's part has grown from 
just under  1%  in 1960  to 16.9%  in 1988  and the  US  share has slipped from  47%  to 
30.3%  over  the  same  period. 
Foreign  direct  investment  has  become  particularly  important  in  the 
services  sector.  Although  in  earlier  decades  FDI  was  concentrated  in  raw 
materials  and  other primary  products,  today  the main  sectors are services  and 
technology-intensive manufacturing (Table 5).  More  than 70%  of Japanese foreign 
investment,  and  around  60%  of  US  investment  are  in  services.  For  Community 
countries,  the  share  of  services  is generally  lower  and  chemicals  and  energy 
account for more  than half of foreign investment  (with the exception of Germany 
for which  the share of  services is over  60%). 
Multinational  corporations  (MNCs)  are  a  major  source  of  FDI  flows,  by 
which  foreign affiliates are set up or acquired.  The  UN  estimates the present 
total number of  MNCs  at (at least)  35,000,  with some  148,000 foreign affiliates 
(Table 6).  Nearly  90%  of  MNCs  are based in developed countries,  and  the links 
with developing economies are mainly through foreign affiliates,  with more  than 
40%  of affiliates located in the latter.  Most  MNCs  are small or medium-sized. 
A small  number  of  MNCs  account  for  the  majority  of  outward  FDI  in individual 
countries.  For example,  in France,  350  MNCs  accounted for  80%  of all outflows 
in  1981-1984.  The  employment  offered  by  foreign  affiliates  is considerable. 
For subsidiaries linked with companies  in Japan,  Germany  and  the US,  it totals 
10m  jobs in  1990  (Table  7). 
Increasing multilateral cooperation 
The  above developments have  taken place against a  very varied regulatory 
background.  Multilateral cooperation initiatives have  been undertaken in this 
area  in  the  OECD  and  more  recently  in  the  GATT  and  the  TRIMS  (Trade  Related 
Investment Measures)  negotiations.  In addition,  UN  agencies and  the World  Bank 
have  also  addressed  various  issues  of  relevance  to  FDI.  However,  the  issues 
involved  have  generally  been  dealt  with  in  a  fragmented  fashion.  Bilateral 
agreements  to  address  concerns  with  respect  to  host  country  treatment  of 
investment,  particularly in the developing world,  have also proliferated. 
A consensus of opinion is gradually emerging in favour of an agreement on 
a  rationalised and more comprehensive multilateral framework for foreign direct 
investment.  This  is discussed  in greater detail  in Chapter  III,  section  iv) 
below. 
(iii) Globalisation of Technology 
Growing  interdependence 
Technological resources and R&D  activities remain largely concentrated in 
the Triad countries  (US,  Japan,  EC).  The  dependence of countries outside this 
group  on  Triad  technology  is therefore  very  substantial  and  transfer of  this 
thechno-logy,  generally  through  direct  investment  by  Triad  multinational 
enterprises,  is  of  prime  importance.  Within  the  Triad,  the  level  of 
technological  interdependence  is high  and  increasing further,  particularly  in 
the  new  high-tech  areas,  prompting  the  coining  of  terms  such  as  "techno-
globalism".  Here too,  direct investment plays an important part in technology 
transfer and it is increasingly the case that multinationals are decentralising 
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customisation  of  production  to  fit  the  needs  of  local  markets  and  to  take 
advantage of  local human  and technological  resources. 
FDI  and Mergers and Acquisitions  (M&As) 
Foreign direct investment  can take place through acquisitions of existing 
firms  or through the creation of  new  firms  and production facilities 
("green-field"  investment).  The  input and output structure of production 
tends to remain largely unaltered when  existing firms  change hands,  at 
least not in the short run.  The  creation of  new  production facilities, 
however,  is more  likely to entail new  international  input-output patterns. 
In the  US,  acquisitions accounted for nearly  85%  of  foreign  investment 
outlays in the last decade,  while  in the  EC  around  60%  of  recent foreign 
direct investment occurred through acquisitions.  These acquisitions were 
for  a  large part concentrated in process  industries,  where  there are  im-
portant economies  of  scale in production,  marketing and/or possibilities 
of spreading the costs of high  R&D  (e.g.  chemicals). 
Cross-border mergers  and acquisitions in Europe  totalled ECU  45.3  bn  in 
1989,  and  ECU  30.4  bn  in the first half of  1990,  with  the  US  as  the main 
single acquiring nation and  the  EC  clearly the largest acquiring entity. 
By  far the most  important  "target" was  the  EC  itself,  accounting for 
around  90%  of  these flows  (Table 8). 
Apart  from  FDI,  other  forms  of  cross-border business  linkages have also 
grown  rapidly.  Cross-border minority holdings  and  joint ventures  in the 
EC  both in industry and services accounted for  more  than half of all EC 
minority acquisitions and  joint ventures  taking place in the second half 
of the eighties  (Tables 9-10). 
Sources: 
OECD,  Industrial  Policy in OECD  Countries,  annual  review  1992,  Paris  1992. 
CEC,  Panorama  of EC  Industries  1991-1992,  Luxembourg,  1992. 
CEC,  XXIst  Report  on  Competition Policy,  Brussels,  1992. 
International collaboration 
At  the same  time,  although most  inter-firm agreements in this area still 
take place within the same country or region, cross-border collaboration between 
companies  in industrial  R&D  and  innovation has  come  to play  an  important  role 
in certain industries  such as  semiconductors,  computers,  automation,  telecom-
munications,  biotechnology,  as  well  as  in  a  number  of  more  traditional  areas 
such as  chemicals and automobiles. 
The  motivation  for  technology  collaboration is based not  only on  market 
considerations but also on the need to reduce the uncertainty and costs of  R&D 
and to spread the risks involved.  It takes many  forms  including research cor-
porations,  joint R&D  agreements,  second sourcing and licensing agreements.  This 
type of  cooperation has also been stimulated by  the  growing  need  to cope  with 
the complexity of  new  technologies  as  well  as  the high degree of  interlinkage 
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time.  This makes it increasingly difficult for a  single company,  no matter how 
big,  to cover the areas of  research required for its strategic development  and 
leads in turn to collaboration between companies with both related and comple-
mentary  technology. 
Empirical  research on  the motives  for  inter-firm cooperation in general 
indicates that cooperation agreements related to technology complementarity and 
reduction of  innovation time  span have become  as  important as  those related to 
market access considerations,  which were the main motive force in the seventies. 
Thus,  one recent study  found  31%  of the inter-company agreements  examined were 
motivated by  technology complementarity,  28%  by  the wish to reduce the innova-
tion time span and 32%  by market considerations.  Not surprisingly,  the techno-
logy related considerations were particularly strong in the high-tech sectors, 
while  for  traditional  sectors  the  tendency  was  for  market  motivations  to  be 
stronger.  Similar findings  could be expected  from  an analysis  limited only to 
international  inter-firm alliances. 
International  cooperation  in  government  sponsored  R&D  and  innovation 
activities is much  less widespread,  although  the advantages  of  sharing costs, 
particularly  in expensive  basic  research,  are  beginning  to  make  an  impact  on 
government  attitudes.  Nevertheless,  many  restrictions  on  such  cooperation, 
often justified in national security grounds,  remain in force. 
As  for  cooperation  between  industry  and  university  or  other  research 
establishments,  this still is largely confined within countries or regions.  It 
is,  however,  expected  that  the  general  trend  for  greater  cross-border 
cooperation will eventually extend to this area also. 
The contradiction between traditional government policies with respect to 
technology related issues and  the reality of  growing  international interdepen-
dence in this area mirrors the general lack of adaptation by national/community 
decision makers to the prevailing conditions governing economic activity.  A re-
evaluation of the presumptions on which these policies are based,  particularly 
with respect to national security,  would seem necessary.  In this context,  the 
importance  of  technology  transfer  in  the  effort  to  bring  about  the  fuller 
integration  of  the  less  developed  parts  of  the  world  in  the  global  economic 
system should be highlighted. 
(iv)  Transnational  Information Flows  and  Networks 
A booming sector 
Data  communication services are one of  the most  rapidly  expanding areas 
of economic activity.  On  a  global  level this sector has,  over the last decade, 
been  growing at an  annual  rate of  over  40%,  by  volume.  In the Community,  the 
telecommunications market accounts for around  6%  of gross national product.  Of 
this  the  services element  represents  about  80%.  Although  voice  transmission 
makes  up  the bulk of  these services,  its growth rate is relatively low,  10-15% 
per  annum  in  volume  terms  in  most  industrialised  countries  or  5-7%  in  value 
terms.  The  real  growth  area  is  in  the  wide  range  of  data,  image  and  video 
signal transfers,  which in the EC  is growing at an estimated annual rate of  20% 
in value terms.  This  trend is expected to intensify with the new  generation of 
services  made  technically  possible  by  the  progressive  replacement  of  the  old 
telephone network by  the Integrated Services Digital Network  (ISDN)  and by  the 
progress of deregulation. 
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communications  volume  on  the  telephone  network.  In particular,  data communi-
cations via this network do not even reach a  significant volume,  largely because 
of  the  system's  real  or  perceived  poor  performance  and  inappropriate pricing 
schemes.  The  further  development  of  tele  data  processing  and  information 
services is linked to the development of communication facilities and services. 
The  conversion of  the old analog telephone system to the  ISDN,  a  process 
which will be completed before the end of the decade in most  western countries, 
will alter the situation dramatically.  One  immediate outcome will be that many 
services currently supported  by  other transmission  means,  will  be  transformed 
to ISDN.  These services, will include features such as high quality facsimile, 
graphic data transmission,  high speed information transfers, multilateral video 
conference  (more exotic services such as TV a la carte, video telephone and many 
others will probably not become  widely available until the next century). 
The  rapid expansion of these new  services can be expected to outstrip the 
growth  of  voice  communications  and,  in  the  long  run,  they  could  become  more 
important  in absolute  economic  terms.  Their  most  visible effect will  be  the 
creation of  new  markets  to  the  detriment  of  some  existing ones:  multilateral 
video conference will significantly reduce business trips, reliable high quality 
facsimile  will  undoubtedly  have  a  negative  impact  on  traditional  mail,  while 
fast and reliable data transfer is likely to change radically our practices in 
administration,  commerce  and  data  exchange.  In  practice,  these  developments 
will  result  in  a  growing  convergence  of  public  and  private  communication 
networks  and  will  call  for  international  rule-making.  The  new  data  transfer 
possibilities will  certainly  give  an  added  boost  to  the  process  of  economic 
globalisation. 
Repercussions for the developing world 
The  spread of  data  communication  services  and  networks will,  inevitably 
continue to be concentrated in the first instance,  in the industrialised world. 
The  question  arises,  whether  this  will  act  as  a  disincentive  to  foreign 
investment in the developing countries and hinder their fuller integration into 
the world economy. 
In  the  absence  of  positive  action  to  promote  the  necessary  public  and 
private  expenditure,  there  is  a  very  real  danger  that  the  poorer  of  the 
developing countries will be unable to undertake the substantial infrastructure 
costs involved.  Although a  number of third world economies,  such as India,  are 
making  intense  efforts  to  introduce  new  technologies,  notably  satellite  and 
mobile  communications  networks,  others  are  unable  to  mobilise  the  necessary 
funds and human  and technological resources to follow suit and thus run the risk 
of  becoming even more  peripheral  than at present. 
(v)  Economic  Networking 
The developments outlined in the preceding section have been instrumental 
in  promoting  the  spread  of  new  forms  of  corporate  strategies  at  the 
int~rnational level.  These strategies are based concurrently on cooperation and 
competition between economic operators engaged in various forms  of joint value-
creating activity.  The  resulting  interrelationships are usually referred to 
as  "networking" while some  analysts now  increasingly speak of  the emergence of 
a  "networked  economy". 
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One  of  the  most  1mportant  practical  outcomes  of  the  ISDN  1s  the  blending  of  voice,  data  and 
video  transm1ssion  both  at the  national  and  1nternational  level.  In  fact,  once  ISDN  becomes 
fully  operational,  it w1ll  be  v1rtually  impossible  for  the  carr1er  compan1es  to split  vo1ce 
and  data  services  as  at  present  and  harder  for  governments  to  1mplement  restr1ct1ve  pol1c1es 
1n  this  sector.  Deregulation,  spurred  on  by  the  new  technology,  will  1ntens1fy  and  private 
carriers  w1ll  be  able  to  use  the  public  ISDN  infrastructure  adding  services  to  the  network, 
Value  Added  Networks  or  VANS,  in  competition  w1th  the  trad1t1onal  monopolies  in  activit1es 
other than  voice  transm1ss1on. 
So  far,  public  and  private  carriers  have  carried  out  vertical  1ntegration  policies:  the 
carrier  in  most  cases  owns  both  the  phys1cal  infrastructure and  provides  the services offered 
to  the  customers.  In  the  case  of  public carriers,  vert1cal  integrat1on  has  often  gone  much 
further  to  include  the  manufacture  and  d1stribut1on  of  network  and  term1nal  equ1pment, 
telecommunication  computers,  phone  sets,  modems,  etc.  Deregulation  is  11 kely  to  cut  the 
present vertical  sectors  into  horizontal  layers.  The  telecommunicat1ons  infrastructure  w1ll 
be  owned  by  public  and  pr1vate carriers  while  pr1vate  and  public  companies  w1ll  develop  and 
offer Value  Added  Network  services on  top of the  prev1ous  layer. 
In  overall  terms,  therefore,  corporate  network1ng  1s  mov1ng  towards  1ncreased  util1sat1on  of 
publlc  facilit1es  and,  1ncreasingly,  pubhc  infrastructure  1s  be1ng  used  as  an  1ntegral  part 
of  the  private  infrastructure.  Th1 s  trend  should  be  further  reinforced,  as  the  costs, 
coverage  and  reliab1l1ty  of  publ1c  networks  1mprove  and  as  1nternat1onal  standard1sation  and 
deregulation  proceed,  even  if  certa1n  sectors  such  as  banking  and  some  sensit1ve  defence 
related  1ndustr1es  cont1nue  to ma1ntain  the1r ex1st1ng  closed  networks. 
The  future  landscape of  internat1onal  commun1cations  1s  l1kely to  be  one  in which  many  pr1vate 
compan1es  offering value added  services over  networks  w1th  1nternat1onal  coverage,  compete  for 
the  prov1sion  of  these  serv1ces  with  publ1c  carr1ers.  Transnat1onal  J01nt  ventures  can  also 
be  expected  to  increase.  Already  such  J01nt  proJects,  notably  between  European,  Japanese  and 
US  carriers  and  users,  are  be1 ng  set  up  1  n  the  face  of  the  h1 gh  1  nvestment  costs  of 
1~troduc1ng the  new  technolog1es. 
The  economic  potent1al  of  these  developments  1s  enormous.  It  1s  estimated  that  80%  of 
1nternat1onal  data  1nterchange  relates  to  trade,  transport  and  admimstrative  activ1t1es. 
Only  a  small  proport1on  of this  is currently transm1tted  by  electron1c  means,  and  much  of the 
electronic data  1nterchange wh1ch  does  take place  1s  v1a  pr1vate 1nfrastructures and  uses  non-
standard  message  formats.  The  sav1ngs  1n  adm1mstrat1ve  1nfrastructure  wh1ch  could  accrue 
from  the  1ntroduction of  electron1c  standard  message  transfers  could,  accord1ng  to  estimates 
of  some  private  compan1es,  be  as  h1gh  as  40%.  Thus  add1ng  substant1al  cost  benef1ts  to  the 
advantages of greater  rap1dity  and  accuracy of transm1ss1on. 
A  clear  1nd1cat1on  of  the  degree  of  1nternat1onal  1nterdependence  in  this  area  1s  the 
development  of  the  UN  1n1tiative on  Electronic  Data  Inter- Interchange  for  Admin1stration, 
Commerce  and  Trade  (EDIFACT).  The  EDIFACT  regional  boards,  are  respons1ble  for  the 
elaboration  of  standard  messages  for  internat1onal  information  interchange.  It  is  expected 
that,  by  the  end  of the century,  standard  formats  will  have  been  developed  for  most  messages, 
thus  enabling  interlocutors  across  the  world  to  overcome  lingu1st1c  as  well  as  geographic 
barr1ers  and  to  interchange orders,  1nvo1ces,  data etc.  qu1ckly  and  eff1c1ently. 
In  addition,  for  the  new  services  described  above  to  become  fully  operational  and  widely 
accepted  various  legal  and  security  problems  have  to  be  solved,  for  example,  electron1c 
signatures,  data  privacy,  and  Intellectual  Property  protect1on.  The  pressure  will  grow  for 
greater  1nternat1onal  cooperat1on  among  governments  to  rat1onal1se  and  1mprove  the  ex1sting 
regulatory  framework. 
The  above  developments  raise  issues  concerning  the social  aspects  of telecommun1cat1ons.  The 
provis1on  of  certain  m1n1mum  services  have  to  be  assured  for  soc1al  reasons  (e.g.  1n 
unprof1table  rural  or other  remote  regions).  These  cons1derat1ons  apply  pr1mar1ly  to  bas1c 
vo1ce  commun1cations,  the so-called  "reserved" services.  A degree of  policy 1ntervention will 
inevitably  rema1n  not  only  for  social  reasons  but,  equally,  because  of  national  secunty 
considerat1ons. 
Of  even  greater  long-term  importance  are  the  social  and  cultural  changes  impl 1ed  by  the 
changes  1n  working  practices  brought  about  by  the  new  commumcation  possibillt1es.  A 
foretaste of the  k1nd  of  rad1cal  changes,  1ncluding  the global1sat1on effect,  is given  by  the 
revolution  in  financ1al  markets  wh1ch  has  already occurred. 
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electronic  data  interchange  (EDI)  systems;  more  advanced  types  of  corporate 
alliances such as cross-licensing arrangements,  R&D  consortia or joint ventures 
and other  forms  of  co-production;  as well  as alliances  for  moulding  the 
environment  within  which  the  companies  in  question  operate,  for  example  by 
developing common  norms  or by  influencing the regulatory  framework. 
Networking  is  most  prevalent  in  the  services  sector.  Such  economic 
linkages are particularly advanced  in the area of  professional  services while 
financial  services  are  increasingly  relying  on  networking  arrangements  to 
develop  their  business  in  foreign  markets  as  an  alternative  to  cross-border 
provision of  services or of direct investment.  However,  similar arrangements 
are also becoming  more  widespread in the  manufacturing industry,  particularly 
in  the  high  tech  areas  of  microelectronics,  computers  etc.  Networking 
arrangements  can  cover  activities  ranging  from  the  research  and  development 
stage through to the production and marketing phases.  This introduces a  greater 
element  of  flexibility  in the operation of  companies,  which  in  turn,  permits 
them to adapt their output to the specific needs of differentiated and variable 
markets  and cope  more  effectively with competition,  short  product  life cycles 
and  rapid technological  change. 
Chemical  companies  and  more  traditional sectors  such  as  automobiles  are 
also discovering the benefits of competitive cooperation,  particularly in data 
exchange.  This  trend can be expected to continue and to spread to cooperation 
in production and distribution as modern production and control technology,  such 
as computer-aided design,  manufacturing and marketing,  becomes  more  widespread 
in a  greater range  of  industrial sectors. 
Assessing  the  total  volume  of  current  economic  activity  covered  by 
networking  is not  easy,  and  few  if any  estimates  have  been  published.  It is 
equally difficult to evaluate the policy ramifications.  What  is clear is that 
it increases  the complexity  of  international  linkages  and  erodes  further  the 
effectiveness of national  policies and regulation.  The  impact on competition, 
to  name  but  one  area,  can  be  positive  or  negative  depending  on  the  specific 
circumstances.  On  the one hand,  networking arrangements can increase the risk 
of cartelisation.  On  the other hand,  such arrangements can raise the prospects 
of  survival for  small  firms  who  might  otherwise be unable to compete. 
This is an area which merits deeper examination  in order to assess  the 
implications in terms of policies and priorities. 
(vi)  Financial Markets 
The  emergence of  a  global financial  market  is the most  highly developed and 
pervasive aspect of economic  interdependence.  The  advances  in informatics and 
communications  technology,  within the last ten years,  have  permitted  the de-
velopment  of  instantaneous  and  continuous  trading  in currencies  and  financial 
assets across the world,  thus creating the most  truly global market.  The  size 
of  this market  is enormous.  The  turnover  of  foreign  exchange  markets  alone 
amounts  to $900  billion per day,  three times more  than the equivalent value in 
1986.  The  current annual turnover in cross-border equity transactions adds up 
to $1.4 trillion,  compared  to $120  billion in  1980,  a  figure  which corresponds 
to  7%  of world GOP.  The  outstanding stock of international bonds and principal 
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while "international" bank lending  (cross-border lending plus domestic lending 
denominated in foreign currency)  rose from  $324 billion in 1980  to $7.5 trillion 
in 1990.  With pension funds,  which are the major institutional investors,  also 
increasingly entering the international financial markets,  many  of these trends 
will be reinforced.  Currently,  only  5%  of the total assets held by  US  pensions 
funds  of  $3.3 trillion is invested outside the country,  and only 8%  of Japanese 
pension funds of $2.2 trillion. The equivalent figure for European funds is hig-
her,  about  20%.  These percentages are expected to double for  the  US  and  Japan 
within the next few years as asset diversification increases and legal obstacles 
~o cross-border investments are  lowered.  This is likely to give a  substantial 
further  impulse to international  financial markets. 
This  unprecedented  mobility  of  capital  has  its  positive  and  negative 
aspects.  On  the one hand it can help to assure the most efficient utilisation 
of capital at world level.  On  the other hand,  it does hold potential dangers, 
particularly in the present institutional set-up. 
The  globalisation of  financial  markets  has  had a  profound effect on  the 
extent and degree  of  macroeconomic  interdependence.  As  a  result of  the sheer 
volume of funds  involved and the speed with which markets can respond to events, 
the impact of market developments can be both massive and immediate.  Hence,  the 
effects of changes in policy variables which influence the financial markets in 
one  country,  can  be  transmitted  very  rapidly  to  others.  The  total  non-gold 
reserves  of all industrial countries  in  1992  stood at around  $550  billion,  or 
40%  less than the daily turnover in foreign exchange markets.  Action by mone-
tary authorities to influence exchange rates,  which is deemed  to be unwise can, 
therefore,  be quickly  swamped  by  the response of  the markets. 
Global  financial  markets,  therefore,  exercise  a  powerful  discipline  on 
national governments  and  limit the extent to which  they can pursue a  genuinely 
independent policy course.  As  long as market behaviour reflects real economic 
fundamentals,  the effect of  market discipline should be  beneficial.  However, 
it is also true that the potentially destabilising effects of simple speculation 
are now  much  greater.  In addition,  the complexity and extent of  interlinkages 
between financial systems can in themselves generate new  risks of breakdown and 
other malfunctioning permeating throughout the system.  Apart from this  system-
risk,  the complex  interlinkages can also facilitate misuse of  the system  (e.g. 
money-laundering). 
1  The  Econom1st  of  19/09/1992,  Financ1al  Times  04/05/1993  and  06/05/1993. 
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(i),~~  A Stable and Open World Economy 
The  various  forms  of  international  economic  activity described  in the 
preceding  chapter  make  up  an  intensive  and  complex  system  of  global 
interdependence.  The interlinkages between individual economies are too strong 
and the momentum  of globalisation too great for the process to be reversed.  In 
such a  system,  where wealth-creating activities are increasingly transnational, 
it makes  sense to facilitate these activities by  providing an open and stable 
world  economic  environment.  It also makes  sense to provide  an  international 
regulatory framework.  The effort required to achieve the latter is likely to 
be far less than the cost of non-cooperation at the multilateral level. 
Managing  a  global economy 
A stable macroeconomic environment implies effective policy co-ordination 
between  governments,  at least of  those economies  whose  size is such  that  they 
can  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  global  economy.  The  need  for  this  is 
intensified by  the  increasing multipolarity of  the  world  economic  system.  No 
single economy  is large enough to assure the stability of  the system or act as 
its engine  of  growth.  The  stability and  predictability  of  the  international 
economic  environment  can  only  be  achieved  through concertation among  the main 
economies. 
The  economic  welfare of  the citizens of  any  country or entity like the 
European  Community  is  intricately  bound  up  with  the  prosperity  of  other 
economies.  All  economies  are  involved  in  the  same  self-reinforcing  dynamic 
process which can,  in the right circumstances,  lead to higher growth and welfare 
for  everyone  or,  in  the  wrong  circumstances,  can  spiral  down  into recession. 
Moreover,  because of the stronger and more  numerous  links between economies,  as 
well  as  the  rapidity  with  which  effects  are  transmitted,  the  positive  or 
negative trends are likely to be  stronger than in the past.  Recent  experience 
with  the  world  recession  seems  to  indicate  that  even  the  richest  and  biggest 
economies  are  finding  it  harder  to  insulate  themselves  from  international 
developments or to reverse their situation in isolation. 
The  drive  by  individual  countries  to  increase  their  economic 
competitiveness is,  therefore,  not necessarily a  zero-sum game.  A competitive 
edge  for  one  economy  leading  to  more  efficient  production  and  increasing 
standards of living will not necessary occur at the expense of other economies, 
even  though it may  cause difficulties for specific sectors within the latter. 
In fact,  given the right conditions of openness and competition, it is equally 
likely to have  the opposite effect in a  dynamic,  self-reinforcing process of 
growth,  especially in the medium  to long term.  The  greater the interlinkages 
between economies,  the stronger this effect. 
Therefore, strong competition between economies notwithstanding, countries 
have a  common  interest in assuring a  stable economic and political environment, 
open  markets  and  effective  rules  governing  the  multifarious  forms  of 
international economic activity. 
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The  econom1c  costs  of  inadequate  liberalisation  are  widely  recogmsed.  The  benef1cial  hnk 
between  trade  and  econom1c  growth  has  been  demonstrated  in  practice,  s1milarly other  forms  of 
1nternational  exchange  have  a  favourable  impact  on  growth.  A  fa1lure  on  the  part  of 
governments  to  fac1 1 itate  these  activit1es  w1thin  an  appropriate  multi lateral  regulatory 
framework  and  to  introduce the  necessary  adjustment  policies  to  reduce  the  short  term  dislo-
catlon which can cause opposition to liberalisation,  would  prevent the  realisat1on of the full 
potent1al  benef1ts  and  prevent  a  more  opt1mal  allocat1on  of  resources.  While  attempts  to 
quant1fy these effects may  yield  varying  results,  they  do  at least agree on  the adverse  nature 
and  significance of the  impact. 
The  absence  of  a  su1table  framework  for  international  econom1c  act1vity  may  hinder  but  w1ll 
not  stop the  latter.  What  1t w1ll  do  is to decrease further  the capab1l1ty of  governments  to 
manage  the1r  econom1c  environment  and  to  assure  the  best  poss1ble  condit1ons  for  econom1c 
growth,  domestically  and  internat1onally.  Even  in  the  most  extreme  case  of  a  fa1lure  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  and  a  regress1on  1nto  protection1sm,  the  trend  may  be  slowed  but  not  reversed. 
Th1s  means  that  the costs of  non-cooperation  at the multilateral  level  will  1ncrease further 
with  time. 
One  recent  French  study  est1mates  that  in  the  extreme  case  where  the  major  trading  blocs 
(EC+EFTA,  NAFTA,  and  Japan+Asian  NIE's)  apply  protection1st  measures  on  1nter-bloc  trade, 
world  manufacturing  product1on  would  be  15%  lower  by  the  year  2000  than  1t  would  be,  ceteris 
par1bus,  on  the  bas1s  of  current  trends,  as  a  result  of  a  reduction  of  1nter-bloc trade  and 
higher  than  otherw1se  1nflat1on  rates  brought  about  by  a  less  effic1ent  allocat1on  of 
resources.  It is  interest1ng  to  note  that the  same  model,  which  assumes,  1nter  alia,  a  more 
dec1sive  apphcat1on  of  protect1on1st  tools  by  the  Un1ted  States  than  by  the  Commun1ty, 
y1elds  substant1al  reg1onal  var1ations  in  the cost of  protect1on1sm.  The  hardest hit are the 
industrial1sed  As1an  countr1es  (-23%),  who  are  assumed  to  be  the  primary  targets of  EC  and  US 
protection1st  measures,  these  are  followed  by  Afr1ca  and  the  M1ddle  East  (-16.5%),  Eastern 
Europe  (-14%),  and  the rest of  Asia  (-13.5%).  Product1on  1n  Western  Europe  1s  expected  to  be 
almost  13%  down,  while  the  US  and  Lat1n  America  are  expected  to  be  the  least  affected  w1th  a 
fall  of  around  7.5%. 
In  contrast to this,  a  s1mulat1on  us1ng  the same  model,  based  on  the assumption of accelerated 
market  l1beralisation  which  leads  to  a  rate  of  growth  of  world  trade  wh1ch  exceeds  present 
trends,  f1nds  that world  manufacturing  product1on  would  be  20%  h1gher  by  the year 2000  than it 
would  be  if the  present trade growth  rate  were  cont1nued. 
Another  study,  based  on  game  theory  analys1s.  1nd1cates  that,  wh1le  the  EC  and  the  U.S.  may 
stand  to  lose  less  than  others  from  a  tr1lateral  EC/US/  Japan  trade  war,  nevertheless  all 
countries are sign1f1cantly better off  1n  a  world  l1beralisat1on  scenar1o. 
Models  such  as  this  1nevitably  oversimpl1fy  reality  and  the1r  results  have  to  be  v1ewed  w1th 
caut1on.  For  example,  1n  the first  simulation  account  is  not  taken  of  alternat1ves  to trade 
whose  development  could  be  spurred  further  by  a  more  restr1ct1ve  trading  env1ronment. 
Nevertheless,  1ndependent  qual1tative  analys1s  would  lead  to  sim1lar  conclus1ons,  regarding 
the  1mpact  of  protect1on1sm  or  of  l1beral1sation,  even  1f  the  magn1tude  of  the  effects  and 
the1r distribution are open  to discuss1on. 
The  above  studies relate spec1f1cally  to trade  in  goods.  The  cost of  1nadequate cooperation 
at the mult1lateral  level,  and  hence  the pers1stence of current difficult1es,  both  for  pr1vate 
business  and  for  governments  seeklng  to  regulate,  could  be  expected  to  be  at  least  as 
substantial  in services,  as  well  as  investment  and  other  forms  of  1nternational  collaborat1on 
between  economic  operators. 
References: 
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In  this  context,  an  open  environment  means  more  than  an  open  trade 
regime.  It entails  open  regimes  for  foreign direct  investment,  for capital 
flows,  for  access  to  networks  and  for  all  forms  of  international  economic 
activity.  This  policy  option,  if  pursued  by  all  concerned,  is  the  optimum 
course  of  action.  Although  economic  protectionism  may  bring  some  apparent 
short-term gains to an individual economy,  it is ultimately counterproductive. 
It increases internal costs  and it affects other economies  adversely,  thereby 
reducing  their  imports  and  their  investment  outflows  etc.  Moreover,  if  it 
provokes retaliation the negative effects are  compounded  further. 
Economic liberalisation, of course, entails substantial and often painful 
structural  adjustments,  at  the  domestic  and  the  international  level.  It  is 
incumbent  on  governments  to  take  the necessary  action to address  the  negative 
consequences  in  order  to  ensure  the  long-term political viability of  liberal 
economic  policies.  At  the  international  level,  a  more  intensive,  concerted 
effort  is  called  for  to  address  the  imbalance  in  the  global  distribution of 
wealth.  At  the domestic level,  this action involves such measures as education 
and retraining, creation of alternative employment opportunities, social welfare 
provisions etc. 
It is important to note that the same  technological forces which have been 
the  driving  force  behind  globalisation  are  also  responsible  for  the  radical 
changes  which  are  taking  place  in  the  nature  and  organisation  of  economic 
activity at  the  domestic  level.  Even  the  most  advanced  industrial  countries 
have  not  yet  adequately  adapted the structure and  skill distribution of  their 
workforces.  Neither  have  they  adequately  responded  to the development  of  new 
and  increasingly  flexible  processes  for  production  of  goods  and  provision of 
services,  which  in  turn  imply  new  and  ever  more  flexible  working  methods  and 
practices.  It seems  likely  that  these  underlying  factors  have  substantially 
aggravated  the  effects  of  low  growth  and  recession  in  recent  years  and  are, 
therefore,  in part responsible  for  the  sustained high  levels  of  unemployment 
currently experienced by  much  of  the industrialised world. 
In  such  circumstances,  achieving  the  highest  possible  levels  of  world 
economic  growth  becomes  even  more  crucial.  It offers  the  best  environment 
within which to realise the difficult adjustments which have to be carried out. 
Trying to preserve  jobs  through  economic  protectionism will,  by  slowing  down 
world growth,  merely compound  the problem. 
The limits of national policies and regulation 
The globalisation of economic activity and the resulting interdependencies 
and interlinkages between countries seriously curtail the ability of individual 
governments to carry out autonomous economic policies and to implement effective 
national regulation.  The  macroeconomic  policy decisions  of  others  can  often 
negate the effects of particular government  measures or oblige a  government to 
abandon  a  preferred course of action. 
_  ,.,  Another consequence of interdependence is that the definition of national 
interest  has  become  much  more  complex  and  is  no  longer  confined  within  the 
traditional narrow  geographic boundaries  of  the national  economy.  A growing 
part of the activity which adds to the wealth of a  particular country is taking 
place beyond its frontiers.  Even when wealth creation occurs within the economy 
itself, it is increasingly likely to be the result of activities carried out by 
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The spread of regional cooperation and integration initiatives is in part 
a  response  to  this reality.  -It reflects  a  degree  of  recognition by  national 
governments  of  the limits to their effective sovereignty and their,  sometimes 
grudging,  acceptance of the fact that plurilateral cooperation is necessary in 
order to deal  more  adequately with many  of  the  issues they have to face.  The 
success of these initiatives have varied.  Governments have often been reluctant 
to  translate intentions into practice.  The  history of  the  European  Community 
would  seem  to indicate that strong political as well as economic motivation is 
required,  at least in the early stages,  for such initiatives to take off. 
Regional cooperation is often easier to establish than multilateral action 
because it involves  fewer participants.  Even  if different regional models  are 
adopted,  they  all  ultimately  rely  on  consensus  building  and  as  such  provide 
useful experience for further multilateral cooperation.  Moreover,  regional co-
ordination can reduce the number of views which have to be reconciled to arrive 
at a  multilateral consensus.  It can also provide  a  useful  testing ground  for 
various  approaches  to transnational  policy-making or regulation. 
The renewed efforts to reinforce and extend the multilateral trade regime, 
the deliberations in the GATT  and  the  OECD  on  investment  and on other policies 
which  have  an  impact  on  international  exchange,  such  as  the  environment, 
competition and security also reflect the global convergence of interests.  The 
same  can be said for existing international collaboration in the establishment 
of  common  or  mutually-recognised  health  and  safety  requirements  and  product 
standards.  However,  it is becoming  increasingly evident that  interdependence 
between economies  is rapidly reaching the point where  far more  than free  trade 
or  free  investment  flows  are  called  for.  The  expansion  of  networking,  is 
essentially based on  the free movement  of  information,  people,  money  and  long-
term capital,  as well  as  goods  and  services.  The  promotion of  networking and 
its expansion not only among  industrialised countries as at present but also to 
the emerging market economies of the ex-Communist  bloc and to the third world, 
implies a  much  broader approach to liberalisation, particularly with respect to 
transfer of  knowledge  and  technology. 
Globalisation  of  economic  activity  is  bringing  about  a  degree  of 
uniformity between different economic systems.  However,  many  differences remain 
in attitudes,  living habits and working practices.  Aspirations,  social values 
and  regulatory  traditions still vary  substantially.  Competition  for  markets 
can,  therefore,  give  rise  to  tensions  and  disputes  ar1s1ng  from 
incompatibilities between different socio-economic systems.  An  internationally 
accepted  framework  of  rules  governing  transnational  economic  activities, 
together with effective dispute settlement procedures,  is the least costly way 
of  reconciling  differences  between  systems.  Multilateral  cooperation, 
therefore,  is  the  ultimate response  both  to  the  growing  overlap of  interests 
arising from  economic  interdependence and to competing interests. 
It follows from what has preceded that deregulation at the national level, 
which lies at the heart of an economy  open to international trade,  investment 
and  other  forms  of  transnational  interchange  has  to  be  accompanied  by 
multilaterally  agreed  minimum  rules  and  practices,  i.e.  by  international 
1  Reich,  Robert  B.  (1990)  Who  is us?,  Harvard  Business  Review,  January-February. 
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controls,  which  may  or may  not be motivated by  overt or  cov~rt protectionism, 
by  a  system of multilateral rules designed to facilitate economic  interchange, 
to establish common  ground  rules  for  economic  operators,  which  would  also be 
more  effective  than national  regulation in many  instances,  and hence  ensure  a 
more efficient functioning of an increasingly globalised economy.  Without such 
a  multilateral framework,  the full benefits of economic liberalisation will not 
be  realised.  Bilateral,  or  even  regional  initiatives  may  often  provide  a 
partial answer but in many  instances they are likely to prove little more  than 
imperfect,  stop-gap measures,  which should not detract from efforts to achieve 
multilateral  solutions.  It  goes  without  saying,  therefore,  that  such 
intermediate  steps  should  not  take  a  form  which  contravenes  existing 
multilateral rules and runs counter to further multilateral cooperation. 
(ii)  The  need to address  imbalances 
Economic  interdependence  is  strongest  and  most  intricate  among  the 
countries of  the  industrialised world.  It is by  no  means  limited to these 
countries.  The  direct links between western industrialised economies  and the 
ex-COMECON  countries and the Third World may still be less complex but they are, 
nonetheless,  significant and two-way.  The  energy dependence of Western Europe 
or Japan and the debt crisis of the eighties demonstrate the  two-way  nature of 
the  relationships.  Direct  investment  is  also  on  the  increase,  albeit  at  a 
relatively low rate and a  growing proportion of  labour-intensive activities is 
being transferred to both the developing countries and the new  market economies. 
Interdependence is,  therefore,  growing  and  gradually becoming  more  complex  in 
form  and geographically more  diverse.  It remains true,  however,  that the very 
poorest countries remain largely untouched and are,  if anything,  becoming  more 
marginalised. 
The  economic  interdependence  between  the  industrialised  and  developing 
worlds is less asymmetrical  than some  might  think,  particularly if issues such 
as  migration,  the  environment  and  drugs  trafficking  are  taken  into  account. 
Furthermore,  the  .potential  threat  to  the  politico-economic  stability  and 
security of  the  industrialised world of  instability and/or conflict in either 
the  former  Soviet  bloc  countries  or  in  other  developing  countries  is 
substantial.  The  spread of fundamentalism,  ethnic minority conflicts and other 
destabilising  manifestations  are  fostered.by  economic  discontent.  Economic 
development  and  improved  living  standards  in  these  countries  is  the  most 
effective way  of reducing this threat.  The present unequal distribution of the 
world's wealth - 80%  of it is concentrated in the hands of the industrialised 
countries,  which  together  account  for  only  20%  of  the  global  population  -
represents an enormous potential danger for all. 
The new  market economies 
The  above  arguments have been determinant in the case of  the Central and 
Eastern  European  countries,  and  the  CIS  Republics,  largely  because.  of  the 
proximity and size of the dangers,  including the nuclear threat,  as well as the 
ideological dimension.  Although  the  response  in market  opening  and  financial 
terms  may  be  considered  inadequate,  the  objective  has  at  least  been  clear: 
namely  the  integration of  the countries  involved  into  the  democratic  world's 
economic and political system. 
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a  deliberate  effort  to  develop  political  relationships  and  economic 
interlinkages  with  them.  The  West  is  also  encouraging  localised  regional 
cooperation such as  the Visegrad initiative. 
The  emphasis on political and economic cooperation,  on joint ventures,  on 
their integration into the  trans-European networks
1
,  as  well  as  the  expansion 
their administrative  and  entrepreneurial  know-how  help  to  foster  a  sense  of 
common  purpose.  Provided political stability in  the  region  is sustained  and 
adequate investment resources can be mobilised,  the majority of new  democracies 
can expect a  faster rate of integration into the global economy  than many  of the 
countries of  the third world. 
A closer partnership with the developing world 
Tackling the persistent problem of underdevelopment in the Third World is 
in  many  ways  harder  than  promoting  the  growth  of  many  of  the  new  market 
economies,  most  of  which  have generally well  educated  human  resources  even if 
administrative and economic infrastructure of  the latter are often inadequate. 
Yet  the  effort  has  to  be  made,  with  the  assistance  of  the  industrialised 
countries.  This is not only a  moral  necessity,  it is in the enlightened self-
interest of  the industrialised world. 
In  addition  to  the  issues  related  to  political  stability  and  global 
problems referred to earlier, there are sound economic reasons for helping these 
populous  countries.  Their  substantial  market  potential  can,  if turned  into 
reality,  give a  much  needed boost to world economic growth.  This will help to 
alleviate the pressure of large-scale migration and  facilitate the substantial 
structural adaptations  which  are being undertaken  by  the  mature  economies  in 
response to the rapidly changing technological environment. 
Many  of  the  developing  countries  have  recognised  that  traditional 
development  policies  based  on  import  substitution  have  hindered  rather  than 
helped their economic progress.  The  success of the Asian Tigers and others who 
adopted the export led path to growth are showing the alternative way  forward. 
For  their  part,  the  industrialised  countries  have  come  to  realise  that  many 
traditional  aid  recipes  have  not  proved  effective.  More  constructive 
assistance, building on the experience being gained in the assistance programmes 
for Central and Eastern  European,  with their emphasis  of  integration into the 
world  economic  and  industrial  system,  is  likely  to  prove  a  more  fruitful 
alternative than earlier policies. 
Involving  the  developing  countries  more  fully  in  the  international 
structures required to manage international economic activity will promote their 
economic progress and assure their political will to undertake the obligations 
this entails.  At the same time,  a  more consistent effort to reinforce political 
relations with these countries,  by  engaging  them  in a  more  comprehensive  and 
constructive political dialogue would help to promote a  greater sense of  com-
monality of interests. 
The  establ1shment  and  development  of  transEuropean  networks  w1th1n  the  community  in  the 
sectors of transport,  telecommuun1cations and  energy,  are prov1ded  for  in the Union  Treaty. 
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One  consequence of the globalisation of economic activity is that it is 
now  more difficult to distinguish between  its various forms and the motivation 
behind them.  Its effects are also becoming less clear.  Thus,  foreign direct 
investment  is  partly  replacing  trade,  a  growing  percentage  of  international 
trade occurs within multinational companies and networking arrangements between 
companies is developing as an alternative to both traditional trade and foreign 
direct investment.  This overlap means  that statistical data on  just one t~ 
of activity,  such as trade,  often gives only a  partial, if not actually mislea-
ding,  picture of the extent and nature of real economic linkages.  For example, 
the Community's deficit in merchandise  trade in recent years has been matched 
by a  corresponding surplus in trade in services.  Undue reliance on one economic 
indicator can lead to sub-optimal policy responses. 
As  economic  globalisation  proceeds,  a  more  comprehensive  and  more 
coordinated approach  to international regulation is called for.  The  growing 
complexity  of  international  economic  interconnections  means  that  the present 
"compartmentalisation"  of  regulatory  issues  is  becoming  increasingly 
inappropriate. 
In practice,  therefore,  traditional policy demarcations are becoming less 
relevant.  This is true as much for distinctions between various sector-specific 
policies as for distinctions between domestic and external policies.  The divi-
ding lines everywhere are becoming increasingly blurred.  Industrial policy de-
cisions,  for example,  will only correspond to the real needs  of  the economy  if 
they take account of the globalisation of production.  Similarly,  the close in-
ter-relationship  between  trade  and  global  production  means  that  trade  policy 
should not  be elaborated in isolation but  as  one  element  of  a  set of external 
economic policies.  And  both should be seen as part of a  broader mix  of coherent 
policies  designed to ensure that the economy is strategically placed within the 
global  economic  system. 
This  blurring of  distinctions  should  also  be  better  reflected at  the 
multilateral  level.  Steps  in  this  direction  have  already  been  taken,  for 
example the Uruguay Round negotiations include trade related investment measures 
or  trade  related  intellectual  property  issues.  Multilateral  discussions  are 
also taking place on environmental  and other policies  related to trade.  The 
widening  of  the  scope  of  the  multilateral  trade  regime  through  the 
establishment  of  a  Multilateral  Trade  Organisation  dealing  with  a  range  of 
issues with a  bearing on trade constitutes progress in the required direction, 
although it is questionable  whether  it goes  far  enough.  In  any  event,  this 
still leaves many  issues, such as health, safety and environmental requirements, 
data protection and questions related to investment, either inadequately covered 
at the  international level or dealt with in a  fragmented  manner. 
It is,  therefore,  becoming more  widely accepted that international rule-
making  will  have  to  cover  new  areas  of  economic  activity  and  address  new 
concerns,  as well  as shifting current types of rules  from  the national  to  the 
international level and  building wherever possible on  existing private sector 
initiatives.  An  essential feature of such an international regime would be its 
trans-sectoral nature,  the objective being to provide  a  framework  which  would 
promote  competitive  cooperation  between  economic  operators  and  safeguard  the 
interests of  consumers  and society at large. 
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recognition  of  the  need  for  wider  multilateral/international  agreement  in 
regulatory  matters  is  gaining  ground  in  academic  circles,  in  international 
organisations and in many  business circles.  They are however,  often less well 
accepted  by  governments.  The  European  Community's  own  experience  with 
interdependence at the regional  level  makes  it more  receptive to multilateral 
initiatives.  Among  the other industrialised countries,  the  United States has 
probably  been  among  those  most  resistant  to  such  ideas  in recent  years.  The 
present Administration seems more  aware of the realities of the global economic 
environment.  The  United States is one of the economies  most  implicated in the 
new  forms  of  global  economic  organisation.  American  companies  are  heavily 
involved  in  traditional  foreign  investment  activities.  The  high-tech  and 
services  sectors  are  becoming  increasingly  engaged  in  various  networking 
arrangements,  in  an  attempt  to  maintain  their  competitive  position.  The 
benefits of  improved  ground  rules  for  transnational  economic  activity,  linked 
with  greater  liberalisation,  could  be  expected  to  receive  a  more  positive 
response  from  this  segment  of  the  US  private  sector,  which  constitutes  a 
powerful  lobby  in  the  US.  In  fact,  companies  world-wide  recognise  the 
disadvantages of multiplicity of  regulatory  systems  and  are calling for clear 
and predictable multilateral rules.  The  main  problem for the United States is 
to overcome  any  "ideological" aversions to regulation in general  and  to regain 
confidence in the effectiveness of  international institutions. 
For  the  rest,  the  problem  of  reconciling  the  "traditional"  concept  of 
national  interest with  the  wider  interests of  global  economic  operators is an 
issue  which  affects  the  approach  of  all  countries  to  the  question  of 
international regulation.  The  Americans  are not  alone  in having difficulties 
in adapting to this.  Other countries,  also,  could well  be reticent,  not least 
the  developing  countries,  who  are  often  suspicious  of  the  motives  of  the 
industrialised countries.  The protraction of the Uruguay Round negotiations has 
helped to intensify cynicism and disillusionment with multilateral cooperation 
at a  time when  the need  for this is becoming increasingly urgent.  A new,  less 
adversarial  approach  to  global  questions,  based  on  the  recognition  of 
interdependence,  should therefore be fostered in all countries.  This  implies 
launching  a  systematic  long  term  dialogue  with  the  us,  Japan  and  other 
industrialised and developing countries,  both bilaterally and in multilateral 
forums. 
(iv)  The Policy Issues 
The development of a  coherent multilateral system to deal adequately with 
global  management  will  inevitably be  a  long drawn  affair.  It will  involve,  in 
the  first  instance,  the  identification of  the  relevant  policy  issues  and  the 
appropriate forums  for addressing these issues,  establishment of  the necessary 
co-ordination  between  the  latter  and,  more  fundamentally,  the  assurance  of 
widespread  cooperation  on  the  part  of  all  countries  concerned.  This  will 
require a  systematic dialogue on both the bilateral and multilateral level.  The 
major economies should be at the forefront of the effort.  They  are· best placed 
to see the need for it and the EC,  in particular, has its own  unique experience 
to bring to the endeavour. 
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The growing complexity of the task of managing a global economy  inevitably 
raises  the  question  of  whether  the  present  framework  of  international 
institutions and discussion forums  is adequate.  Does  it provide the means  for 
elaborating effective and cohesive multilateral initiatives? 
With regard to macroeconomic co-ordination,  most  people would agree that 
the  G-7  mechanism  has,  more  often  than  not,  failed  to  provide  the  level  of 
policy  coordination  necessary  to  assure  economic  stability  and  growth.  The 
problems this has caused have been compounded by  the inability of international 
monetary institutions to cope fully with the repercussions of the globalisation 
of  financial  and  money  markets. 
There  is  less  of  a  consensus  on  how  to  remedy  the  situation. 
Macroeconomic  policy  is  one  of  the  core  areas  of  state  action  and  many 
governments  are,  understandably  enough,  reluctant  to  cede  their  apparent 
sovereignty.  The  fact  remains,  however,  more  extensive  and  binding  forms  of 
joint macroeconomic  management  are urgently required.  As  the Community's  own 
internal experience has shown,  the greater is interdependence,  the g£eater the 
need for policy convergence.  Sooner or later,  therefore,  governments will be 
obliged by the growing pressure of events to develop the necessary institutional 
structures for more effective policy co-ordination. 
On  the regulatory side,  the situation is relatively better.  Substantial 
progress  has  been  made  over  the  past  three  or  four  decades  in  the  area  of 
multilateral  rule-making,  especially  in  the  trade  area.  Nevertheless,  more 
needs to be done.  The  long overdue conclusion of the Uruguay  Round  will expand 
the  multilateral  system  further,  for  example  to  cover  trade  in  services  and 
trade-related intellectual property issues, etc.  This is of crucial importance. 
However,  the matter should not stop there.  An  important outcome of the Uruguay 
Round  negotiations  will  be  the  creation  of  a  Multilateral  Trade  Organisation 
(MTO),  providing a  single coherent  framework  for existing rules under the GATT 
and its various Codes,  as well as  for  the new  rules which will emerge  from  the 
negotiation. 
The Multilateral Trade Organisation could provide a  forum  for addressing 
many  of the necessary regulatory issues.  It should permit the establishment of 
a  continuous programme of work to tackle issues in a  systematic manner,  at tech-
nical and political level.  It is,  however,  too early to  judge if the  outcome 
of the negotiations will provide a  sufficiently flexible and evolutive institu-
tional structure for the work  which needs to be done  and whether it will be in 
a  position  to  co-ordinate  its activities  adequately  with  other  multilateral 
work.  The  OECD  constitutes an additional, albeit restricted,  forum,  useful for 
exchanging  ideas.  Its deliberations  on  investment  and  other issues  touch  on 
many  issues of broader application,  which will ultimately have to be addressed 
in a  more  extended multilateral setting. 
The  situation  regarding  the  institutions  and  mechanisms  designed  to 
promote  economic  progress in the developing world  and  the Central  and Eastern 
European countries and  the CIS  republics,  is more  diverse. 
There are numerous  structures ranging  from  the  ad  hoc,  such as  the  G-24 
initiative,  through to permanent structures such as the  UN  specialised agencies 
and  the  World  Bank.  Coherence  between  the activities of  each has  not  always 
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coherence with the other institutions and  mechanisms. 
The  wider  question  remains  to  what  extent  the  required  international 
policy and regulatory framework can be developed within existing institutions, 
suitably adapted,  or whether in the longer run new  international structures need 
to  be  established.  Some  would  argue  that  the  time  is  ripe  for  a  radical 
overhaul  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  and  others  would  add  the  UN  economic 
agencies.  Gradual  adjustments  to  the  existing  institutions  is,  they  feel, 
unlikely to yield affective and coordinated multilateral management and correct 
global  inequality.  This  view  deserves  serious  consideration.  The  present 
institutional structure was  the product of the bi-polar post-war period.  The 
world  now  is multipolar,  particularly in economic  terms.  Adaptation  of  the 
system to the new  economic and political reality is inevitable.  The extent and 
timing of the adaptation needed,  whether a gradualist approach should be adopted 
or  a  radical  one-step revision undertaken,  is something which  will  have  to be 
carefully considered. 
( v)  The next moves 
The  above reforms require new  and specific political initiatives.  It may 
take  time  to  develop  the  necessary  degree  of  political  will  to  launch  such 
initiatives and carry them to completion.  In the meantime,  work should progress 
as far and as fast as existing structures permit.  The  conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round  will  open  the way  to further progress  in the  regulatory sphere,  in par-
ticular.  There is a  growing consensus that priority issues here include rules 
governing competition policy,  foreign direct investment and environmental mea-
sures. 
One  of the negative aspects of the growth of multinational enterprises and 
economic  networking  is  the  heightened  risk  of  cartelisation  and  excessive 
concentration  of  economic  power  on  a  global  level.  Equally,  many  of  the 
obstacles to international economic activity take the form of indirect barriers 
to  market  entry.  For  example,  some  of  the  most  effective  trade  barriers, 
intended or not,  are the result of business structures and relationships which 
preclude or hinder entry by  "outsiders".  Both types of problems are best dealt 
with  through multilaterally agreed rules  to safeguard  competition.  Subsidies 
and other trade related competition issues  are already being discussed in the 
GATT.  The  MTO,  which  will  emerge  from  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  could 
build  on  this  to  develop  a  more  comprehensive  framework  of  rules  covering 
anti-trust issues. 
Effective multilateral rules covering foreign direct investment activity 
are  related  to  this.  The  initiative  in  the  OECD  framework  for  a  national 
treatment  instrument  deals  with  one  of  the  aspects  involved.  There  are, 
however,  many  other re~latory issues which need to be addressed and both in the 
OECD  and elsewhere the possibility of establishing a  wider investment instrument 
is being  mooted.  Some  of  these  issues  are  covered  in various  guidelines  for 
multinational enterprises elaborated in the OECD  itself or in UN  agencies.  Many 
are the subject of  the  more  than  300  bilateral  investment  treaties which  have 
been concluded between industrial  (mainly European)  and developing countries in 
order to promote and protect foreign direct investment.  The  issues covered by 
most of these treaties include treatment of investment by host countries,  expro-
priation and compensation conditions and arbitration procedures, often involving 
mandatory  recourse  to  the  International  Centre  for  Settlement  of  Investment 
Disputes  ( ICSID).  The  proliferation  of  these  agreements  reflects  ,the  more 
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to note  that  the  US,  which  initially showed  little interest,  has  in the  last 
decade concluded a  number of such agreements.  This suggests that the time could 
be ripe for revisiting the  idea of  a  more  comprehensive  and global  initiative 
on  i~vestment. 
Such a multilateral/international initiative should ideally bring together 
the various policy strands involved and result in agreement on both host country 
treatment of  foreign  investment  and  the behaviour of  the investing companies. 
The  advantage of this comprehensive approach is that it increases the chances 
of  arriving,  through  mutual  concessions,  at substantial  commitments  on  both 
sides.  On  the host country side this would entail undertakings with respect to 
the fair and equitable treatment of investment,  IP protection, etc.,  along the 
lines set out in many  bilateral treaties.  On  the part of  the  investors,  this 
would  entail  commitments  on  such  things  as  working  conditions,  training  and 
other social commitments,  environmental undertakings  and  technology transfer. 
Again,  the  MTO  could  begin  to  consider  this  issue,  building  on  the 
agreement which will emerge  from  the current talks on trade-related investment 
measures.  It could be argued  that any prospective deliberations  in this area 
would proceed more  rapidly and come  to fruition much  earlier if the OECD,  which 
covers  the  major  players  concerned  by  current  foreign  investment  activity  on 
both  the  source  and host  country side,  were  the  chosen  forum.  However,  while 
discussions in the OECD  could serve to clarify ideas,  it would be important for 
the  discussion  to  be  transferred  as  soon  as  possible  to  a  forum  which  would 
permit the  involvement of all players interested in foreign  investment,  either 
as  sourc·e or host countries. 
Many  environmental problems are global and cannot be tackled by any single 
country or group of countries.  International cooperation is either indispensa-
ble  or  offers  a  lower-cost  option  for  dealing  with  environmental  problems. 
Without  such  cooperation,  unilateral  environmental  measures,  whether  based  on 
genuine  environmental  considerations  or  whether  serving  as  a  pretext  for 
protectionism,  will proliferate with a destabilising effect on the multilateral 
system.  The  interface between environment and economic development,  including 
trade,  is becoming increasingly important.  Both the perceived conflict between 
environmental  protection  and  free  trade,  or  between  the  respective  views  of 
developed and developing countries over the model  and costs of  environmentally 
sustainable development,  pose new  challenges for the international system.  This 
not only calls for  multilaterally agreed rules  for  environment  protection,  it 
also requires effective means  of  implementation and adequate monitoring of  the 
effects of environmental measures  on  trade and vice versa,  including credible 
dispute settlement procedures.  The  latter calls, inter alia,  for the "greening" 
of  the GATT/MTO. 
No  winners  - everyone a  loser 
If governments  fail  to  adapt  their  policies  to  the  fact  of  growing 
economic globalisation,  every one will pay the cost.  There will be no winners, 
if multilateral cooperation fails to keep pace with global  economic trends or, 
worse  still,  if  retrograde  steps  towards  greater  economic  protectionism  are 
adopted. 
The  developing countries are likely to be  the most  immediate losers in a 
non~cooperative/or protectionist  scenario  and  their  economic  marginalisation 
maintained or most  probably accelerated further  (see p.14).  The  integration of  ... 
- 43  -these countries into the world economic system would be more difficult, the less 
open the system and hence the fewer the opportunities for them to capitalise on 
their cost advantages, as well as their natural resources.  Their attractiveness 
for foreign investors would be clearly curtailed if trade and other restrictions 
limit their appeal as regional (or global) export launching pads,  an increasing-
ly important motivation for foreign direct investment.  The dangers of economic 
and political instability that economic marginalisation represents has already 
been discussed in section ii above.  In addition,  the opportunity cost of not 
promoting the development of their market potential is a  substantial one for the 
industrialised economies. 
Whether similar losses would accrue to the new  market economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet  Union is more difficult to judge.  It may 
be that political considerations coupled with geographic proximity would result 
in certain of these economies at least being encompassed in the wider European 
region.  The  risks of  marginalisation of  some  of  the new  Republics  of  the ex-
USSR  are,  however  much  greater. 
In the short and medium  term the industrialised countries as a  group are 
likely  to be  less  adversely  affected in economic  terms  since  they  are  better 
placed to compete regionally and internationally.  Their international economic 
operators will continue to expand their transnational activities,  finding  ways 
as  in the past of  circumventing or overcoming  the obstacles,  albeit in a  less 
efficient manner  than in a  setting more  conducive  to global business. 
However,  they  too  will  pay  the  economic  cost  sooner  or  later.  The 
additional costs entailed as well as the inability to carry out effectively the 
necessary regulatory and other policies means  that even  for  the industrialised 
countries,  the  absolute  and  opportunity  cost  of  not  assuring  appropriate 
multilateral  structures  will  grow  with  time.  Moreover,  one  could  expect 
substantial  variations  in  the  distribution  of  these  costs  within  the 
industrialised world,  although it is by  no means  easy to predict who  would lose 
out most. 
It  could  be  considered  that,  by  virtue  of  their  size  and  economic 
diversity,  the consequences for the Community  (of Twelve or more)  and the United 
States  of  a  situation in  which  multilateralism gives  way  to  unilateralism or 
introverted regionalism  would  be  less  serious  than  for  other  industrialised 
countries.  In reality, while this argument may  be valid in the short run, their 
reliance on international trade and the extent to which their economic operators 
are  involved  in  transnational  economic  activity  means  that  the  economic 
prosperity of both is heavily dependent on the continued liberalisation of the 
world economy  and on the evolution of multilateral cooperation. 
Equally,  the  belief  of  many,  particularly  in  the  US,  that  the  latter's 
comprehensive unilateral  trade and  other economic  legislation places it in a 
uniquely  strong  position  to  defend  its  economy  overlooks  the  real  long  term 
economic  interests involved.  It ignores,  moreover,  the possibility that this 
could trigger a  process of escalating economic retaliation,  in which all would 
lose out in the longer run. 
It has been argued that countries like Japan,  with a  global  predominance 
in many areas of production would suffer fewer negative consequences than others 
and might  even  be better off  in such a  situation because of  the dependence of 
other  countries  on  its  exported  products.  However,  this  is,  for  several 
reasons,  again  likely  to  be  a  short-lived  prospect.  First,  as  the  recent 
- 44  -experience of the Japanese semiconductor  industry illustrates,  the dependence 
on export demand makes an economy like that of Japan very vulnerable to changes 
in the global  economic  climate,  a  slow-down of  world demand  having  immediate 
repercussions.  Furthermore, if disenchantment with the multilateral system were 
to lead not just to continuation of the status quo in multilateral cooperation, 
but to an actual regression into more  active national or regional isolationism 
and  a  concomitant  increase  in protectionist measures,  "non-essential"  imports 
from  Japan could well be considered by  some  as a  prime target.  Equally,  in the 
longer  run,  other  countries  which  have  the  technology  could,  in  a  protected 
environment, undertake production of products which under a  liberal regime could 
be produced more  competitively in Japan. 
In addition,  the Japanese  economy  is more  dependent  than the  larger and 
more  diversified economies  of  the Community  and  the United  States on  imported 
raw  materials  and  energy  products.  This  makes  Japan  even  more  immediately 
vulnerable  to  economic  and  political instability in its suppliers.  It also 
relies heavily on  trade substitution through direct investment  in its largest 
markets and has an interest,  therefore,  in the maintenance of a  relatively open 
world economy. 
It may  be true that the imperfect state of the present multilateral system 
offers Japan certain advantages which would  be circumscribed if more  effective 
multilateral rules were  to be developed.  However,  these would  seem  to be out-
weighed by  the dangers of  a  check on  further multilateral cooperation or,  even 
more  so,  of a  breakdown of  the existing regime.  It is probably no  coincidence 
that some  of the more  ambitious ideas regarding multilateral cooperation should 
have emanated  from  Japanese business circles
1
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The  smaller  industrialised  economies  are  also  likely  to  be  more 
immediately affected than either the EC  or the US  in the absence of appropriate 
multilateral  cooperation,  their  dependence  on  an  open  economic  system  being 
generally high.  Not  only would  they bear the direct economic costs,  they would 
also have  a  smaller margin of manoeuvre  in terms of policy alternatives unless 
they were  to align themselves  with one or another  regional bloc. 
One  of the advantages of a  common multilateral regime is that it provides 
a  more predictable environment for policy making.  The  increased difficulty in 
predicting  how  different  players  will  act  in  the  absence  of  multilateral 
cooperation  and  the  consequent  uncertainty  surrounding  the  extent  and  the 
distribution of the costs of developing appropriate  multilateral structures, 
means  that all industrialised countries,  as well as developing countries,  have 
an interest in promoting multilateral cooperation.  The greater stability that 
this  would  provide  should  facilitate  the  taking  of  a  long-term  view  by 
governments and encourage economic growth.  A stable economic environment with 
a  comprehensive  and  effective  multilateral  regulatory  framework  offers  an 
increased  likelihood  that  all  economies  would  benefit  from  the  further 
development of the world economy. 
Proposal  for  a  wor7d  economic charter,  which  would  include  harmonisation of costs  in  terms 
of  salaries  and  dividends,  by  Akio  MORITA,  the  Cha1rman  of  Sony,  in  an  article  in  "Le 
Monde"  07/04/1992,  p.  24 
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Globalisation  of  economic  activity  and  hence  growing  economic 
interdependence is an inescapable fact,  although its implications are not always 
fully recognised or understood. 
Policy  makers  have  to  adapt  their  thinking  and  their  policies  to  this 
trend if they  are to succeed in managing  economic developments  to the benefit 
of  their  societies  as  a  whole.  A static  and  fragmented  approach  to  policy 
making will fail to take into account  the growing  interlinkages and overlap of 
interests which are eroding traditional concepts of so-called national economic 
interests.  A  longer-term approach to economic policy-making is more  necessary 
than ever before. 
International economic interdependence means that competing economies have 
a  common  interest in assuring macroeconomic  stability,  an  open  world  economic 
system and  a  multilateral framework of rules and institutions to manage  global 
economic activity. 
Economic  liberalisation alone will  not  resolve structural problems  such 
as  unemployment  or  outdated  production  infrastructures,  but  it  can  be 
instrumental  in creating the overall economic  growth which will facilitate the 
necessary restructuring.  The  root causes of the problems have to be tackled by 
appropriate measures to educate and retrain workforces,  to encourage investment 
and  modernisation  of  capital  bases,  to  promote  R&D  etc.  It is  important, 
therefore,  that governments take the domestic measures necessary to assure the 
political viability of a  policy of economic openness.  It is self-defeating for 
individual countries to try and alleviate structural problems by protectionism. 
Sustained economic growth in the new  market  economies  and the developing 
countries,  and their integration into the emerging global  economic  system will 
benefit  the  industrialised countries  as  well.  It is  in  the  interest  of  the 
latter to promote world-wide  economic development. 
In  an  interdependent  world,  the  traditional  adversarial  approach  to 
multilateral negotiation or coordination is becoming increasingly inappropriate. 
Genuine  multilateral  cooperation  calls  for  a  widespread  recognition  of  the 
commonality  of  interests  engendered  by  economic  globalisation,  even  among 
competing economies.  Public awareness of the real interests at stake should be 
increased.  This will  in turn permit  governments  to undertake the multilateral 
initiatives required to manage  an  interdependent  world economic  system. 
- 46  -TABLE  1:  ANNUAL  GROWTH  OF  WORLD  GOP  AND  MERCHANDISE  TRADE  GROWTH, 
1961-1992  (%  change  in volume) 
YEAR  GOP  TRADE 
1961  5,0  4,5 
1962  6,4  6,5 
1963  4,5  12,2 
1964  7,2  10,9 
1965  4,0  6,5 
1966  6,4  7,6 
1967  3,6  5,7 
1968  5,8  10,8 
1969  6,6  121 1 
1970  4,1  8,6 
1971  5,0  7, 0, 
1972  5,7  8,4 
1973  7,2  12,0 
1974  1 , 6  5,3 
1975  0,0  -7,2 
1976  6,6  11, 8 
1977  4,6  4,2 
1978  3,7  4,7 
1979  3,7  5, 1 
1980  1, 3  2,5 
1981  1 '5  0,5 
1982  0,5  -3,0 
1983  2,5  2,5 
1984  4,5  8,0 
1985  3,5  2,5 
1986  3,0  4,5 
1987  3,5  5,5 
1988  4,5  8,5 
1989  3,5  7,0 
1990  2,0  5,0 
1991  0,5  3,0 
1992  1, 5  4,0 
1961-70  5,3  7,7 
1971-80  3,9  5,3 
1981-90  2,9  4, 1 
Sources:  EUROSTAT 
GATT 
- 47  -TABLE  2:  MERCHANDISE  TRADE/GOP  RATIO.  1960-1990 
World 
OECD 
EC  (12)  intra  +  extra 
EC  (12)  extra 
EFTA 
USA 
Japan 
Eastern Europe  (1) 
PECOs 
USSR 
LDCs 
Latin America  (2) 
Africa 
North Africa 
Middle  East  (3) 
South & S.East Asia 
NIEs 
China 
1960 
18.5 
18.0 
30.4 
18.6 
43.4 
6.9 
19.3 
12.2 
16.3 
7.3 
30.4 
27.8 
36.5 
41.6 
38.2 
25.3 
67. 1 
10.6 
1970 
20.6 
21.4 
34.6 
16.8 
47.6 
8.2 
18.8 
13.2 
20.4 
7.2 
29.0 
21.6 
35.0 
38.6 
42.8 
26.4 
17~:g 
5.9 
1980 
33.4 
34. 1 
46.3 
22.3 
58.0 
17.8 
25.5 
17.6 
24.4 
11.5 
48.6 
27.4 
48.1 
56.8 
76.2 
54.7 
110.3 
12.9 
1985 
29.6 
30.4 
51.8 
23.7 
59.2 
14.6 
22.7 
17.9 
21.3 
12.5 
39.7 
25.6 
33.5 
35.2 
42. 1 
52.2 
15.4 
1990 
30.0 
30.9 
45.5 
18.7 
53.3 
16.9 
17.7 
12.2 
15.5 
9.7 
46.4 
22.1 
41.3 
37.4 
40.6 
71.4 
119.6 
16.4 
(1)  Eastern Europe:  Albania,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Germany  (former 
Democratic Republic),  Hungary,  Poland Romania  and  the  former  USSR. 
(2)  Including Caribbean 
(3)  Middle East:  Bahrain,  Cyprus,  Iran,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Lebanon, 
Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Syria,  Turkey,  United Arab Emirates  and 
Yemen. 
Sources:  UN  Handbook  of  international trade and development  statistics, 
latest issue. 
Eurostat  1990  6A  and  Eurostat Basic statistics of  the Community. 
Chelem 
- 48  -TABLE  3:  PRODUCT  COMPOSITION  OF  WORLD  EXPORTS,  1970-1990 
(Percentage based on value data) 
SHARE  IN  WORLD  EXPORTS  AVERAGE  ANNUAL 
CHANGE  IN  EXPORTS 
1970  1980  1990  1980-89  1990 
Merchandise  81  83  81  4  1/2  13 
Commercial  services  19  17  19  6  1/2  17 
100  100  100 
Agricultural products  16  1/2  12  1/2  10  3  1/2  6  1/2 
Mining products  12  22  11  1/2  -4  1/2  17  1/2 
Manufuctures  50  45  1/2  57  _- 8  13  1/2  -.· 
Transportation  8  1/2  7  1/2  6  3  1/2  15  1/2 
Travel  5  1/2  4  5  1/2  8  1/2  20  1/2 
Other private  6  6  7  7  1/2  15  1/2 
services and  income 
Source:  GATT 
- 49  -TABLE  4:  FOREIGN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT  INWARD  FLOWS,  BY  REGION  AND  1980-1990 
(Millions of dollars) 
Host  region/  1980-1985  1988  1989  1990  % SHARE 
economy  (Annual  average)  ·1990 
WORLD  43  831  158  289  195  153  183  835  100 
Developed 
regions/countries  37  179  128  556  165  385  151  970  82 
European 
Community  1  4  690  54  278  75  492  88  871  48 
Other Western 
Europe  1  237  3  205  7  086  10  070  5 
United States  18  742  59  420  70  560  37  190  20 
Japan.  325  -520  -1  060  1  760  1 
Other developed 
countries  2  475  8  386  9  027  ·8  136  4 
Developing 
regions/economies  12  634  29  718  29  756  31  776  17 
Africa  1  411  2  325  4  446  2  196  1 
Latin America 
and  the 
Caribbean  6  035  11  443  8  363  10  055  5 
Western Asia  379  690  447  1  004  0,5 
East,  South and 
South East  Asia  4  644  15  017  16  218  18  328  1  0 
Central and 
Eastern Europe  17  15  11  89  0,04 
Source:  WORLD  INVESTMENT  REPORT,  New  York,  1992 
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TABLE  5:  INDUSTRIAL  SECTORS  WITH  THE  HIGHEST  SHARE  OF  PRODUCTION  BY  FOREIGN  ENTERPRISES  ( *) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
II  4. 
5. 
France 
( 1988) 
Computers 
71% 
Chemicals 
45% 
Electronics 
33% 
Non-met.  products 
27% 
Machines 
24% 
Germany 
( 1 989) 
Computers 
78% 
Chemicals 
39% 
Food,  beverages 
21% 
Automobiles 
20% 
Basic metals 
17% 
Italy 
( 1  989) 
Computers 
63% 
Electronics 
55% 
Chemicals 
30% 
Food,  beverage 
15% 
Machines 
12% 
U.K. 
( 1  989) 
Computers 
65% 
Automobiles 
56% 
Chemicals 
37% 
Electronics 
30% 
Basic metals 
22% 
USA 
( 1 989) 
Other manuf. 
30% 
Japan 
( 1  989) 
Chemicals 
11% 
Non-met.  products  Machinery/e~ 
29%  2% 
Chemicals  Basic metals 
27%  1% 
Basic metals  Other manuf. 
22%  0.6% 
Electronics  Paper, printing 
19%  0.5% 
(*)  Production from  foreign-owned enterprises and enterprises with foreign participation as  a  share of  total 
production in industry in each country 
Source:  OECD,  Industrial  Policy in DECO  countries,  Annual  review 1992 TABLE  6:  THE  GEOGRAPHICAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF  PARENT  MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS  AND  FOREIGN  AFFILIATES  (Numbe~) 
HOST  REGION/ 
ECONOMY' 
World  total  (1) 
Developed countries 
of  which: 
France . 
Germany 
Japan 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Developing economies 
of  which: 
Brazil 
China 
Hong  Kong 
India 
Malaysia 
Republ±c of  Korea 
Taiwan 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Commonwealth  of 
Independent States 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
PARENT 
CORPORATION 
35  000 
30  900 
2  000 
6  984 
3  331 
1  115 
2  750 
3  000 
1  533 
3  712 
3  800 
576 
553 
500  ( 3) 
176 
153 
668 
405 
300 
68 
66 
58 
20 
FOREIGN 
AFFILIATES  (1) 
147  200 
73  400 
3  671  (2) 
10  978 
2  884 
2  799 
3  411 
13  582 
62  900 
7  110 
15  966 
2  464 
926 
578 
2  821 
4  764 
10  900 
2  296 
2  140 
2  168 
3  527 
YEAR 
1990 
1989 
1984 
1990 
1990 
1989 
1986 
1992 
1981 
1989 
1989 
1986 
1988 
1982 
1988 
1981 
1988 
1988 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
( 1 )  Represents  the number  of  foreign affiliates as reported by host 
countries 
( 2) 
( 3) 
For  1·971 
For  ff989 
Source~  UN  WORLD  INVESTMENT  REPORT  1992,  New  York,  1992 
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TABLE  7:  EMPLOYMENT  IN  FOREIGN  AFFILIATES 
(Thousand) 
Japan 
Annual 
Subsidiaries in:  1980  1990  growth ( %) 
Asia  401  484  1  1  9 
North America  82  368  16, 2 
canada 
Europe  33  127  1 4, 5 
Rest of world  186  177  -0,5 
WOrld  701  1157  5, 1 
Manufacturing  605  922  4, 3 
source:  OECD,  Industrial  Policy in OECD  countries, 
' 
Germany  USA 
Annual  Annual 
1980  1990  growth ( %)  1980  1990  growth ( %) 
133  177  2, 9  829  1416  8 
393  498  2,4 
914  945  0, 5 
711  11 00  4, 5  2767  2708  -0,3 
506  553  0, 9  21 31  1552  -4,4 
1743  2328  2, 9  6640  6621  -0,04 
1 31 2  1638  2, 2  4429  4189  -0, 8 
Annual  review 1992 TABLE  8:  CROSS-BORDER  MERGERS  AND  ACQUISITIONS  MADE  IN  EUROPE  BY 
ACQUIRING  COUNTRY,  1989/90 
1989  Jan-Jun  1990 
ACQUIRING  VALUE  TOTAL  VALUE  TOTAL 
NATIONS  (BN  ECU)  NUMBER  (BN  ECU)  NUMBER 
us  13.8  185  5. 1  89 
EUR12  26.2  768  14.4  458 
JAPAN  1.5  54  0.8  26 
Rest of  the world  3.8  268  1  0. 1  175 
TOTAL  45.3  1275  30.4  748 
1989  Jan-Jun  1990 
TARGET  VALUE  TOTAL  VALUE  TOTAL 
NATIONS  (BN  ECU)  NUMBER  (BN  ECU)  NUMBER 
EUR12  43.9  1148  26. 1  672 
Other  Europe  1.4  127  4.3  76 
TOTAL  45.3  1275  30.4  748 
Source:  CEC,  Panorama of  EC  industries,  1991-1992,  Luxembourg,  1991 
- 54  -TABLE  9:  MERGERS  AND  MAJORITY  ACQUISITIONS  IN  EC  INDUSTRY  AND  SERVICES  (*), 
1986-1991 
(Number) 
1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91 
NUMBER  OF  OPERATIONS  220  514  687  947  724 
COMMUNITY  (1}  57  108  163  237  165 
INTERNATIONAL  ( 2)  19  64  75  127  1  01 
TOTAL  CROSS-BORDER  76  172  238  364  266 
NATIONAL  144  170  211  219  192 
TABLE  10:  ACQUISITIONS  OF  MINORITY  HOLDINGS  AND  JOINT  VENTURES  IN  EC  INDUSTRY 
AND  SERVICES  ( *),  1986-1991 
(Number) 
1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91 
NUMBER  OF  OPERATIONS  428  685  677  900  1020 
COMMUNITY  ( 1 )  57  104  126  196  332 
INTERNATIONAL  ( 2)  78  114  96  153  99 
TOTAL  CROSS-BORDER  135  218  222  349  431 
NATIONAL  158  249  233  202  158 
(*)  Distribution,  banking  and  insurance.  Data  collected  from  specialist  press 
regarding operations  involving  the  1000  leading  firms  in  the  Community  (ranked 
according to turnover),  the 500 largest industrial firms worldwide and the largest 
firms  in the service sector. 
(1)  Operation of  firms  from different Member  States 
(2)  Operation  of  firms  from  Member  States  and  Third  Countries  with  effects  on  the 
Community  market 
Source:  CEC,_XXIst  Report  on  Competition Policy  1991,  Luxembourg,  1991 
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THE  EC  AND  GLOBAL  ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  1 
Professor  L.  TSOUKALIS,  university  of  Athen.S,  Director  of  EconOmic 
Studies,  College of Europe,  Bruges 
This paper is divided into three main parts: it starts by  examining the 
position of  the European Community  in the international division of  labour;  it 
then continues  with a  discussion of  EC  policies aimed  at influencing economic 
exchange  with  the rest  of  the  world;  and it concludes  with  some  observations 
regarding the main issues facing the Community  in the context of an ever growing 
international economic interdependence and the options available. The di'scussion 
about  policy  options  revel  ves  around  three  main  themes:  further  internal 
construction  (or  'deepening'  in the Community  jargon},  regionalism  (which also 
includes further enlargement},  and multilateralism. 
(i)  The  EC  in the International Division of Labour 
With  successive  enlargements,  the  EC  has  become  by  far  the  biggest 
trading bloc  in the  world,  accounting for  approximately  20%  of  world exports, 
a'figure which  excludes  intra-EC  trade.  Adding  the share of  the United  States 
and Japan,  we  reach almost one-half of total world trade,  which  is yet another 
reminder  of  the dominant position of  the Triad in the international economy. 
In  terms  of  imports  and  exports  of  goods  as  a  percentage of  GDP,  the 
openness  of  the  EC  as  a  whole  is comparable  to  that  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States;  the latter country having registered a  substantial and steady increase 
in its trade openness since the early 1970s  (see Figure 1;  Annex  I}.  The  figures 
for  the  EC  show  considerable  fluctuations,  especially  during  the  last  two 
decades,  which  have  been  largely  due  to  changes  in  commodity  prices  and  most 
notably oil.  There  is,  however,  no  indication of  a  significant  upward  trend, 
even when  we  exclude energy products from this calculation (see also Commission, 
1993a}. 
Thus,  on  the basis of  the above  simple  indicator,  it appears  that  the 
trade openness of the EC  has not changed much  over a  period of thirty years.  Is 
this fact compatible with the growing literature on  economic globalization and 
interdependence? On  the one hand,  what  is true for the EC  as a  whole is not also 
true  for  the  individual  member  countries  which  have  experienced  a  steady 
increase  in  their  trade  openness  due  to  the  increase  in  intra-EC  trade  as  a 
percentage of  GOP  (Table  1;  Annex  II}.  This applies to both goods  and services. 
There was  a partial reversal of this rising trend during most of the 1970s which 
was,  however,  largely compensated by  the faster growth of extra-EC trade during 
the  same  period.  Accession effects,  following  the enlargements  of  1973,  1981, 
and 1986,  have contributed to the growth of intra-EC trade,  which now  represents 
approximately  60%  of  total  trade  for  the average  EC  country.  Trade statistics 
for  individual  member  countries  are  still  relevant,  since  many  policy 
instruments,  both micro-and macro,  remain in the hands of national governments. 
This  paper  draws  heav1ly  on  Tsoukalis  (1993);  Bekemans  and  Tsoukal1s' (1993).  Outi 
a  Jaaskelainen  and  John  Watson  have  worked  as  research  ass1stants  for  the  preparation of 
n  the  paper. 
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member  countries of  the  EC  becomes  even  more  pronounced  if trade figures  with 
other  European  countries  are  added  to  those  of  intra-EC  trade.  Thus,  for  an 
average  EC  country  (and  this  is  also  broadly  true  of  EFTA  members), 
approximately  three-quarters  of  its total  trade  takes  place  within  the  wider 
European  area  (Table  2;  Annex  III).  Regional  self-sufficiency  is  likely  to 
increase  further  as  a  result of  successive  rounds  of  enlargement  of  the  EC  in 
the  future  and  the progressive liberalization of  Central  and  Eastern  European 
economies. 
On  the other hand,  statistics on merchandise trade are not the only and 
certainly not the most reliable indicator of interdependence.  In recent  years, 
foreign direct investment  (FDI)  flows  have been growing much  faster than world 
trade,  leading  to a  significant restructuring of  world production,  especially 
in services and high technology goods  (for an extremely useful and comprehensive 
survey  of  recent developments,  see also Commission,  1993b).  This  has  been  the 
phase of widespread and rapid diffusion of new  technologies accompanied by major 
institutional  innovations.  Restructuring at the global  level  also needs  to be 
considered  in  conjunction  with  the  establishment  of  wide  'networks'  and 
cooperation  agreements  among  firms,  covering  the  whole  range  from  R&D  to 
marketing and distribution.  The  rapid growth of  trade in intermediate products 
and  intra-company  trade are also consistent with  the  trend  towards  the  inter-
nationalization of production. A similar,  and indeed much  more pronounced,  trend 
can be observed with respect to financial  markets.  And  this is directly linked 
to  technological  developments  and  the  rapid  liberalization  of  all  capital 
movements.  Capital is much  more  mobile  than either goods or  labour. 
Increasing  economic  internationalization  is  an  undeniable  fact,  and 
there  has  been  a  considerable  acceleration of  this process  during  the  recent 
period.  Yet,  references to the  'global economy'  seem  premature and can only be 
made  under  poetic  license.  Political  boundaries  are  still  far  from  being 
irrelevant,  and this also applies to the EC  which has reached the highest stage 
of  integration of  national economies. 
The  surge  of  FDI  in  the  EC  during  the  second  half  of  the  previous 
decade,  combined with the wave  of mergers  and acquisitions,  is directly linked 
to the process of  economic restructuring at the world level.  But  there is also 
some  evidence  to suggest  the  existence of  a  '1992 effect',  in other words  the 
anticipation of  a  truly unified market  in Europe,  on  investment  behaviour  and 
the  geographical  orientation  of  the  strategic  alliances  pursued  by  European 
firms.  The  increasing number  of  cross-border mergers,  acquisitions  and  joint-
ventures,  together with the ever extending economic  'networking'  among  European 
firms have characterized the latest phase of European integration which has now 
gone beyond simple trade;  hence a  qualitatively different phase of integration. 
In  this  respect,  intra-European  and  international  developments  have  been 
inextricably  linked,  even  though  the effect of political initiatives taken at 
the  EC  level can by  no  means  be denied. 
The  big bulk of external  EC  trade has always  been intra-industry trade 
in manufactured goods,  although some  important changes have  taken place in the 
position occupied  by  the  EC  in  the  international division of  labour  over  the 
years.  Machinery and transport equipment which accounts  for  the big bulk of  EC 
exports  shows  a  steadily  increasing  import  penetration.  This  is particularly 
true of  motor vehicles;  but it is also true of several dynamic  sectors,  with a 
high  technology  content  and  very  rapid  rates  of  growth,  such  as 
telecommunications equipment, office machines, and data-processing. With respect 
- 62  -to those sectors,  the decline of the EC  export/import ratio has been very rapid 
indeed.  The  Community  has  remained  a  big net  exporter  of  chemicals  and  steel; 
and it has also retained a  strong presence in the up-market of relatively weak-
demand  sectors such as textiles and clothing.  Several  studies  have  pointed to 
the  unfavourable  pattern  of  export  specialization  for  the  EC,  the  poor 
geographical  spread because of  the heavy reliance on  slow-growing economies  in 
the developing world,  and the increasing import penetration (Buigues and Goybet, 
1989). 
Although the above observations are generally true of the EC  as a  whole, 
generalizations of this nature conceal  enormous  differences  among  the Twelve. 
The  commodity  structure  of  external  trade  for  a  country  such  as  Portugal  or 
Greece  is  closer  to  that  of  some  developing  countries  than  the  commodity 
structure of  Germany's external trade.  There are also important differences in 
terms  of  the geographical  orientation of  trade.  All  these help to explain why 
member  countries have  tended to squint  in different directions. 
(ii)  Characteristics of  EC  Policies 
The  EC  started basically as  an  incomplete  customs  union,  which  meant 
that the common  external tariff constituted the building block of its fledgeling 
international  role.  With  the  gradual  deepening  ·of  integration,  new  common 
instruments have been created,  while there has also been a  shift in the division 
of external economic competences between the EC  and national institutions. There 
is a  wide range of policy instruments which can be used by political authorities 
in order to influence cross-border economic exchange.  Some  of these instruments 
have long since been transferred to the EC  level,  while others have remained in 
the preserved domain  of  the nation-state.  In between,  there has  always  been  a 
wide grey area where the division of power between different levels of authority 
has been ambiguous  but also changing.  This is the counterpart of  the grey area 
which exists  in terms  of  internal policies,  the boundaries  of  which are still 
in the process of being redefined because of the internal market programme;  and 
the same  will be  true in the  future  because  of  EMU. 
Are regional integration and international liberalization complementary 
or competitive objectives? There has never been anything approaching unanimity 
on this issue in the Community,  and the situation is unlikely to change'much in 
the future.  Yet,  experience seems to suggest that, generally speaking,  regional 
integration  in  Europe  has  not  taken  place  at  the  expense  of  international 
liberalization. Trade creation has greatly exceeded trade diversion (agriculture 
being a  notable exception to the rule).  Furthermore,  a  large part of this trade 
diversion  has  been  compensated  by  the  extra  growth  generated  by  regional 
integration.  It  can  also  be  argued  that  the  very  existence  of  the  EC  has 
contributed to trade liberalization in the context of  GATT,  partly acting as a 
catalyst  when  the  Community's  trading  partners  tried  to  minimize  the  trade 
diversion effects arising  from  internal  EC  decisions  and partly by  helping to 
bring about  a  shift in the attitudes of  member  governments. 
Early  GATT  negotiations  have  contributed  to  the  liberalization  of 
international  trade  mainly  through  the  reduction  of  tariff  levels  and  the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions. But many  international trade practices 
have since developed on the margin or even completely outside GATT  legality; and 
most  have  figured prominently  on  the  agenda  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  The  EC  has 
had,  of  course,  its fair  share  of  such  practices.  Thus,  the  trade  liberalism 
manifested  through  the  low  level  of  its  common  external  tariff  needs  to  be 
qualified in several respects due to the extensive use of other instruments of 
- 63  -external  protection  (including  subsidies,  'voluntary  export  restraint 
agreements',  and  anti-dumping}  which  varies  considerably  from  one  sector  to 
another. 
There  are  two  broad categories of  products subject to relatively high 
protective barriers in Europe which can be distinguished  (Jacquemin and Sapir, 
1990},  with agriculture perhaps forming a  third category of its own.  On  the one 
hand,  there  are  labour-intensive  products,  with  low  R&D  intensity,  such  as 
textiles  and  clothing,  footwear  and  shipbuilding,  characterized  by  growing 
import  penetration by  the developing countries.  In these  cases,  international 
trade is close to  the  Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm  of  comparative  advantage based 
on  different  factor  endowments.  European  protection has  been  aimed  mainly  at 
resisting and/or slowing down  the process of adjustment  imposed by  the loss of 
comparative advantage. 
On  the other hand,  there are products with high R&D,  large economies of 
scale,  and·  learning curves,  such as  telecommunications,  consumer  electronics, 
and  office  equipment,  where  the  steady  loss  of  market  shares  by  European 
producers is mainly due to competition from  the United States and Japan.  Modern 
strategic trade  theories  seem  to  be  more  relevant  to  those  products.  The  new 
theories  of  international  trade  put  the  emphasis  on  economies  of  scale  and 
imperfect competition. Comparative advantage is not seen as given; it is largely 
created,  and  governments  can play an active role  through policies directed at 
investment,  education  and  R&D.  If  there  is  market  failure,  then  the  most 
relevant question to ask is about the probability of government failure (limited 
information,  vulnerability  to  interest  group  pressure  etc}  and  the  danger  of 
retaliation from other countries.  Thus,  the answer is no  longer clear cut as in 
the good old days of Ricardo.  In the words of Krugman  (1987},  'free trade is not 
passe,  but ±t is an idea which has irretrievably lost its innocence.  Its status 
has shifted from  optimum  to reasonable rule of  thumb'. 
Multilateralism  is  a  principle  that  the  Americans  fought  hard  to 
establish  as  one  of  the  foundations  of  the  post-war  international  economic 
order,  and the Community  has been traditionally one of  the worst offenders.  In 
the  meantime,  the  Americans  have  themselves  discovered  the  virtues  of 
regionalism.  Trade  preferences  have  been  an  integral  part  of  EC  commercial 
policy,  and this has  ~ed to the construction,  in a  rather absent-minded manner, 
of  a  pyram±d  of privilege in which different countries or  groups  of  countries 
occupy  successive  layers.  The  Community's  privileged  partners  include  EFTA 
members,  the countries of  the Mediterranean and  the ACP.  Since the dismantling 
of  the  Sov-iet  empire  and  the  collapse  of  communist  regimes  in  Central  and 
Eastern Europe,  the countries of the region have been progressively climbing up 
from  the bottom of this pyramid of privilege. 
Since  the  1970s,  the  Community  has  made  a  greater effort to reconcile 
preferential agreements with Article XXIV  of GATT.  Such agreements are supposed 
to cover a  'substantial' part of  trade,  while liberalization should take place 
within  a  'reasonable'  length  of  time.  Furthermore,  the  actual  economic 
significance of preferential concessions has been reduced by the lowering of the 
common  external tariff and the adoption of the Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP).  The distinction between European and non-European countries in the group 
of  the  Community's  prfvileged  partners  has  become  increasingly  clear  and 
relevant  in  terms  of  policy.  This  distinction  is  linked  to  the  prospect  of 
further  .enlargement.  For  the  'non-European  countries,  privilege  has  been 
increasingly  defined  in  terms  of  trade  concessions  without  reciprocity  and 
financial assistance. 
- 64  -EC  trade preferences cannot be understood in purely economic terms.  Keen 
on  making  its mark  as  an  international  actor  and also  interested in exerting 
influence in certain areas,  the Community  has had to resort to the use of policy 
instruments  which  were  actually  available  to  it.  In  other  words,  trade 
pr;ferences can be largely explained in terms of the frustration of an economic 
giant  which  has  remained  for  long  a  political  dwarf.  The  wide  discrepancy 
between  political  objectives  and  economic  instruments  at  the  EC  level  has 
provided the foundation stone for the construction of the pyramid of privilege; 
and  even  though,  perhaps,  narrowed,  this discrepancy is unlikely to disappear 
after Maastricht. 
Another  feature  of  EC  policies  is  their  predominantly  defensive  and 
reactive  nature;  and  the  contrast  with  the  aggressive  unilateralism  which 
sometimes characterizes US  policies is quite striking. This has much  to do with 
the high  degree  of  decentralization of  the  European  political  system  and  the 
wide  economic diversity  inside the  Community.  It has  been as much  true of  the 
role of the EC  in successive GATT  rounds as it has been of trade preferences and 
specific sectoral policies. 
The  link between the internal market programme  and the Uruguay Round  is 
quite typical.  The  White Paper of  1985  was  marked  by  the absence of any serious 
consideration  of  the  external  dimension  of  the  internal  market.  The  European 
response to the American initiative for a  new  round of  GATT  talks was  initially 
entirely defensive. Yet,  the fears expressed about 'Fortress Europe'  have proved 
unfounded.  The  implementation of  the internal  market  programme  has  not  led to 
higher levels of external protection; if anything, it has contributed to further 
international  liberalization,  at  least  in  certain  areas  (e.g.,  capital 
movements,  banking).  On  the other hand,  had it not been for agriculture,  the EC 
would have appeared as one of the more  eager participants of the Uruguay  Round. 
There is also an  interesting comparison which can be drawn between the 
EC  internal  market  programme  and  the  Uruguay  Round.  Many  i terns  on  their 
respective agendas have been similar;  attempts to tackle the multitude of non-
tariff barriers and the extension of  jurisdiction to new  areas and most notably 
services.  The  internal  market  programme  has  involved  a  strong  element  of 
deregulation,  although on this subject the jury is still out.  Yet,  deregulation 
has gone hand in hand with new  rule setting  (frequently based on a  combination 
of  minimum  common  standards  at  the  European  level  and  mutual  recognition  of 
national  rules  and  regulations),  the  development  of  common  policies  and  the 
transfer of powers to central institutions; not to mention the strengthening of 
redistributive instruments  (see Structural Funds)  intended,  among  other things, 
to make  liberalization more  palatable to the economically  weaker  members.  And 
all  this  became  possible,  even  though  being  the  result  of  long  and  painful 
negotiations,  because  of  the  considerable  similarity  of  economic  and  social 
values,  the  long  history  of  cooperation,  the  existence  of  an  elaborate 
institutional  machinery,  a  well  established  legal  order  and  common  long-term 
political goals.  GATT  is hardly comparable,  and this fundamental difference is 
bound to operate as  a  major  constraint  on  the  liberalization process  on  which 
the members  of  GATT  have  been engaged. 
To  the extent that there is a  fledgeling.European policy on industrial 
structures,  the emphasis  seems  to be  on  competition policy  which applies both 
to  private  enterprises  and  also  increasingly  to  state  aids  and  nationalized 
fif~s.  Otherwise,  public intervention at the European level is mainly directed 
at the promotion of  R&D,  especially in high technology sectors,  and inter-firm 
collaboration across national borders.  The  internal market programme was  mainly 
- 65  -directed at  those sectors in order to enable European  firms  to take  advantage 
of  the  economies  of  scale  of  a  true  common  market.  However,  in  view  of  the 
limited policy instruments available,  the relatively scarce financial resources 
and the weak  legitimacy of central institutions,  this can only be far short of 
an activist industrial policy. It will remain instead a  very mild version of the 
old policy of national champions which it has partially replaced.  Title XIII of 
the  new  Maastricht  treaty may  suggest  an aspiration to  move  gradually  in this 
direction,  but  even if such a  move  does  take place,  it is likely to happen at 
a  very  slow pace.  In a  world of strategic trade interaction,  and assuming that 
this is a  correct description of current economic  reality,  the  EC  is bound to 
remain  for  long  a  weak  player.  But  this  will  be  all  to  the  good  for  free 
traders. 
In terms  of  sectoral policies,  agriculture and steel stand out  as  the 
main exceptions of strong interventionism at the EC  level.  With respect to both 
sectors,  the  emphasis  has  been on defensive policies,  including  a  whole  range 
of measures of external protection,  aimed at resisting adjustment.  However,  some 
signs of  a  change  in attitudes have  appeared in more  recent  years. 
In the macroeconomic field,  EC  policy has been rather less than the sum 
of  its  national  parts.  Intra-EC  cooperation  has  remained  at  the 
intergovernmental  level,  and  this  was  true  even  when  the  EMS  was  close  to  a 
system  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  with  the  DM  acting  as  the  'anchor'  of  the 
system.  The  Community  as such has played until now  little role in international 
policy  coordination,  to  the  extent  that  such  coordination  has  indeed  taken 
place. 
(iii}  Issues and Policy Options for the Future 
The  major challenge for the EC  in the foreseeable future will be how  to 
reconcile  the  objective  of  further  internal  construction,  closely  linked  to 
wider  political  goals,  with  its role  and  responsibilities  as  a  regional  and 
international  power.  And  it  will  certainly  not  be  an  easy  task.  The  wide 
discrepancy between economic and political integration,  which  can be presented 
in different  terms  as  the  uneasy  coexistence  of  an  increasingly  European  and 
international  economic  reality with national political units,_ could act  as  an 
important  constraining  factor  on  further  economic  integration.  On  the  other 
hand,  the persistence of high unemployment rates and growing economic inequality 
in  European  societies  will  make  the  task  of  building  a  political  and  social 
consensus  behind new  liberalization measures  at the  Community  level  even  more 
difficult. 
At  the  same  time,  the  EC  is  faced  with  the prospect of  a  never  ending 
process of  enlargement,  since virtually every European country is now  aspiring 
to full  membership.  Even  if most  of  those countries  may  have  to remain  in the 
waiting  room  for  many  years  to  come,  with  some  new  status  of  associate 
membership,  the Community will still need to improve considerably market access 
for  their  exports,  often  directly  competing  with  those  of  the  economically 
weaker  countries and  regions of  the  EC,  and  also undertake  the biggest  burden 
of financial aid for those same  countries.  True,  trade liberalization may  be in 
the  long.  term beneficial ·for all European countries concerned.  But  as  long as 
there  is  no  significant  improvement  of  the  macroeconomic  environment  and 
unemployment  remains  at socially dangerous  levels,  public attention is likely 
to  focus  on  the short-term adjustment costs. 
- 66  -With  the  exception  of  a  few  politically  stable  and  economically 
prosperous  countries,  most  of  whom  are  anyway  expected  to  join  the  Community 
sooner rather than later,  the whole of the Community's  immediate neighbourhood 
is unlikely  to be  a  model  of  stability in the  foreseeable  future;  and this is 
cl~arly meant as an understatement. This applies not only to Central and Eastern 
Europe but even more so to most countries in the Mediterranean w~ere demographic 
growth,  economic stagnation, and Islam can produce a very explosive mixture.  And 
the large waves  of  immigrants  should be expected to swell  further.  · 
Serious  internal problems  in the Community  and perceived threats  from 
the East and the South could therefore lead to much  introspection and impotence 
at the international level.  This is a  real risk.  Yet,  the EC  cannot· shut itself 
off  from  international  markets  nor  can  it ignore  the  effects  of  increasing 
economic  interdependence  at  the  world  level.  As  the  European  experience  very 
clearly  shows,  liberalization cannot  procee~ much  further without  joint rule-
setting  and  common  management.  This  applies  to  FDI  but  also  to  economic 
regulation  relating-to  consumer  and  environmental  protection,  not  to  mention 
different  forms  of  government  intervention intended  very clearly to  influence 
the allocation of resources and which are often lumped together in this strange 
category  called  non-tar~ff  barrier~  (which  are  supposed  to·  be  abolished 
altogether?). 
As  a  major international economic actor,  the EC  has a  clear interest in 
the  development  of  common  rules  and  the  strengthening  of  international 
institutions for  the more  effective management  of  interdependence,  even though 
experience  would  suggest  that  it is  mainly  the  less  powerful  member~ of  any 
system who  need most clearly defined rules and supranational methods of dispute 
settlement.  However,  this first-best approach,  based on the principle of multi-
lateralism, cannot assume away  the real difficulties and constraints which often 
exist in reaching meaningful  agreements  at the world  level.  The  experience  of 
GATT  and  the Uruguay  Round  in parti:cular is a  good  example-. 
The  EC  has a  strong interest in the successful conclusion of this  (never 
ending?)  round  of  trade  negotiations  and  the  further  strengthening  of 
multilateral cooperation,  including most notably the creation of a  Multilateral 
Trade Organisation with some  real powers.  Yet,  to expect agreement on the basis 
of  anything  more  than  a  very  low  common  denominator  on  important  issues  and 
policy areas,  such as competition policyJ  may  be to expect  too much.  Could the 
members  of the Triad undertake a  joint leadership role in this respect?  On  the 
other  hand,  bilateral_ (see  the  EC-US  agreement  on  competition  policy)  and 
regional arrangements are not always incompatible with a  long-term multilateral 
goal. 
In the macroeconomic field,  the efforts at policy coordination have been 
concentrated within a  small group of highly industrialized countries  (G-7);  and 
the results have not been brilliant.  Coordination has been sporadic and it has 
worked only when  all major players happened to share the same  interests. It has 
focu~sed on  exchange  rate  coordination,  with  some  occasional  coordination  of 
monetary policies and virtually no coordination of fiscal policies. Incompatible 
analytical frameworks and strong domestic political constraints have constituted 
the main obstacles to  a  more  effective international policy coordination.  The 
proposal  made  by  President  Delors  for  the  creation  of  an  Economic  Security 
Council  at  the  UN  level  may  be  a  useful  one;  but  as  long  as  no  great 
expectations about quick and concrete results are attached to it. 
- 67  -It  is  sometimes  argued  that  the  creation  of  EMU  and  hence  the 
replacement of an uncoordinated musical group of Twelve by a  single and stronger 
European  voice  in  international  fora  should  lead  to  a  more  effective 
coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies  at  the  international  level.  This 
expectation  may  be  not  only  illusory,  but  also dangerous.  The  high  degree  of 
decentralization  of  the  emerging  European  political  system  will  add  to  the 
constraints on effective policy coordination.  In a  future EMU,  the President of 
the  ECB  should  be  able  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Community  with  respect  to 
monetary  policy;  but  what  about  fiscal  policy?  The  problems  experienced by  US 
Administrations  in  the  past  in  terms  of  being  able  to  commit  themselves  and 
eventually deliver the goods in international policy coordination, will pale into 
insignificance compared with those to be faced by  Community  representatives in 
the future. 
The  policy  conclusion  is  simple:  multilateral  cooperation  and  joint 
management yes,  but as long as expectations and policies take sufficient account 
of  the  political pluralism  and  the  economic  diversity  which  characterize  the 
international  system.  And  this  is not  necessarily  a  defeatist  conclusion.  In 
certain  cases,  bilateralism  and  regionalism  may  be  second- or  third-best 
solutions.  As  for  the  Community,  its ability  to  play  an  effective role  as  a 
regional and international power will largely depend on the strengthening of its 
own  political system,  the creation of  the necessary conditions for sustainable 
economic  growth  and  the  development  of  policy  instruments  which  can  promote 
internal adjustment. 
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The dominant fact in Europe is mass  unemployment;  the accomplishments of 
four decades of integration,  and specifically the brilliant 1992  strategy,  have 
lost their shine.  A good portion of the electorate wants  to put Europe  on hold, 
or on ice,  and instead pursue narrow national interest policies.  This  comes at 
the very poor time.  The world economy  ios stagnating; worse,  with communism  gone 
transatlantic partnership has lost in apparent importance.  That view,  of course, 
is dangerously  wrong.  There  are  important  tasks  in world  economic  management 
that need cooperation and that should not be sacrificed to parochial issues at 
the national  level.  I  shall bring the  following  arguments: 
The  narrow  European  Community,  even  augmented  with  a  sprinkling  of 
Scandinavia,  is an anachronism.  Widening to the East,  early and fully,  is 
far more  important than carrying forward the 100%  integration scheme which 
seemed plausible a  few  years  ago  and  is now  on the rocks. 
The  world  trade  system  urgently  needs  attention.  Sustaining  GATT  and 
pushing  forward  with  the  Uruguay  Round  is  essential  if  a  relapse  into 
world protectionism is to be  avoided.  The  fuse  is short,  both in Europe 
and  in  the  United  States.  Bad  news  on  the  progress  in  world  trade 
negotiations  would  quickly  take a  toll  in assert markets  and  would  also 
bring to the surface the latent and not the latent call for protectionism 
in many  places. 
Bilateral trade liberalization is a  powerful way  to enhance the scope for 
trade  in goods  and  services  far  beyond  what  can  be  accomplished  in the 
framework  of  GATT.  Europe  and the United States  should  open  discussions 
on  a  sweeping North Atlantic Free Trade  Agreement. 
There  is  a  need  for  a  better  worldwide  mechanism  of  regulation  of  an 
increasing  range  of  services  and  for  dispute  settlement.  A World  Trade 
Organization with a  strong charter and substantial leadership would be an 
asset for  the world economy. 
A priority and  challenge in world trade is to  integrate  India and  China 
as  they  open  their  economies  and  seek  markets.  These  economies  are  too 
large and  too  important to be  treated as  run of  the mill newcomers. 
EMU  has become an obstacle to prosperity;  reenacting stubbornly the 1930s 
only  serves  to  create  even  more  unemployment  and  reaps  no  benefit;  in 
fact,  it even gives  integration a  bad name. 
The notion of introducing capital controls in support of unviable economic 
policies is an  extraordinary retrogression  for  a  modern  market  economy. 
Developing countries are routinely advised  to dismantle  at the earliest 
convenience  such  mechanisms;  it would  be  surprising if they  were  found 
useful  and  productive  for  modern,  open  economies  and  societies.  A good 
policy is a  financial  transactions tax,  but that cannot work  except when 
applied by all major  economies .. 
- 71  -A new  international monetary  system is not  a  good  idea.  The  independent 
pursuit of monetary and fiscal policy,  except for occasional coincidence 
of purpose,  makes  fixed rates impossible.  There is some  room  for de facto, 
broad target zones.  Little else is worth  doing  to contain exchange rate 
movements  in the North Atlantic Area. 
Japan's  continued  closed  markets  are  the  most  blatant  violation of  the 
open world  trade system.  The  United States and  Europe should collaborate 
in opening Japan or else in  impose  a  major  penalty  for  violation of  the 
rules of  the  game. 
A  major  appreciation  of  Asian  currencies,  not  only  of  the  Yen,  is 
appropriate  so  as  to  shift  these  economies  from  export-led  to  a  more 
domestically centered growth. 
(i)  What  Concept of Europe? 
One  Europe?  Yes,  but going far to the East.  The  urgent part is the East  -
not  Italy with  its unacceptable  puberty  pains,  not  Portugal,  Greece  or  Spain 
feasting  at  the  transfer  trough,  not  the  idiosyncrasies  of  a  Brussels 
bureaucracy,  that  has  proven  unable  to redefine priorities  in the  face  of  the 
most dramatic shift of  needs  and priorities.  The  end  of  communism  reminds  us 
what  the  game  is all about  - peace  and  prosperity,  that  is how  Franco-German 
cooperation started - and  this is where  Europe  must start afresh.  There  needs 
to be an alternative to Germany filling the vacuum.  Maastricht is not coming on; 
Franco-German cooperation is the next best alternative.  But  even  that is hard 
to get.  Focus  on  the East  is the essential priority. 
People  in  Poland  or  the  Czech  Republic,  and  increasingly  in  Russia  do 
think of  tbemselves as European and  they want  their claim recognized.  The  two-
speed strategy of carrying the West  to full  economic  and political integration 
whole  the  East  is  left  pout  in  the  cold  cannot  but  breed  instability  and 
ultimately  bad  European politics.  Anyone  who  is  concerned  to contain  Germany 
against an expanding tole in the east must  focus  on the East becoming  an early 
partner rather than a  problem. 
With European mass unemployment,  integrating the East is a  hard challenge. 
But  if  this  does  not  become  the  central  European  task,  Eastern  Europe  will 
become  a  major  trouble  region.  Economic  progress  is  not  being  made  on  the 
requisite scale,  investment  will not  pour  into the region  and  the consequence 
will  inevitably be bad economics,  bad politics,  migration and  instability. 
Spain,  Portugal,  and  Greece  were  brought  into the  EC  to stabilize their 
-economies and open their societies. The  same argument applies to the East today. 
The existing time table makes  less than appropriate concessions to the genuine 
need for fast  and vast action. 
(ii) _ World Trade at the Cross Roads 
The  final  stretch  is  opening  up  for  the  world  trade  policy  race.  The 
Uruguay  Round,  as every year,  has its "last" chance of passing or going on the 
rocks.  Except,  this_time_ the stakes are much  higher;  if we  fail,  there may  not 
be an easy extension since in the U.S.  authority for trade negotiations expires 
and may  not. be  sought  or  renewed  in a  way  that makes  life easier for  reaching 
a  compromise.  Moreover,  NAFTA  is about to go to Congress and is about as popular 
as the Chinese flu.  If NAFTA  and/or GATT  fail,  there is genuine trouble for the 
- 72  -status quo.  All the more reason for Europe and the United States to reaffirm our 
confidence  in an open  trading system and  to recognize the stakes.  World  stock 
markets will go  into a  nose dive if trade negotiations fail! 
Everywhere jobs are at the very top of the agenda and the support for free 
trade falls far short of unanimity.  Organized labor wants protection and there 
is a  risk that the politicians may  go  along,  at least part of  the way.  In some 
countries,  notably  France,  nobody  even  bothers  to  make  excuses  for 
protectionism;  its simply called the  "national interest". 
For many  observers free trade has become  suspect - the benefits seem  less 
obvious because are too many  instances where market access abroad is impeded one 
way  or  another:  landing  rights  for  our  airlines,  lack  of  access  to  public 
tender in Europe,  unfair competition in the aircraft market,a closed Japan, etc. 
Even our managed  trade deals are not coming off as planned and promised.  If the 
benefits  seem  limited,  the  costs  of  an  open  trading  system  are  blatantly 
apparent.  Jobs  all  too  easily  go  offshore  and  labor  markets  opened  to  world 
competition have  gone soft. 
Even if free trade is suspect,  of the options we  have it still remains the 
one  that  best  suits  the  national  interest.  Free  trade  needs  no  apologies;  by 
contrast,  protection is an irresponsible flirtation with a  threat to prosperity 
and  international  security.  The  end  of  communism  has  weakened  the cohesion of 
our international system and poor economic  performance everywhere has added to 
fragility.  Ambiguity in the U.S.  trade policy stance-could all too easily sweep 
in pessimism and a  slide towards trade conflict and the same  is true in Europe. 
Our  exports are there only  as  long as  our  trading partners can earn their way 
to pay for them.  If world trade is shut down,  as it was  in the 1930s,  everybody 
stands to loose. 
Is  there not a  third way,  in between free trade that  "does not work"  and 
the  1930s  that  nobody  wants  to  bring  back?  Can't  we  increase  the  range  for 
managed  trade  where  markets  are  split  up  among  contenders,  each  gets  their 
share,  and that is the end of the game?  We  should be suspicious that some  of our 
most  interventionist  trading  partners  - France  and  Japan  most  prominently  -
actively  favour  such  an  approach.  The  world  and  each partner does  best  in an 
open,  competitive atmosphere and we  should shy away  from static, interventionist 
deals that limit the scope  for  our expansion in the years  to come. 
Europe  and  the  United  States  should  now  assert  unequivocally  their 
commitment  to an open  trading posture.  The  Uruguay  Round  works  on  a 
multilateral basis to open  new  areas  of  increasing interest to  Europe  and  the 
United  States,  including  intellectual  property  and  services  and  to ·start 
bringing  some  rationality  to  world  agriculture.  The  existing  blue  print, 
although  rushed  in  shortly  before  midnight  last  year,  goes  far  to  meet  our 
interests. With proper amendments to offer more liberalization and to retain the 
option of  US  trade sanctions,  it is another important stepping stone on the way 
to free trade.  Against the background of  a  firm and demonstrated resolve to 
pursue an open trading system,  trading partners can and should then take a  very 
assertive  stand  in all  those  areas  where  today  our  rights  and  interests  are 
infringed. 
Soon  we  have  to  cope  with  the  integration of  post-communist  economies, 
India,  and China into the world trade system.  Billions of people who  today live 
in basically closed economies will over the next decade try and participate in 
the  world  trading  system.  We  can't  keep  them  out,  at least not  without  major 
- 73  -security risks.  Better to create a  good,  open  system before this waye  crashes 
fragile resolve and weak institutions.  We  can chose to do things well or poorly, 
but we  cannot escape from the reality that what happens next door and around the 
globe has a  direct impact on our standard of living.  No  country,  not even Europe 
or the United States,  can pretend it is an island onto itself. we  have interests 
around  the world and can prosper best by  spreading our-way of  doing business. 
(iii) North Atlantic Free Trade 
Europe's  focus  on  1992  and  on  building  a  politically  integrated  region 
and,  at  the  same  time,  the  U.S.  focus  on  domestic  problems,  has  detracted 
attention from  cooperative possibilities.  There are compelling reasons to move 
a  North Atlantic Free Trade  Agreement.  Excepting minor areas of friction,  both 
Europe and the United States view North Atlantic trade as a  two-way street. Both 
regions accept broadly  the idea of competition and of openness.  Why  not  make  a 
virtue of it and open up fully.  Specifically,  with high tech trade and trade in 
soft goods becoming more  important,  why  not move  a  Europe style agenda for North 
Atlantic trade. 
One  objection might be that until Europe is complete,  further trade moves 
with the outside threaten the progress  on  the inside.  It might  be  argued that 
there  is  already  too  much  restructuring  and  competition  so  that  it would  be 
unwise  to overload the boat.  Of  course,  the counter argument  is that one might 
as  well  make  the full  adjustment  to a  more  open  economy  rather  than moving  in 
stages that need not  go  in the  same  direction. 
A more  important  argument  in support  of  he  position is political.  There 
is a  great need to reestablish a  sense of common  purpose between Europe  and the 
United States. Building Europe should not become an anti-Us move;  after all, the 
U.S.  has  always  been  in  the  front  line  of  support  for  an  integrating  Europe 
(doubtful  comments  about  the  EMS  notwithstanding).  A  fresh  wave  of  economic 
integration will  broaden  the market,  unify  the  regulatory  framework,m  enhance 
members'  international cost competitiveness and create a  center of gravity that 
is more  nearly ale to compete with the emerging  Asian economies. 
(iv)  World Trade Organization 
Beyond the Uruguay  Round,  the world economy  needs a  cleaner set off rules 
and regulations  than is available  today.  Trade  is spreading to areas  that are 
not  at all regulated  nor  are  they  open at present.  Dispute  settlement  is  too 
arbitrary,  including as  an  extreme  the  u.s.  super  301.  A fresh  approach  is o 
create a central institution that promotes the free and frictionless functioning 
of  world  trade.  GATT  has  been very  good  for  the expanding of  world  trade;  now 
a  further step would help in taking the institutional setting for  world  trade 
a  large step forward. 
Industrial policy,  competition policy,  and  regulation are  issues  on  the 
agenda everywhere.  But they do not or at least should not have national answers. 
Finding  international  answers,  standards  and  procedures  will  make  for  less 
friction and less waste in the world economy.  A World  Trade Organization would 
be  the answer. 
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In  the  ERM  straitjacket,  the  European  economy  in  1993  was  lost  to 
recession and  1994  is unlikely to see recovery.  European unemployment,  already 
at 22  million,  was  expected to rise in 1994  to an all-time high.  The  demise of 
the narrow  ERM  now  opens  the door to far better performance  in most  economies. 
It is entirely wrong to believe that something precious was  lost last week-end; 
on  the  contrary,  the  liberation of  currencies  previously  trapped  in  the  ERM 
offers a  major opportunity to recapture the buoyant spirit that animated Europe 
in the run-up to  1992. 
The  decision  to  loosen  exchange  margins  was  inevitable;  central  banks 
could postpone,  within limits and at escalating cost,  the time of a  crisis, but 
not the ultimate occurrence.  The  markets  understood  the basic dilemma.  T  h  e 
Bundesbank had  made  clear its unwillingness  to cut  interest rates to preserve 
the existing exchange rates.  Whatever the rhetoric,  Denmark,  Spain,  Belgium and 
ultimately France lacked the reserves and the resolve to sustain exchange rates 
at the price of visibly and rapidly rising unemployment.  Uncertainty about  the 
timing and extent of  German  interest rate cuts  and  the urgent  need  for relief 
in  the  distressed  partner  countries  opened  up  a  credibility  gap.  Such  a 
situation always is a  standing invitation for speculators who  understand which 
way  rates must  move. 
Sometimes  currency  speculation  may  deserve  the  bad  name  it  has;  by 
prematurely hardening exchange rates,  the central bankers and finance ministers 
of  Europe  gave  speculators  the proverbial  one-way rise.  Even  so,  in this case 
the  speculators  were  the  best  friend  of  the  unemployed,  and  - even  though  we 
will  not  hear  that  admission  - of  the  monetary  officials  who  had  assumed 
unsustainable  commitments.  There  has  undoubtedly  been  some  loss  of  face  for 
officials who  proclaimed  that  they would  never devalue,  but it would  be  wrong 
to  dwell  on  that;  rather  than  look  back  and  dream  of  punishing  speculators, 
officials need  now  to exploit  the  newfound  freedom  to  fight  unemployment,  of 
course paying due  respect to inflation risks. 
The  decision to maintain the format  of  the  ERM  - exchange rate margins, 
but  15%  - is  sound  and  pragmatic.  The  EMS  was  a  good  convergence  device  for 
quite  a  while  but  it hardened  prematurely  with  the  insistence  that  further 
realignments would destroy the accumulated gain in credibility.  Countries like 
France  or  Belgium  and  Spain  did  not  want  to  throw  away  their  crutches.  With 
narrow  margins  and  no  realignments,  the  room  for  divergent  interest  rate 
developments vanished just at the time when  the high German  inflation made'far 
more  flexibility  highly  desirable.  Everyone  had  conceived  the  EMS  as  a 
disciplining device for  lax Latinos;  ironically now  it became  the victim of  an 
immensely inflationary Germany.  The wide margins adopted in the present form can 
accommodate major divergences in interest rates without the prospect of creating 
yet another crisis,  or at least not soon. 
What  strategies should countries pursue to use enlarged scope for interest 
rates and currency movements?  There is no common  and simple answer  for each of 
the  countries  gaining  freedom  of  maneuver.  All  most  be  concerned  to  avoid  a 
recurrence of  inflation,  a  task  more  easy  for  some  than  for  others.  But  they 
also  must  give  urgent  priority  to  expansion  because  that  is  the  only  way  to 
bring  down  unemployment.  Low  interest  rates  are  the  fastest  affordable  way, 
given actual or  imagined constraints to fiscal action,  to get  there.  Finally, 
they all must  look  beyond  recovery  to  give  more  emphasis  to  the  supply  side: 
more  room  for  incentives,  more  flexibility,  less status quo.  But  beyond  these 
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spelling out. 
France enjoys a  privileged position for action.  With  moderate inflation, 
France can go hard for growth and will succeed.  France should cut interest rates 
rapidly to  reach  a  level  of  4  to  5  percent  in just a  few  months.  There  is no 
reason  to  hold  off.  In  fact,  given  the  long  lags  of  monetary  policy  in 
stimulating  recovery  - particularly  when  unaided  by  fiscal  stimulus,  as  the 
United States demonstrates so clearly - there is no place for complacency.  Even 
with  immediate  action,  it will  take at  least  to  the  beginning  of  1994  to  see 
results in terms  of  growth. 
In the case of Belgium the need for  moderate interest rates is even more 
imperative.  The  extraordinarily high debt  ratio  - perhaps  the  highest  in  the 
world - makes the country hypersensitive to even the appearance of unsustainable 
strategies.  The  country has a  good reputation now,  but it can lose it in no time 
if interest rates stay high. 
Spain  faces  far  more  serious constraints.  Inflation is not  moderate  and 
the  instinctive  response  to  a  weakening  of  the  currency  is  a  resurgence  of 
inflation. Of  course,  keeping the tight money  lid on does not solve the problem. 
Lower  interest  rates  are  essential,  growth  is  paramount,  the  status  quo  of 
pervasive corporatism,  lack of competition and mounting unemployment needs a  co-
operative,  frontal attack. 
That  there is another  way  is demonstrated  by  Switzerland,  Italy and  the 
United Kingdom.  Switzerland has interest rates below 5 percent,  far below those 
of Germany.  The  United Kingdom  when it was  pushed out of the ERM  last fall opted 
for growth and is well on the way,  without signs of strain or loss of financial 
stability. Italy's demise at the hands of speculators became  the foundation for 
growth and for domestic far-reaching domestic reform.  Italy's case demonstrates 
that unions can be farsighted and willing to cooperate in a  growth strategy that 
does  not translate into inflation. 
Interest rate  cuts  cannot  be  accomplished  without  some  depreciation  of 
currencies.  Only with the expectation of an appreciation relative to the DM'can 
a  currency have  lower interest rates than Germany.  The  practical question then 
is  ~ow much,  say,  the  French  Franc  must  decline  to  support  moderate  interest 
rates.  The  necessary depreciation is very  limited,  perhaps  5-7  percent.  After 
all,  France would  just be moving ahead of German  rate cuts by 6-12 months or so 
and that hardly warrants major  swings.  In the case of  Belgium and  Denmark  much 
the same argument applies.  Thus the extent of depreciation need not be large and 
stabilizing speculation can be counted on  to limit the fall. 
There is, of course,  a  strong argument for limiting unnecessary volatility 
and uncertainty by  broadly  and  informally coordinating the strategy among  the 
floaters.  For  interest rate cuts they can travel  together for  much  of  the way 
and  that will limit excess volatility.  Where  they part company  will  depend  on 
their attitude  toward unemployment,  their performance  on  inflation,  and  their 
success  in bringing down  rates without  overly large depreciation. 
If interest rate targeting takes  advantage  of  the newly  gained  room  for 
letting exchange  rates  move  and  growth  resume,  there  is also  the  question  of 
when  to  tighten  the  margins  and  return  to  the  EMU  project.  The  immediate 
priority is flexibility and~ that precludes formal  commitments to unsustainable 
exchange  rate  targets.  There  is  no  reason,  however,  to  rule  out  pragmatic 
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rate cuts have taken place.  Thus we  do not expect major volatility,  just because 
the margins are wide.  Ultimately,  18  months  or 2  years  from  now,  Europeans  can 
reexamine whether the preconditions for stable rates or even monetary union are 
in'.place,  how  to remedy shortcomings,  how  to assure better coordination,  and who 
to proceed. 
Whether  one  day  there  is  a  common  money  or  not,  a  common  Europe  has 
already  shown  its  worth  in  the  establishment  of  a  market  where  goods  and 
services flow freely;  the good name  of Europe will be all the better if further 
integration yields prosperity and not mass  unemployment. 
(vi)  capital Controls? 
The  idea that capital controls should have a  come  back in Europe is very 
disturbing.  (Financial  Times  Sept.  19,  1993).  Capital  controls  are  immensely 
cumbersome  and  mostly  ineffective.  A  monetary  "fortress  Europe"  is  an 
anachronism  and  a  major  intrusion  in  the efficient operation of  markets.  The 
enemy  is not  the speculator but the central bariker  with the wrong priorities. 
Good  economics  combines  a  financial  transactions  tax  which  penalizes 
short-horizon trading with a  very substantial enhancement  of  the profitability 
of  long-term  investments.  The  financial  transactions  tax  penalizes  heavily 
short-run trading but puts virtually zero penalty on the long-term profitability 
of  investment.  The  reason  is that payment  of  a  2.5  per mil  tax  on  a  ten  year 
investment  represents a  negligible fraction of  the principal and  earnings  but 
on  an  overnight  round  trip it would  eat  up  the profits except  on  the hottest 
tips. With this tax, the hurdle rate required to warrant short-term transactions 
is inversely related to the holding period.  A one-night stand would require an 
annualized rate of  return of  more  than  500  percent  to  just pay  the  tax.  For  a 
half-year round trip the hurdle rate is down  to less  than  100  percent  and for 
a  3  year  investment  the burden falls to  less than one-twentieth of  a  percent. 
Clearly the tax is not an obstacle to long term investment.  Investors will look 
for assets that promise serious returns in the  long term,  not  for  a  way  to get 
overnight  returns  from  the  negative-sum  game  of  volatility.  Predictably,  the 
round-trip industry will disappear,  and  good  riddance! 
The  scheme  is in the best  tradition of  the  Chicago  School.  The  economy 
needs  a  favorable  environment  for  capital  accumulation.  The  unreasonable 
treatment of equity and long term investment has taken us to a  point where every 
morning investors look out of the window  to see whether America is still there. 
Debt  burdens  encouraged  by  the  tax  laws  already  impair  the  Fed's  ability  to 
conduct  a- noninflationary  monetary  policy.  CEOs  of  nonfinancial  businesses 
divide their time between litigation and speculation,  rather than focussing on 
investment  in  research,  development  of  technology,  products  and  markets. 
Capitalism blossoms when  business takes the  long view,  unimpeded by  insecurity 
of  property  rights  or  financial  fragility.  We  have  managed  to  undermine 
capitalism's blessings by  turning financial markets overly trigger-happy by  an 
emphasis  on debt-leverage and the short horizon. 
Keynes  in  the  General  Theory  offers  a  description  of  the  difference 
between  "speculation"  which  is geared to making  capital gains  from  uncovering 
the shifting psychological moods  of the market versus "enterprise" which seeks 
to  earn  income  from  the  long-term holding  of  an  asset.  He  notes  the markets' 
pursuit of  short-term capital gains rather than  long-term holding yields: 
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activities of  a  casino,  the  job is likely to be  ill-done.  The  measure of 
success attained by  Wall  Street,  regarded as  an institution of which the 
proper social purpose is to direct new  investment into the most profitable 
channels  in  terms  of  future  yield,  cannot  be  claimed  as  one  of  the 
outstanding  triumphs  of  laissez-taire  capitalism  which  is  not 
surprising,  if I  am  right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street 
have  been in fact directed towards  a  different object." 
Keynes  concludes with the recommendation for  "a substantial transfer tax 
on all transactions ... to mitigate the dominance of speculation over enterprise 
in the United States."  That  advice of  1934  is even more  appropriate today.  In 
fact,  nobel laureate James Tobin has advocated a  variant of this scheme to curb 
excessive  zest  for  speculation  in  international  capital  markets.  In  Tobin's 
scheme a  tax on international currency purchases should "throw some  sand in the 
wheels"  of  international  financial  markets.  Others  have  gone  further  to  argue 
that if sand is not  enough,  use rocks. 
Why  interfere  with  short-horizon  speculation?  Financial  market 
participants must  know  what is best for them.  Who  is to double-guess that their 
individual  profit  maximization  does  not  also  lead  to  the  best  social  use  of 
resources?  The  short-run focus creates an externality in the  form  of excessive 
liquidity.  An  analogy  helps  build  the  case.  Most  sane  people  agree  that  gun 
control is desirable because  an uncomfortably  large number  of  people  do  carry 
guns.  Whatever  they  may  be  maximizing,  it surely  is not  social  welfare.  Gun 
control  disarms  an  overly  trigger-happy  world,  just  as  speed  limits  cool  off 
overly aggressive driving.  Liquidity is of  the same  nature;  it cries out  for a 
tax that curbs the excess.  We  all want  to be totally liquid,  all the time;  yet 
the  economy's  capital  must  be  held.  Too  sharp  a  focus  on  the  short  run  means 
that the capital stock will adjust;  there will be little and what there is will 
be  short lived and not  the most  productive. 
If most trading takes a  short focus,  most actors in the economy cannot but 
follow  the  same  pattern.  If  everybody  speaks  loudly  we  have  to  shout  to  be 
heard,  if everybody  carries revolvers,  we  have  to carry  submachine  guns  to be 
safe.  And  if everybody  trades by  the minute,  we  have  to trade by  the second to 
get  ahead.  The  economy  converges  to  a  bad  equilibrium,  far  away  from  the 
productivity  of  capital,  totally  focused  on  the  minute  capital  gains.  Nobody 
stops us  from taking the long view but that would be a  lonely life made  far more 
precarious by the high volatility created by the market's short horizon.  Excess 
liquidity produces an abnormal and counterproductive shortening of the economy's 
horizon;  it spreads  from  financial  markets  to  corporate  suites  and  the  shop 
floor.  It has corrupted America's ability to compete in the world market and it 
urgently needs redress. 
Gun  control would not stop all murder;  poison and knives would make  a  come 
back.  And  speed limits have  not  done  away  with traffic accidents.  A  financial 
transactions  tax  will not  stop  speculation altogether.  But  it certainly will 
help lengthen the horizon and  focus  the mind  of capital markets  on enterprise, 
and  on  investment,  rather than trading. 
Opponents of a  financial transactions tax will be quick to point out that 
it  cannot  work.  Business  will  simply  move  offshore,  to  the  islands  where 
catering to tax evasion is already the chief industry.  True,  some  trading would 
move  offshore.  The  risk  is  easily  exaggerated  and  in  any  event  it  can  be 
checked.  Switzerland,  for  example,  has  a  financial  transactions  tax  and  that 
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not  seek  international  agreement  on  a  world  tax  since  the disease  is clearly 
spreading. 
(vii)  Asian Appreciation 
Over  the  past  two  decades  and  more,  Asia  has  been  enjoying  an 
extraordinary growth  experience.  A virtuous cycle of  high rates of  investment 
and  innovation,  high growth rates of  output  and real wages,  and high rates of 
saving combined with macroeconomic stability yielded record growth rates almost 
without interruption.  And  that process keeps going on.  Japan's recession is but 
a  momentary  setback in a  picture of stunning growth. 
Table  1  Asian Economic  Growth 
1971-80  1981-90  1991-93 
As:i,an  Nics  9.0  8.8  6.9 
S.E.  Asia  7.7  5.5  6.7 
China  7.9  1  0. 1  9.2 
Japan  4.5  4.2  2.7 
Source:  Asian Development  Bank  and  IMF 
Widening access to the world market  and a  dynamic export sector have been 
key  factors  in the  growth  record  of  these  economies.  For  at  least  a  decade. 
large trade surpluses have also been part of  the story.  By  way  of  envy or  just 
curiosity,  the question  arises  whether  the  performance  unduly  benefited  from 
export-led growth,  at the expense of the rest of the world.  Specifically, of the 
many  explanations for Asia's surpluses,  has systematic currency undervaluation 
been an  important  factor?  And  if so,  is there likely to be  a  correction soon? 
We  will  argue that the answer  to both questions is affirmative. 
Asia  has  been  running  surpluses  with  the world  for  more  than  a  decade. 
Moreover,  bilateral  surpluses  with  the  United  States  have  been  growing.  On 
preliminary indications the 1992  numbers,  which are not yet available,  promise 
to show  record levels. 
Asia's surpluses have received a  number  of explanations: 
Asia  saves  at  a  high  rate,  the  rest of  the  world  and  specifically  the 
United States does not. 
Asia has surpluses because the playing field is tilted in their favour. 
Evidence  in support  of  this view  includes  the very  closed nature of  the 
Japanese  economy.  In  other  industrialized  countries  import  penetration  has 
doubled or tripled,  in Japan it has barely moved  from  a  minimal  level. 
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(Percent of  GOP) 
Non-Oil  Manufactures 
1961-70  7.9  2.0a 
1971-80'  7.2  2. 1 
1981-90  6.4  2.4 
1991  5.9  2.9 
1992  n.a.  2.6b 
a1965-70  b1991:4  to  1992:3 
If Japan is closed,  the same  cannot be said of all Asian economies.  Some 
have practice outright openness. Others,  such as Korea have gradually opened but 
reached in the process a  very remarkable level of exposure to world competition. 
For  example,  In  Korea  non-oil  imports  corresponded  in  1991  to 26.5  percent of 
GOP. 
Quality,  marketing,  and  service  have  also drawn  attention as  a  separate 
explanation. 
A further explanation should occupy a  central place:  exchange rates.  Over 
the past decades  Asia  has  been catching up  with  the  United States.  That 
catchup  process  should  ultimately  translate  into  significant  currency 
appreciation,  but that has not yet happened.  In fact,  with the exception 
of  Japan,  Asian  currencies  today  are at  their  1980  levels  or  even  more 
competitive  then  at  the  time.  And  even  for  Japan  the  moderate  real 
appreciation in no way  offsets the enormous gain in market position of the 
past  few  decades.  Unchecked  by  appreciation,  the gains  in manufacturing 
performance translate directly into export-led growth and trade surpluses. 
Table  3  Real  Exchange Rates  in Manufacturing 
(Index  1980-82=100,  data  show  July  1993) 
Japan  -139.2  Malaysia  85.8 
Taiwan  87.3  Thailand  78.8 
Hong kong  123.3  Indonesia  56.2 
Singapore  88.1  Philippines  92.9 
Korea  74. 1 
Source:  Morgan  Guaranty 
There  are  three  reasons  to  expect  a  major  appreciation  of  Asian 
currencies.  First,  in the current situation of  world  weakness  the  evergrowing 
Japanese surplus is an offense. 
The  second  reason  for  appreciation  is  less  immediate  but  as  important. 
Asia is experiencing a  unification project just as occurred in Germany.  Coastal 
China,  Vietnam,  North  Korea  and  Siberia  are  moving  toward  the  market.  Asia 
money,  capital goods technology,  management,  and market outlets are the engines 
of that process.  As  this process  goes  forward,  Asia's  advanced  economies  from 
Hongkong to Taiwan,  Korea  and Japan will run trade surplus with the transition 
economies  and  they  will  be  financed  by  direct  foreign  investment  flows  and 
portfolio capital. 
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As  that  boom  comes,  just as in Germany,  real appreciation is inevitable.  That 
can come  in one of  two  ways:  domestic  inflation or currency appreciation.  The 
preferred  way,  of  course,  is  a  rise  in  all  the  Asian  currencies  in  unison 
relative to  Europe  and  the dollar.  The  reason to take this prospect seriously 
is not only the fact that it is already underway.  More  so,  it is the sheer size 
of  this  transition  region  - far  larger  in  fact  than  Eastern  Europe  and  the 
former  Soviet  Union.  China  is  already  the  second  largest  economy  and,  at  the 
growth rates  we  are seeing today,  it won't  take  much  time  for  the giant  to  be 
H1. 
The  third reason for Asian appreciation is to be found  in Europe  and the 
United States where fiscal tightening is underway.  The phase-in assures that the 
economy  has  a  chance  to adjust to  the budget  cuts without  recession,  but what 
is the adjustment?  Lower  longterm interest rates will help increase  investment 
and a  far lower dollar and European currencies relative to Asia will turn around 
external trade.  While there may  be some  dollar depreciation relative to Europe 
or the other way  round,  the  brunt  of  our gain in competitiveness will  have  to 
be relative to Asia.  We  need trade surpluses,  they can shift their surpluses to 
the Asian transformation economies.  A major currency appreciation will help make 
that adjustment  smoothly. 
Sceptics will ask:  can exchange rates do the trick? Where  is the evidence 
that  a  stronger  Yen  will  mean  smaller Japanese  surpluses?  In the past,  major 
changes  in the  Yen  have not  had  a  stark impact  on Japan's  trade?  An  important 
reason  was  the  way  Japanese  companies  operate.  Rather  than  rapidly  adjusting 
prices  (and hence the trade balance)  the companies would pursue their long term 
strategies even at  a  loss.  Their captive  financial  institutions would  finance 
the  long horizon strategies.  Today  the financial  system is on  the  ropes.  They 
can  no  longer  accommodate  a  extended  adjustment  to  a  tight  exchange  rate 
situation.  Accordingly,  Japanese firms would  be forced to work  more  with prices 
and  that  is  precisely  what  one  expects  in  the  aftermath  of  currency 
realignments. 
That  leaves one more  question:  how  to accomplish the move  in the  Yen?  To 
accomplish  a  major  Asian  appreciation  is  in  the  first  place  a  political 
decision.  Countries such as Hongkong  who  peg the dollar would have to move  just 
as much  as Japan where the exchange rate is closely managed  by the authorities. 
A good move  on the Yen  could come  about if Europe and the United States made  it 
known  that  just this is their agenda  for  the next summit. 
A major currency realignment such as the one discussed here is not without 
precedent.  During  the postwar period Europe  enjoyed export-led  growth,  taking 
advantage of  an  increasingly undervalued currency.  Germany  (like Japan  today) 
had occasional and minor realignments,  but the group held on to an undervalued 
currency despite repeated U.S.  appeals.  Only with the transition to floating in 
the early 1970s was  the situation rectified with a  30  percent U.S. depreciation. 
Just  the  same  is necessary now  in our currency relations with all of  Asia. 
Attention  rightly  focuses  on  opening  up  Japan,  but  the  cumbersome 
diplomacy focuses  on only one  instrument,  the administrative piecemeal  opening 
of one sector or another.  Because there is a  lot of work  to be done in breaking 
d9wn  Japan's closed economy,  we  should use all tools available for the task.  It 
would  be  a  mistake  to  forget  that  currency  depreciation  can  render  sweeping 
assistance in that effort. Moreover,  adjustment is as important for all of Asia 
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currency appreciation. 
(viii)  What  To  Do  About  Japan? 
Japan  goes  through  the  motions  of  participating  in  world  affairs.  But 
missing is the commitment to help build a  better world;  Japan just stands by and 
waits to be told how  much  to pay  and what is the bare minimum  with which to get 
by.  Japan has  strangely been unable to find its way  into the world  community; 
it has  lacked great  leaders  who  shaped  by  the  trauma  of  war  might  have helped 
build  an  open  world  economy  where  economic  nationalism  would  not  be  again  a 
cause of war.  Japan has no strong links to a  world system which it did not help 
build,  and it has  made  few  friends.  Herein lies the risk of  serious conflict. 
Four decades of trade liberalization notwithstanding,  the Japanese markets 
for  manufactures,  for  services  and  for  agriculture  remain  virtually  closed. 
Manufactures cannot make  their way  into Japan,  except when  produced by Japanese 
firms  abroad.  The  difficulty of  access has nothing to do  with special economic 
conditions of the Japanese economy  nor with the shoddiness of  foreign goods.  It 
reflects  a  culture  determinedly  opposed  to  trade  as  a  two-way  street.  That 
attitude  is  increasingly  challenged  by  Europe  and  the  United  States.  It  is 
becoming  more  and more  likely that it will  lead to a  major  trade conflict. 
In  merchandise  trade  and  in  services  it  is  exceptionally  hard  for 
European,  U.S.  or Asian firms to break into the Japanese market.  Firms that have 
cultivated the market for a  long time do sell and,  because margins are extremely 
high,  enjoy  a  profitable business.  But successful firms  ares outnumbered  100:1 
by  those  who  have  not  been  able  to  make  it  even  if  they  try  hard  by 
international standards. 
The episodes are more  than telling.  Security firms that ultimately manage 
to cut through bureaucracy and get registered in Tokyo,  find their bond  issues 
boycotted.  Manufactures  find it impossible  to cut  through the complexities  of 
trade access.  Service firms find it impossible to compete in public tender.  The 
game  is rigged and it takes an age to make  headway.  By  then Japanese competitors 
have  in place the  technology,  innovation,  or  financial  product  that a  foreign 
firm  was  trying to introduce. 
Of  course,  there are messages  to the contrary.  Successful  foreign firms 
operating in Japan sing an "all-is-well" chorus which is not really persuasive. 
We  are told that US  firms are making profits in Japan.  What  is surprising about 
this?  US  firms  make  profits  everywhere;  what  is  suspect  is  the  need  to  even 
assert it.  In fact,  the very profitability of  these firms  has  probably more  to 
do with the closed Japanese markets where margins are phenomenal  than with the 
achievements  of  the chosen  few  firms  who  have gained access. 
Japan tells us that most  problems lie abroad:  US  budget deficits and the 
poor  quality  of  American  goods.  Or  else,  that  Japan  is  not  closed  but  must 
export  manufactures  goods  to  compensate  for  its  lack  of  natural  resources. 
Finally,  that  Japan  may  have  been  closed  in  the  past  but  liberalization  is 
underway  by  leaps  and  bounds.  These  arguments  either  miss  the  point  or  run 
counter to the facts.  The  mechanisms that close Japan to outsiders are not clear 
- neither  tariffs  nor  quotas  play  a  role  - but  by  any  definition  Japan  is 
closed. 
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compared  to  other  industrial  countries.  In  Europe  the  ratio  is  more  than  10 
percent of  GNP.  Even  the United States,  a  far  larger country,  has still twice 
the Japanese  import penetration ratio. 
Table  4  Import Penetration in Manufacturing 
Canada 
Germany 
UK 
us 
Japan 
Consumption Share 
1975  1985 
19.5 
22.9 
14.2 
5.5 
4.7 
38.7 
31.7 
33.2 
12.9 
5.3 
GNP  Share 
1980  1989 
14.0 
12.0 
13.2 
4.5 
2.4 
18.8 
15.6 
17.9 
7.1 
3. 1 
Note:  The  data refer to manufacturing. 
Source:  OECD  "The  OECD  Compatible  Trade  and  Production  Data  Base:  1970-85". 
Paris,  mimeo,  1988.  GATT  and  IMF 
Korea's  import  penetration in manufacturing'is  18.7 percent- six  times 
that  of  Japan.  Of  course,  Korea  is  a  developing  country  and  hence  the  ratio 
might be high for that reason.  But this would suggest that Japan might have had 
a  high penetration ratio in the past.  In Japan manufacturing imports have moved 
between  1 . 5  and  3  percent  of  GNP,  without  much  change  for  a  quarter  of  a 
century. 
GATT  rounds  of  trade  liberalization  and  major  swings  in  exchange  rates 
have done almost nothing to change Japan's openness.  This evidence supports the 
view that Japanese protection is like an onion;  it has multiple layers like an 
onion and the inner most are cultural,  not the conventional restrictions in the 
form  of quotas  or tariffs. 
Considering  next  the  entire  range  of  non-oil  imports,  the  Figure 
represents  a  dramatic  portrait  of  Japan's  situation.  While  Germany's  import 
penetration increased steadily,  that of  Japan actually declined over  the  past 
3  decades. 
Intra-Industry  Trade.  In  open,  developed  economies  consumers  have  the 
advantage  of  choosing  from  a  broad  range  of  product  qualities  and  varieties 
produced throughout  the  world.  Given  the diversity of  consumer  tastes and  the 
specialization of firms,  any country would both import and export consumer goods 
or  capital  goods  in  many  categories.  Intra-industry  or  two-way  trade  is  the 
common  experience of  advanced countries. 
The extent to which countries do  pursue two-way trade is readily measured 
by  an  index which assumes  a  value of  1  when  trade is completely  two-way,  i.e., 
in a  particular commodity  group  imports  equals exports.  The  index reported in 
the Table  5  assumes  a  value of  zero when  trade is a  one-way street. 
- 83  -Table  5  Intra-Industry Trade  in Selected Manufactures 
(Index:  One  Way=O,  Two-Way  =1) 
Category  Germany  S.Korea 
Finished Manufactures  .72  .72 
Machinery  & Transp.  Equip't.  .66  .94 
Elect.  Mach.  & Apparatus  .89  .68 
Automotive  Products  .71  . 91 
Textiles  .90  .33 
Source:  GATT  International  Trade 
Japan 
.33 
.25 
.27 
. 1  7 
.36 
All  three  countries  are  resource  poor.  Korea  and  Japan  have  their 
geography  and transport costs to the West  in common;  Korea  is poor while  Japan 
and  Germany  are rich.  Whichever  way  we  look at  these  data,  Japan  is severely 
closed  to  intra-industry  trade.  Any  story  of  resource  endowments,  geographic 
location or the state of  development  simply fails. 
In  Japan  protection  is· at  work,  by  invisible  hand.  There  is  no  other 
explanation  for  a  value  of  intra-industry  trade  of  finished  manufactures  in 
Japan of  0.33 versus  0.72  for each,  Korea  and Germany.  A good specific example 
is  automotive  products.  Germany  does  have  superior  products  and  even  so  has 
intra-industry  trade  with  a  two-way  index  at  0.71  In  Japan  the  corresponding 
number  is an entirely absurd 0.17. 
Japan does not practice two-way trade. Manufactured goods are produced and 
exported,  they are rarely imported.  To  some extent resource endowments inf  1 uence 
the index:  clearly,  a  country without natural resources will be a  net exporter 
of manufactures to pay for oil imports.  Yet,  the puzzle is this:  why  does  Japan 
look so different from Germany?  Germany does not have natural resources anymore 
than  Japan.  Do  Japanese  consumers,  unlike  consumers  everywhere  else  in  the 
world,  not  like imports?  Or  are they still taught  to save  foreign exchange  and 
favor  home  industry  as  might  have  been  plausible  in  the  immediate  postwar 
period? Or are there mechanisms we  cannot see that plainly keep imports out? The 
skyrocketing of imports when liberalization does occur lends weight to this last 
hypothesis. 
Radical,  rapid and complete opening of the Japanese market is now  a  must. 
But it is not  enough  for  Japan  just to start catching up with other countries. 
Moving  too  late  and  too  little means  a  path  straight  to  trade  conflict  and 
beyond. 
Japan must  make  a  real and determined effort to become  a  leading,  active 
part of  the world  system.  Japan  must  recognize that there are  two  ways  to go. 
Either  the  country  participates  in  a  system  of  common  goals  and  common 
responsibilities where the largest countries drive the initiatives and bear the 
burdens,  or else Japan divides the world and builds its new  Asian empire,  based 
on confrontation and hostility to  the  West. 
Dissatisfaction in America with its own  performance  and rising populism 
in  response  to  the  middle  class  squeeze  will  make  America  increasingly 
antagonistic.  Therefore the state of  limbo cannot last;  Japan should be  nudged 
to act. 
- 84  -In the 1930s,  access to markets and access to raw materials were the issue 
and with ineffective sanctions the aggressors drifted toward war.  Just as in the 
1930s,  there are no plausible  sanct~ons against large countries who  do not play 
by-·the rules of  the  game.  Unless  Japan  looks at the  1930s,  at the arrogance of 
Pearl  Harbor  and  the  tragedy  of  Hirosnima,  the country  once  aga~n puts itself 
at  odds  with  the  world.  The  time  ~s  particularly  appropr~ate  for  a  maJor 
initiative:  Europe  is opening  to  the  Eas~ to  stem  ~ne  t~oe of  m~gration,  the 
United States is opening  to  Lat~n Amer~ca.  Japan needs  to  open  to  ~he world. 
Japan has grown up and is looking  ~o define a  role  commensura~e with her 
economic strength. It is as well to  ~r~gger the search for  tna~ ~dent~ty ana let 
Japan choose whether she is w~lling to be part of an open  ~rading sys~em or look 
for  another  role.  We  are  ambivalent  abou~ Japan,  fearful  of  Japan bashing and 
uncertain  about  triggering  trade  confl~ct.  Japan  is conscious  of  our  lack  of 
resolve and exploits it to the fullest.  Where  we  go  wrong  is in assuming that 
a  showdown  can  and  should be  avoided. 
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- 86  -Hain speakers in the debate: 
1.  lfr ALBERT,  Executive Chairman of Assurances Generales de France, 
Paris 
Mr  Chairman,  I  am  in a  position of weakness as I  have not had the 
time  to read  the papers  which  I  found  upon  my  arrival.  My  comments 
will therefore have to be somewhat off-the-cuff,  but this is possible 
as we  have just heard two  speeches which were each,  in their own  way, 
excellent. 
If I  may  reply to you,  Professor DORNBUSCH,  who,  as we  all know, 
has the gift of being provocative -with this gift, Professor,  I  think 
that  you  could  make  a  career  in  the  media  and,  indeed,  you  have 
perhaps already begun to do so.  This gift is due to the fact that you 
have,  first and  foremost,  an  overall  world vision.  You  have  a  very 
wide-ranging  and  enquiring mind,  which  is particularly alive  to  two 
facts.  The first is the need for a  new  way  of thinking to ensure that 
China and India are now  integrated into the international economy.  I 
believe  that there is  a  danger  of  us  being  slow  to realize this.  I 
also believe that you are right to say that Western  Europe  and North 
America have many  problems  in common  and that it is important that an 
in-depth  agreement  should  be  reached  between  these  two  regions.  I 
agree with that,  particularly as  we  face  many  problems. 
Another  important  point  is  that  free  trade  is  even  more  of  a 
thorny issue given that we  are facing a  period of recession.  You  are 
quite  right  on  that  point  and  it is clear  that  a  great  deal  is at 
sta~e in the Uruguay  Round. 
However,  we  should  not  forget  that  major  social  and  political 
problems  in  many  countries  are  tied  up  with  the  problems  of 
international trade. 
I  was  impressed  by  a  book  which  has  just  been  published  in 
Belgium  by  a  leading  Belgian  figure,  Andre  Ley sen,  entitled  'Le 
Retournement'  (Reversal).  I  was  intrigued to see that,  in the opinion 
of  this  former  Chairman  of  the  Belgian  Employers'  Federation,  this 
reversal  is  now  related  to  the  problem  we  are  discussing.  Leysen 
begins  by  quoting  the  figures  presented  by  Jacques  Delors  in 
Copenhagen  showing  how  the  Community's  share  of  international  trade 
has decreased over the last 20  years and,  more especially,  showing the 
European Community's  ineffectiveness when  it comes  to creating  jobs. 
Leysen goes on to say that,  in order to remain within the world sphere 
of  interdependence,  the  Belgians  must  radically  modify  their social 
welfare system. 
I  do  not  need  to tell  you  that  this is set  to  become  a  highly 
topical  issue and  perhaps not  only in Belgium.  So  I  come  back to  my 
point that you spoke about world organization and not only about world 
trade.  I  think  that  we  must  bear  in mind  that  the  subjects  we  are 
discussing  are  not  merely  trade  transactions  and  that  social  and 
political aspects underlie these subjects-.. 
- 87  -This leads me,  Professor DORNBUSCH,  to admit that I  was  shocked to hear you 
say that Europe is an anachronism.  This is a  phrase often used by the media but 
it could  not  be  more  inaccurate.  The  only  benefit  it  may  have  is  to  help 
provide us  with what  we  lack most  in Europe,  namely,  stimulants.  By  the very 
sharpness of your criticism you may  have a  stimulating effect upon us.  But,  for 
example,  when  you  say  that  the  European  Monetary  System  is  an  obstacle  to 
development,  I  find it hard to agree with you  for at least  two  reasons. 
The  first  is  that,  since  the  EMS  upheavals,  (September  1992  and 
August  1993),  nearly  all  businesses  in  the  European  Community  have  been 
obliged to take out exchange cover,  which clearly constitutes not only an extra 
expense  but  also an  obstacle  to  the  preparation of  projects  and  investments. 
The  more  we  look at  the medium- and  long-term,  the more  the  lack of  a  stable 
exchange  rate  system  becomes  a  handicap  for  two-thirds  or  three-quarters  of 
trade.  In other words,  failing a  European monetary system,  we  will not have  a 
single market.  We  will  have  an  incomplete  market  which  will  be  volatile and 
separated out into its component parts.  This is one of the reasons why  I  truly 
believe that we  must not treat this subject lightly. 
I  also wonder  whether  you are not going a  little too far when  you put all 
the Asian currencies into the same  category.  You  say that the Asian currencies 
should be  revalued  by  around  30%,  but it seems  to  me  that  a  little more  of  a 
distinction  should  be  made  with  regard  to  certain  countries,  such  as  South 
Korea,  Malaysia and  Indonesia,  which are running a  current account deficit. 
These  comments  lead  me  on  to  tell  you  why,  on  the  other  hand,  I  agree 
wholeheartedly with Professor TSOUKALIS.  I  think that he was  right to emphasize 
that we  are,  as has been said,  an economic giant and a  political dwarf,  but an 
economic giant in the process of breaking up;  if we  do not get organized,  in the 
monetary field first of all and then,  as rapidly as possible,  in the sphere of 
political union,  we  shall cease to be an economic giant and I  fear that we  might 
even  revert  to  being  a  quarrelsome  entity.  You  have  shown  how  our  European 
experience  was  truly an example  for  the building of  a  better world because  we 
were able not only to improve trade amongst ourselves at regional level but also 
to open  up  to the world outside. 
I  should like to draw attention to two  experiences in the past which were 
highly significant.  In the first place,  let us  suppose,  Mr  Chairman,  that we 
never had the Treaty of Rome,  the European Community or a  common  external trade 
policy.  Let  us  suppose,  for  example,  that  instead of  having had  a  negotiator 
for  30  years or more  in international bodies  and,  in particular,  the  GATT,  we 
had had  12  negotiators.  Do  you not believe that the addition of  12  countries -
all different from one another - in the negotiations would have imposed far more 
obstacles than those same countries united by their single negotiator?  This is 
at least one  reason why  Europe is not  an  anachronism. 
And  I  would add that the processes by which European integration began are 
worthy of consideration today.  As  you know,  European integration began with the 
ECSC  (European  Coal  and  Steel  Community)  Treaty.  As  you  also  know,  shortly 
after the entry into force of the ECSC  Treaty,  we  witnessed a  structural  cr~s~s 
in the coal industry and a  slower crisis, although also a  structural one,  in the 
- 88  -steel  industry.  At  that moment,  Professor,  we  in Europe  had  the organization 
which was  most characteristic of all the Community  undertakings,  namely,  on the 
one  hand,  the  desire to  open  up  competition,  with  competition  law  prevailing 
within the European Community  and,  at the  same  time,  methods  of  financial  and 
social intervention which ensured that the developments were not too drastic or 
too· intolerable  in  social  and  political  terms.  The  experience  of  the  ECSC 
initially and the European  Customs  Union  subsequently  gave  us  an appreciation 
of  what  transition  entails,  it  fostered  in  us  the  art  of  taking  into 
consideration  the  fact  that  the  economy  does  not  consist  solely  of  goods  or 
transactions but  also  of  human  beings,  families  and  cultures.  Today,  rather 
than forgetting the value of this experience at a  time when,  for example,  we  are 
seeing so many  drastic redundancies in the motor industry,  we  must remember that 
the  European  Community  certainly  accomplished  its  task  with  regard  to 
international  economic  integration  in a  wise  manner  which  deserves  to  be  not 
only extended but also imitated.  Thank  you  Mr  Chairman. 
- 89  -2.  G.  SINCLAIR,  Deputy  Permanent  Secretary  of  Sistema, 
Latinoamericano  (SELA),  Caracas  (Venezuela} 
Econ6mico 
Let  me  begin  with  the  paper  of  Prof.  TSOUKALIS.  I  would  like  to 
congratulate him  very  sincerely for  what  seems  to us  to  be  a  truly excellent 
document.  It is a  thorough,  accurate and  thoughtful  assessment  of  the role of 
the  European  Community  in  the  global  economy.  It describes  well  the  changes 
taken place in that Community  and the reasons  why  the Community  has  to change, 
particularly changing  trends  towards  greater emphasis  on  intra-european self-
sufficiency.  The  analysis  suggests quite rightly that there is likely to be  a 
readier  spread  of  economic  activity:  production,  trade  flows,  commercial 
cooperation  within  the  region  than  on  a  global  level.  His  treatment  of  EC 
policies highlights two  areas that are of special interest to Latin America and 
the Caribbean,  both the areas of  low  technology production such as clothing and 
footwear and that of agriculture have been the focus of continued discussion if 
not  disagreement  within  the  Community.  His  argument,  that  there  has  been  a 
reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  Community  to  agree  to  dismantle  protective 
mechanisms coincides with our own  contention in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
I  will,  therefore,  not  take issue with you  on that. 
There  is  a  very  important  conclusion  in  the  section  on  policy  options 
which holds a  lesson for observers of european integration as well as for those 
who  are striving towards  achieving  integration.  That  is the need  to reconcile 
future internal construction,  whether widening or deepening,  with the role and 
responsibilities of the integration body within the region and internationally. 
Some  more  general  observations,  one  relating  to  the  question  of 
definition:  He  did  say that it was  not correct to speak right  now  of  a  global 
economy.  I  agree  with  this  view  because  there  is  a  lack  of  the  necessary 
structure,  mechanisms  and rules  to allow us  to  speak  of  the true existence of 
a  global  economy.  But  I  think  we  need  to  be  careful  whether  we  use  economic 
internationalisation  and  economic  interdependence  interchangably.  For  me  the 
concept of interdependence connotes a  level of mutuality of impact or of effect; 
effect or impact that is not necessarily symmetrical;  often it is asymmetrical; 
it is not necessarily mutual either; it is often not mutual.  There is certainly 
a  widening of  production processes and  economic  interactions.  It is debatable 
to  what  extent  that  constitutes  mutual  impact,  or  worse,  mutual  benefit.  It 
seems  that  what  we  used  to  call  transnationalisation  or  cross-frontier 
activities are being used as  a  synonym  for  interdependence.  There is a  subtle 
but  important difference. 
I  would  like to raise now  one  perspective of  the  EC  and  what  that  body 
signifies to the outside world:  How  we  in Latin America  and  the Carribbean see 
the  EEC.  The  EEC  is  a  whole:  to  a  large  extent  it is a  unified  group  but  in 
another  real  sense  the  EC  is  also  the  sum  of  its parts.  The  paper  of  Prof. 
TSOUKALIS  addresses very well the functioning of the whole:  less well I  suggest, 
does it address the functioning of the disaggregated parts of the Community.  If 
we  are  to  look at the  G-7  for  example,  we  see  that  there  are  four  EC  Member 
states participating,  plus the Members  of  the Commission.  To  some  extent it is 
correct  to  say  that  these  members  participate  in  the  G-7  in  an  individual 
capacity representing their individual  countries.  But  I  think it is  naive  to 
believe  that  these  countries  do  not  to  some  extent  reflect  a  common  European 
perception  that  is  bred  of  the  EC  experience  and,  therefore,  reflective  of 
shared  objectives  among  the  Community.  In  other  words,  we  all  see  the  four 
contributions as  Community  perspectives.  The  point  I  am  making  is that  the  EC 
- 90  -does  have  a  presence  and  an  impact  in the world quite outside that manifested 
by its formal  institutional manifestations.  That presence lies in the voices of 
its individual  members  particularly for  us  in Latin America  and  the  Caribbean 
as  heard  in  the  pronouncements  of  the  G-7.  I  would  contend  that  in  order  to 
determine  fully  the role of  the  EC  in global  economic  interdependence  we  have 
to examine the roles of its individual Member  states and see how  they contribute 
to  interdependence  and  the  extent  to  which  those  states  represent  common  or 
allied positions which might  then be representative of  the Community. 
Another  general  feature  which  will  demand  further  examination  is  the 
impact  of  internal  developments  on  the  outside  world.  The  paper  does  great 
justice  to  internal  developments  as  constraints  to  or  inputs  in  EC  common 
policy.  Those developments are part of a  dynamic economic process whose effects 
extend well beyond the confines of the EC  into other regions of  the world such 
as Latin America and the Caribbean.  A clear example of this is the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
Finally if we  were to transfer the basic premise of the analysis from  the 
EC  to the global  level  then  the prospects  for global  economic  interdependence 
do  seem  quite  daunting.  What  the  European  experience  demonstrates  is  the 
difficulty of reconciling disparate political objectives and authorities as well 
as  economic  inequalities  among  the  Twelve.  That  reality  suggests  that  the 
achievement  of  joint  management  and  rule  setting  at  a  global  level  which 
economic  interdependence  would  seem  to require,  is extremely difficult except 
under  the undesirable condition of  the  imposition of wills by  the powerful.  I 
am  not  very  certain  of  the  effectiveness  or  the  usefulness  of  an  Economic 
Security  Council.  I  think,  in this  regard  we  are  ad  idem.  But  once  again,  I 
think that is a  truly superb study. 
Now  if  I  may  turn  to  Prof.  DORNBUSCH's  paper  I  would  also  like  to 
congratulate  him  very  sincerely.  I  think  that  as  a  macro-economic  study  this 
approach is a  very brilliant and a  very thourough one.  But  looking at this from 
the prospective of the Latin American Economic System we  would have liked to see 
some  geopolitical,  some  real  world considerations  introduced there.  The  paper 
says  that  for  Europe  the  focus  on  the East  is  an  essential priority.  It does 
recognise that integrating the East is going  to be  the hard challenge and  I  am 
not  necessarily  disagreeing  with  this.  But  we  would  have  liked  to  see  some 
attempt at least at tracing the dimensions of that challenge.  And  we  are looking 
at  these  states  against  the  background  of  recent  experience  in  the  case  of 
Germany.  That experience was  dramatic and traumatic.  What  we  saw  on CNN  did not 
necessarily represent the feelings of the majority of Germans,  but it represents 
the  feeling  of  a  minority  of  Germans.  Nevertheless  there  were  some  important 
negative manifestations  and  the process  of  opening  towards  the  East will  have 
to take account of similar feelings in Germany  and in other countries of Europe. 
What  it  shows  is  that  in  the  context  of  Europe's  current  unemployment  and 
recession,  opening to the East is a  process on which individual governments will 
have to take bold and hard internal decisions. All because of the consideration, 
as he said himself,  of national interest.  Such opening is going to be viewed by 
all Western European states in the scale of national interest. Each one is going 
·to be putting in place its own  attempts at limiting what he considers to be the 
damaging effects of  opening to the East. 
This makes  me  think,  therefore,  that to the extent that it is possible to 
identify a  first priority and  a  second priority,  that first priority might  be 
trying  to  put  Europe's  economic  house  in  order.  I  think,  when  that  is  done 
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undertaking. 
With regard to the Uruguay  Round,  we  in our region do not believe that it 
is enough simply to reaffirm confidence in an open trading system as is called 
for  in the paper  of  Prof.  DORNBUSCH.  We  have  no  doubt  that Europe  believes  in 
such  a  system.  The  problem  is  that  in  our  perspective  seen  from  down-South 
Europe  is preaching one  thing and practising something else.  We  would  like to 
see more  uniformity between  what  is preached and what  is practised. 
My  next point regards interdependence and I  return to this very important 
point which  I  started in connection with the address by  Prof.  TSOUKALIS.  Prof. 
DORNBUSCH  says  that  what  happens  next  door  and  around  the  globe  has  a  direct 
impact on our standard of living.  That is very clear and well said,  but  I  think 
even that is an understatement.  Interdependence is not so easy for us to grasp, 
though it is everywhere  around  us.  One  dimension  of it we  see in the  role of 
CNN,  which  is  bringing  to  the  peoples  of  the  developing  world  in  the  South 
images  of  the  oppulence  that  exists  in  Europe.  And  as  Alfred  SAUVY  said,  if 
capital does not flow to where the people are,  the people will flow to where the 
capital is.  So  I  think of  the  impact  that  CNN,  for  example,  is having  on  the 
developing world,  in relation to reinforcing the contrasts between opulence on 
the  one  hand  and poverty on  the other.  I  think the environment  also  shows  the 
effect  of  interdependence.  What  do  environmental  abuses  in  the  South  do  to 
agriculture  in  Europe?  Here  we  see  a  very  clear  manifestation  of 
interdependence.  The  paper  undoubtedly  recognises  that  the  security  and  the 
prosperity of Europe are inextricably bound with the security and prosperity of 
regions  beyond  Europe,  with the economic  progress  of  the  South,  and  in my  own 
case,  of Latin America  and of  the Caribbean.  We  believe that following  on  from 
such  a  recognition  should  be  a  set  of  corresponding  policies  based  on 
partnership. 
The  paper  recognises clearly that  there is a  pressure  from  the  East  but 
there seems to be a  less clear recognition of pressure from  the South:  from  the 
developing part of the world.  In a  real sense,  therefore,  any consideration of 
Europe and of its future security has to take account of the present and future 
security of Third World countries.  In responding to this our policy should not 
be  simply  to  wait  and  deal  with  the  manifestations  of  these  effects  of 
interdependence  when  they  come  to  our  borders,  but  rather  to  put  in place  a 
number of policies which would try to mitigate those effects even in the places 
where they are taking place. And  these policies should consist,  I  suggest, first 
in  assisting  Third  World  governments  to  resume  a  course  of  economic  growth 
through increased resource flows and through international trade liberalisation 
in the North,  and  secondly  through stabilisation of  the  international  economy 
at  a  level  and  in a  manner  which  takes  account  of  the interests of  developing 
countries. 
My  last  point  has  to  do  with  capital  controls.  We  agree  with  the  very 
sensible  views  expressed  by  Prof.  DORNBUSCH.  The  experience  of  the  Latin 
American and the Caribbean region certainly underscores the great risk inherent 
in speculative capital which can go  just as quickly as it comes.  States of Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  have  had  various  types  of  capital  controls  for 
different reasons.  In our region,  in the 70's till the mid-eighties the popular 
consideration was  that of channelling domestic savings towards local investment 
and preserving selected sectors from  foreign investment.  This was  in accordance 
with the development strategy enforced at that time which accorded a  predominant 
role to the government.  Those sectors which were considered priority benefitted 
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budget  deficits  or  to  subsidise  state  agencies.  Often  the  results  were 
disastrous.  But  whatever  the  successes  or  the  failures  of  these  attempts  the 
entire situation began to change in the context of our policies of reform of the 
ro~e of  the state,  the deterioration of  our  terms  of  trade  and  the decline in 
external  financing.  The  controls  which had been effective for  the development 
of certain industries could no  longer make  up for the weaknesses of the internal 
financial  market. 
While  the  kinds  of  controls  initially  introduced  and  the  reasons  for 
introducing  them  were  convenient  to  all  countries  developed  as  well  as 
developing,  and also the theoretical  framework  is that which the World  Bank  or 
the  IMF  had  defined  the  experience  of  each  government  was  different.  It  is 
therefore difficult to predict what  is going to be the effect of the imposition 
or the lifting of any kind of control on the movement  of capital into or out of 
the  country.  What  is  more,  experience  in  our  region  shows  that  there  is  no 
automatic  relationship  between  modifying  the  external  investment  regime  and 
attracting foreign  investment or the repatriation of capital. 
The  challenge for governments  is to determine what  controls to impose or 
to lift,  and  their timing,  and to assess what  would  be  the short and  long term 
effects of  their decisions. 
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Thank  you  for  your  kind  introduction.  At  the  outset  I  would  like  to 
express  my  gratitude to  the European Parliament  and  to  the  Chairman  DE  CLERCQ 
of  the Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations  and  distinguished  friends  for 
inviting me  to this very  important  Public  Hearing on  Economic  Interdependence 
in  Brussels.  Indeed,  it is  my  real  pleasure  and  honour  to  be  part  of  this 
forum.  I  come  here  with  no  provocative  thoughts  nor  with  results  of  great 
theoretical analysis:  but,  I  come  with a  hard opinion of  the strictly private 
sector from  Asian region.  One  more  excuse:  the two  excellent papers by  the two 
distinguished speakers,  Professors  TSOUKALIS  and  DORNBUSCH,  did reach me,  but 
24  hours before my  departure to Brussels.  Fortunately,  I  have been able to read 
them  during the flight. 
First,  I  will make  some general statements on the implications of economic 
interdependence  on  the  Asian  region  or  on  the  subject  matter  of  this  Public 
Hearing,  and  then,  I  will  continue  with  some  specific  comments  on  the  papers 
presented by  the speakers. 
With  end  of  World  War  II,  the  countries  which  adopted  the  free  trade 
system under  GATT  and  IMF  financial  and monetary  systems were able to register 
sustained  rates  of  economic  growth.  The  Asian  economies,  particularly East-
Asian economies  and today China  coming later,  were  the principal beneficiaries 
of  such  an  economic  order.  Nevertheless,  the  concept  of  non-discrimination 
which is the central principle of  GATT  began to be challenged especially by: 
accelerated structural transformations  in the world economy, 
enhanced economic  competition and, 
the rise of  economic  regionalism. 
With  the global  free  trade  system at the cross-roads  the  Asian  economic 
order  seems  to  be  also  at  a  critical  phase.  There  are  two  opposing  forces 
determining  the direction:  one  by  the necessity to  form  a  region-wide Pacific 
Economic  Community  given the enormity of  the size and the high level of  intra-
regional  interdependence.  Capitalising  on  these  trans-pacific  trends, 
institutions such as  PBEC,  PECC  and APEC,  have been established.  They all aim 
to  strengthen  trans-Pacific  ties,  the  catch phrase  being  "open  regionalism". 
However,  the current economic  trends in the region do  not necessarily favour  a 
trans-Pacific region-wide community.  The  trends concurrently show the political 
potential to divide the region into several sub-regional groupings or free-trade 
areas,  like NAFTA,  AFTA  and  CER. 
Yet,  a  free  trade  area  concept  is  by  nature  only  a  second  best  option 
after "free-trade" itself and possesses an intrinsic danger of becoming inward-
looking.  Let us  look at the NAFTA  for  a  moment.  we  believe in the assurances 
given by  NAFTA  that  NAFTA: 
will not become  a  custom's union, 
will not have  a  common  currency nor  a  common  economic policy, 
will remain as  an  open-ended mechanism. 
Nevertheless,  NAFTA  is an evolving process and it may  disrupt the trans-
Pacific linkage  by  inward-looking potential challenge  and  future direction of 
expansion  which  will  inevitably  provoke  a  similar  reaction  by  East  Asian 
countries. 
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region  have  integrated,  or  are in the  process  of  integrating their  economies 
wi th  .. >the  dynamic  growth  of  the  Pacific  Basin.  The  destiny  of  Asia  will  be 
outward  looking  and  Pacific-oriented.  From  an  East  Asian  perspective,  the 
option of forming an East Asian economic bloc may  not simply be possible for the 
region 
1 s  future  development.  Thus,  Asia  seems  to  have  only  two  realistic 
options: 
strengthening the global  free-trade region, 
reinforcing the trans-Pacific connection. 
Fortunately,  these two  options are  complementary. 
Economic  Interdependence  may  act  as  an  ivisible  hand  to  temper 
nationalistic sentiments of individual countries and guide it towards the common 
good of  the whole  region.  The  solution to problems  such as: 
economic polarisation, 
enhanced competition, 
the rise of  economic regionalism, 
will be to increase the interdependence among  regional economies which,  I  think, 
can  best  be  achieved  by  entrepreneurship  and  individual  initiatives.  I  am 
hopeful  that  a  newly  emerging  global  economy  by  virtue  of  deepening 
interdependence will see: 
explosion in the development  of  technologies, 
rapid exchange  of  information, 
cross-border manufacturing systems. 
This  completes  my  opening  statement  on  implications  of  economic 
interdependence  in Asian region.  Now,  I  would  like to go  briefly through  the 
papers presented by  the speakers. 
In  the  Orient,  there  is  an  old  saying  that 
11 At  Mr  Kim 
1 s  dinner  party 
Mr  Lee  is  not  supposed  to  make  a  long  dinner-speech. 
11  I  know,  I  am  at  the 
European Arena.  However,  in as much  as we  are discussing international economic 
interdependence,  I  would  like  to  have  seen  some  comments  or  a  reference  by 
Professors  TSOUKALIS  and  DORNBUSCH,  in  their  papers  on  the  very  important 
process which is taking place in Asia-Pacific region today.  I  am  referring to 
APEC  process.  President  CLINTON  surprised the Asia  in July with his proposal 
for a  summit  of leaders from  the  15  members  of the APEC  forum.  In other words, 
APEC  process is going  from  ministerial to  summit  level.  The  United States is 
taking the chairmanship of APEC  this year and is exhibiting certain leadership. 
And  we  all know  that Japan is going through a  political readjustment process and 
trade  imbalance  problem  in  the  region  with  Japan  is  not  small.  Stronger  US 
leadership and  initiative for  APEC  process  are probably  more  welcome  at  this 
time,  particularly in countries like Australia and Korea.  We  believe that APEC 
process also is likely to weaken  any Asian regionalism.  The  Atlantic Community 
draws  together the US  and European powers.  Asian is far more  diverse,  but  the 
need  for  trans-regional links would  mean  a  greater urgency as the pace of geo-
political  and  economic  change  quickens  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region.  Economic 
cooperation  through  APEC  provides  a  common  basis  to  build  up  trans-regional 
links. 
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succesful Uruguay  Round.  This has been said before.  However,  the key issues in 
the UR  have to be settled between the United States and the European Community. 
Asia  can continue to grow  even if the  UR  fails,  but at a  slower pace  and with 
far more stresses and strains.  There is no good substitute for GATT.  Asia can 
do  more  in  terms  of  market  access  in  areas  like  rice  and  services.  The 
successful Uruguay  Round  is the single most  significant way  in which the world 
leaders could reaffirm their commitments  to multilateralism and do us all some 
economic  good at the same  time. 
Prof.  DORNBUSCH  has mentioned the integration of China,  Japan,  Indochina, 
India and the Middle East.  In the longer term China's impact could be even more 
significant  than  that  of  Japan.  With  its huge  population  and  resource  base, 
China,  no  doubt,  will  become  an  economic  force.  China  is today  an  important 
regional power with growing global influence.  US  deficit with China would rise 
30%  to 24  billion US  Dollars in 1993  and might  soon overtake the deficit figure 
with Japan.  China-Japan relations are the key  relationship in the Asia Pacifc 
region today after US-Japan relations. 
Prof.  DORNBUSCH  has  contributed several  pages  on  US-Japan relations and 
also the deficit problem with Japan.  The  United States is a  significant partner 
in  Asia.  US  diplomatic,  military  and  economic  power  and  presence  are  very 
strong.  Asia  needs  to find ways: 
of  promoting peace  and stability, 
to build up mutual  confidence and, 
to resolve conflicts of  interests in the region. 
This means healthy bilateral relations with the United States and opening 
of  the  market,  particularly  that  of  Japan,  to  prevent  the  American  domestic 
pressures  for  managed  trade  building  up.  After  all,  Asia  needs  an  outward 
looking self-confident United States with a  robust  economy. 
An  appreciation of Asian currency has been mentioned by  Prof.  DORNBUSCH. 
I  would agree on this issue with Monsieur  ALBERT's  comments  made  earlier.  The 
countries  like  Korea,  Malaysia  and  Indonesia  are  still  in  deep  deficit 
situations.  We  do  have chronic trade deficit problems  with Japan.  Therefore, 
I  am  not  sure what  an appreciation really can do.  In  fact,  this year,  Korean 
WON  has depreciated 5  %.  This is by  market  force. 
This will conclude  my  discussion at this time.  Thank  you  to you all and 
Mr  Chairman  indeed. 
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ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE 
Hr Michael  HINDLEY,  lfEP 
First of all,  a  previous speaker was  quite right to remind us that if we 
are  to  have  a  global  economy,  it must  be  a  global  economy  which  takes  into 
account  the  needs  of  all  the  countries  and  all  the  economies.  I  am  always 
surprised when  I  hear people talk about  a  global  economy  being  something new. 
I  say that as  someone  who  is brought  up  in a  small  textile town  in Lancashire 
which  for  200  years has  traded with the world.  The  money  which startet up  the 
Lancashire textile industry had been made  on  the sugar plantations in the West 
Indies  which  were  in  turn  financed  by  the  slave  trade.  It was  money  made  by 
British investment  abroad which  launched the industrial revolution.  Cotton is 
not grown in my  country and all the cotton which the Lancashire weavers used had 
to be imported; at the "high-watermark" mark of the Lancashire textile industry, 
some  80  % of its production,  was  for export.  Therefore It all comes  a  bit of  a 
shock  to  me  as  a  Lancastrian  to  hear  people  say  that  there  is  something  new 
about  a  global  economy. 
What,  I  think, has changed,  is simply that more countries,  more  economies 
had been drawn into the world economy.  Secondly that as more  countries had been 
drawn  into  a  slow but  sure spread of  democracy  more  countries  have  wanted  to 
have a  say in the formulation of that world economy.  What  has also changed very 
significantly  in  recent  years,  has  been  the  spread  of  new  technology  and  the 
concurrent tremendous speeding up of the ability of capital to move  around.  That 
is clearly  new.  People  are  quite  right  to  warn  that  the  rules  for  a  global 
economy  must not be seen as being rules drawn up  by  those dominating that world 
economy  at  the  present  time.  I  remind  everyone  of  the  reluctance  of  many 
developing  countries  to  come  to  the  GATT  Round  in  1986.  That  reluctance,  I 
think,  grows.  I  certainly think that we  have a  huge problem in Europe and North 
America  to  convince  the  rest  of  the  world  to  stay  on  board  with  GATT  and  to 
avoid the growing suspicion that there is an attempt to sew  up  world trade and 
world  trade  agreements  in  the  interest  of  those  already  in  a  dominating 
position. This suspicion is particularly strong in Asia where there is a  feeling 
that  those  who  are  the  top  powers  at  the  moment  are  not  only  drawing  up  the 
rules but further that those top powers,  Europe and the  USA,  are not only in a 
recession but may  be in permanent decline.  There is some  feeling of apprehension 
that  world  rules  are  being  drawn  up  to  save  and  safeguard  the  position  of 
declining economies. 
A previous speaker said that Europe  is "an anachronism".  He  is right to 
raise the question whether the EC  in its present form is an anachronism.  Clearly 
great  things  have  been  achieved  in  the  EC  and the  lessons  drawn  from  that 
integrating process should not be lost.  But  the essential point is that Europe 
itself  is  changing.  Fortunately  for  history,  things  still  go  on 
chronologically.  The  year  1989  when  Eastern Europe blew up happily came  before 
1992  when  the  EC  market  was  integrated.  It  is  very  pleasing  to  me,  and  a 
salutary  lesson  for  dreamers  and  planners,  to  remember  that  history  still 
happens  day  by  day,  year  by  year.  We  can  come  unstuck  if  we  try  to  impose  a 
pattern on  events  which  then is overtaken by  events  themselves.  1989  has  been 
the significant change in Europe and that impact will spread throughout the rest 
of  the world.  It does  not  mean  to say we  should tear up all that has  happened 
before  1989  but surely it brings into question whether  we  can continue on the 
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wider  Europe,  I  have  always  been  vexed  and  annoyed  about  the  way  the  EC  has 
annexed  the title "Europe"  for itself. 
Two  further  points  :  the  question  has  been  raised  by  all the  speakers 
about  the interplay between foreign policy and trade policy.  Within the nation 
states there has  always  been  an  interaction.  They  use  trade policy to promote 
foreign  policy  issues  and  foreign  policy  issues  are  clearly  influenced  by 
trading matters.  But  there is no  such equation in the European Community.  The 
European Community has an undisputed competence in the field of drawing up trade 
agreements on behalf of Member  states,  but has  scarcely any  competence when  it 
comes to foreign policy.  This is a disequilibrium in the EC  which,  I  think,  will 
always mean  that  - to use one of  the cliches going round  - the  EC  is doomed  to 
play the role of  an economic giant and  a  political pygmy. 
Finally  I  am  very  struck  as,  I  am  sure,  everybody  else  is  by  the 
pragmatic  terms  of  participants'  contributions  so  far.  I  think  it  is  very 
important to proceed on the basis of what is happening rather than on the basis 
of what  we  would like to be happening.  The critisism we  have heard this morning 
on  the  problems  with  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  goes  to  the  heart  of  the 
matter.  If you wanted to integrate 12  countries economically and financially in 
Western  Europe  you  would  not  have  chosen  the  12  countries  which  are actually 
Members  of  the EC.  So  the  idea of monetary union,  I  think,  is correct.  Whether 
it is the right  idea for  the current members  of  the  EC  is another question. 
That  brings  me  to  the need to  be  more  flexible.  I  would  not  like us  to 
be hedged into the present allegiances which we  have,  thinking here is something 
called  Europe,  there  is  something  called  North  America  and  there  something 
called  Asia  which  are  monolithic  blocks  in  competition.  There  is  a  nice 
coincidence that  NAFTA  can mean  North  America  Free  Trade  Area  just as  well  as 
North Atlantic Free Trade Area.  And  I  throw the question out of this stage that 
there is some  sense in looking at the North American Free Trade Area.  It may  be 
yet  easier  to  integrate  and  give  a  framework  to  the  obvious  economic 
interdependence which does exist between North America and Western Europe,  than, 
for  example,  that which may  exist in any  foreseeable  future between the  EC  and 
the rest of Europe.  I  am  grateful for the contributions so far in having brought 
an element of pragmatism to the debate on economics which is often lacking among 
those  of  us  who  are  embedded  in  this  warm  and  complacent  institution,  the 
European Parliament. 
- 98  -III-.  =,PROCEEDINGS 
B.  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  AFTERNOON SESSION 
"A  NEW  APPROACH  TO  ECONOMIC  MANAGEMENT" 
DISCUSSION MODERATOR.  M.A.  FERNANDEZ  ORDONEZ 
PRESIDENT  OF  THE  TRIBUNAL  OF  DEFENCE  OF  COMPETITION,  MADRID 
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INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  AND  GLOBAL  MARRETS 
The  Rt  Hon Sir Leon  BRITTAN  QC,  Vice-President of the Commission of the 
EUropean  Communities for External  Economic Relations 
(i)  Introduction 
I  would like to congratulate Willy De  Clercq and the Committee on External 
Relations of the E.P.  on having the far-sightedness to organise this conference. 
It is not easy for us all to take time for study of  longer term trends in 
the shape of the world,  when  there seems  to be crisis all around us.  But it is 
vitally important that we  do  so.  I  am  pleased to be here,  and want to set in its 
political context the detailed policy paper on interdependence submitted by the 
Commission  services  for this event. 
Europe  is going  through  a  rough  patch.  In  such  times,  it is all  too 
tempting to argue  that we  have first and  foremost  to set our  own  economies  on 
the path of recovery and sustained economic  growth,  confronting  the challenges 
lying beyond our borders only as  a  second priority. 
Such  reactions of  panic and  introversion would  be as  dangerous  today as 
they  were  in  the  1930s.  Perhaps  more  so.  Because,  to  be  blunt,  in  the  new 
world ec  anomie  order,  national  interest  in  the  oltl  sense  is  the  wrong 
objective and the national policy tools of the past will in any case not permit 
the pursuit of national  interest. 
Global  interdependence  makes  worldwide  cooperation not  merely  desirable 
but  the  only  workable  means  of  facing  our  domestic  as  well  as  international 
difficulties.  Our  economic  prosperity,  as  well  as  peace  and  stability in the 
rest  of  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  depend  on  our  understanding  the 
changes  that  interdependence has  brought  and  adapting  our  activities  to  take 
advantage  of  those changes. 
(ii)  Economic Globalisation  :  4  Key  Changes 
The  international  economic  landscape  today  is  radically  changed,  both 
geographically and  in structure. 
The  levels of  trade and  the sort of  product  traded,  have  changed  beyond 
recognition.  Intra-firm  trade  and  trade  in  semi-manufactures  are  the 
dominant activities in the goods secotr, while trade in services and goods 
together now  equal  fully  40%  of  GOP. 
The  focus  of  world  growth  has  broadened. 
Transatlantic economy  to encompass  Asia. 
It has  shifted  from  the 
Foreign investment is no  longer the exception,  certainly among  developed 
and  perhaps  soon among  some  developing countries. 
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world  liquidity  but  reducing  each  individual  country's  macroeconomic 
independence. 
(a)  Trade 
Levels  of  trade  today  are -higher  than  ever.  Merchandise  trade  now 
represents 16%  of world GOP.  If trade in services is included,  the corresponding 
figure  is  around  20%  compared  to  11%  in  1963.  Even  more  significant  are  the 
changes  in  the  composition  of  trade.  Trade  in  manufactured  products  today 
accounts for over  70%  of merchandise trade,  compared to around  50%  thirty years 
ago.  Moreover,  a  growing  percentage  of  this  trade  is  in  intermediate 
manufactured  products.  For  the  major  industrial  economies,  intermediate 
manufactured  products  make  up  as  much  as  50-70%  of  their imports.  And  for 
some  major  economies,  anything  up  to  50%  of  exports  and  30%  of  imports  take 
place within multinational  companies. 
(b)  Asia 
The shape of the world is changing too.  Today,  the Asia-Pacific region has 
the highest  growth rate in the world in spite of world  recession. 
By  the  end  of  this decade,  trade  in the  Asian-Pacific  area  will  exceed 
trade within Europe. 
Across Asia,  output per person is doubling every  10  years.  Savings rates 
run  at  over  30%  of  GOP.  Asian  banks  hold  more  than  1/3  of  the  world 
foreign currency reserves. 
Between now  and the end of  the century the number  of  people aged between 
20  and  40  will  decline  in the  US.  It will  decline  in  Japan.  It will 
decline in Europe.  But  in the Asia-Pacific it will increase by  some  80 
million,  representing  a  huge  advance  in productive  capacity  and  buying 
power. 
These  figures  promise  a 
Asian miracle that has already 
continent of  the next century. 
to this new  reality ? 
(c)  Foreign Investment 
dramatic  transformation,  far  outstripping  the 
brought  most  of us  to realise that Asia is the 
We  realise it, but how  quickly are we  reacting 
The  growth  of  intra-company  trade reflects the substantial direct stake 
we  have  in each other's economy.  Foreign direct  investment  in the last decade 
has grown  three times faster than trade and four  times  faster than world gross 
domestic  product.  The  global  stock  of  FOI  is estimated  to  amount  to  ($  1.7 
trillion)  8. 5%  of  world  GOP.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  foreign 
investment has  fuelled much  of  the growth which  occurred in the Eighties. 
Most  of  this  foreign  direct  investment  still  occurs  among  the 
industrialised countries.  But  the newly  industrialised economies  of Asia,  in 
particular,  are making rapid headway  as outward investors.  They  account for 
most of  the sevenfold increase in outward  investment  from  the developing world 
that we  have seen over the last few  years.  This outflow is directed both towards 
the industrialised world and  towards  other countries in their region.  Although 
outward  investment  from  these countries  remains  low,  they represent  a  mere  3% 
- 102  -of  the  total,  we  can  expect  to  see  the  development  of  increasingly  complex 
flows  of  FDI  in the future. 
·(d)  Financial Markets 
Technological  advances  in informatics  and  communications  have  permitted 
the development of  instantaneous,  24-hour  trading in currencies and  financial 
assets  across  the  world.  The  following  figures  are  eloquent.  Turnover  of 
foreign  exchange markets has  tripled since  1986  to reach  $900  bn 
per day.  The  yearly turnover of cross-border equity transactions correspond to 
7%  of world GOP.  Market  responses  are both massive and  immediate.  The  effects 
of changes  in policy variables in one country will very quickly be  transmitted 
to others. 
The benefits for the world economy  are substantial, but the globalisation 
of  financial  markets  has  sharply  reduced  the  degree  of  macroeconomic 
interdependence. 
Global financial markets  exercise a  very powerful discipline on national 
governments  and  limit  the  extent  to  which  a  government  can  pursue  policies 
judged by  the markets  to be  inappropriate. 
Does  this mean  that national  interests are at the  mercy  of  speculators, 
of  whatever  origin  ?  No.  It means  rather  that  easy  ways  out  of  short-term 
national problems are revealed more  rapidly than in the past to have  immediate 
costs,  particularly on  currency  markets,  as·well  as  the  long  term  costs  with 
which hasty reflation,  in particular,  has  always  been associated. 
It  is 
reinforcement 
developments 
effective way 
and encourage 
becoming  increasingly  obvious  to  policy  makers  that  the 
of  economic  interdependence  brought  about  by  these  market 
calls  for  closer  macroeconomic  coordination.  This  is  the  most 
of  reducing  global  macroeconomic  imbalances  which  hinder  growth 
unwarranted speculation. 
As  I  have argued in the past,  when  pleading the advantages of the ERM,  the 
sovereignty that some  governments  saw  outside the  ERM  is a  fiction,  given the 
influence  of  dominant  currencies  in  the  real  world.  The  turbulence  of  this 
summer has major consequences for ERM  coordination, but it remains the case that 
national macroeconomic sovereignty in Europe is a  myth,  as it is in much  of the 
rest  of  the  world.  For  Europe,  monetary  union  remains  the  right  objective, 
although  the  precise  route  towards  it  may  not  be  the  route  we  envisaged  3 
months  ago. 
(iii) Consequences of Globalisation 
In  response  to  these  changes,  the  nature  of  international  economic 
cooperation is evolving in ways  that we  so far understand rather poorly. 
The  same  technological revolution that has brought  globalisation in the 
financial market is making it possible for manufacturing and service businesses 
to cooperate  worldwide  in ever  more  flexible ways.  No  longer is it necessary 
to. launch a  joint stock company  or build a  multinational. 
On  the contrary,  the trend in company size is now  towards the medium-sized 
or smaller enterprise.  Smaller enterprises can work  together more efficiently 
because the flow of information worldwide is more efficient.  Joint ventures can 
- 103  -concentrate on narrower  market niches rather than  a  whole  range  of  products. 
Producers  and patent owners  in Europe  can select specialist partners  for  each 
product they wish to bring to markets.  The market entry cost for overseas trade 
is dropping sharply,  bringing the world market within reach of a  wider range of 
small  and medium-sized European  companies. 
If ways  of doing business change so radically,  the key  factors shaping 
behaviour will be different.  Already,  import duties are  less significant for 
exporters  than  are  domestic  regulations  covering  tax,  safety  or  consumer 
protection.  Already,  there is less  and  less  scope  for  a  nation state or  an 
economic  community  to  improve life for  its businessmen by  acting alone.  Nor, 
even  internationally,  can  action  be  taken  to  increase  world  trade  without 
looking  at  the  implications  for  policy  in  the  field  of  exchange  rates, 
environment,  national  security,  social welfare or human  rights,  most  of  which 
were hardly considered  to be trade-related 10  years  ago. 
Recipes for success  :  4  new  Rules 
If  we  are  to  make  a  success  in this  interdependent  world,  I  believe  we 
must  work  to  4  new  rules  : 
First, national economic interest must no longer be defined as limited to 
national boundaries or national  companies. 
Second,  we  must  be very wary of  anyone who  suggests that the solution to 
our  European problems  can be  found  solely wlthin Europe.  Europe  is not 
isolated from  the rest  of  the world and cannot  pretend that it is. 
Then,  we  must  recognise that in an  interdependent world,  it is more  than 
ever vi  tal to get our domestic policies right.  Our  international economic 
relations will flourish if we  have got  the right policies on  investment, 
R  & D,  education,  infrastructure and  so  on.  We  must  also  look at  these 
policies in the countries of our partners since their apparently domestic 
policy decisions will also have  an  impact  on us. 
Finally, in an interdependent world,  the new  European economic policy must 
be an  open one.  Not  only  an  open trade regime,  but  also  an  open regime 
for  foreign direct investment,  for portfolio capital and for other forms 
of  economic  cooperation. 
Let me  add to these 4 rules,  3 flanking policies, without which they might 
not  prove easy to sell  : 
First,  these  rules  should  not  produce  a  crude  "laisser-faire" 
Competition  rules,  too,  must  be  adapted  so  that  they  preclude  a 
potentially pernicious effect of the new  international networks.  But where 
competition rules, properly defined and internationally coordinated,  give 
a  green  light  to  particular  activities,  national  policies  must  be 
constructed that welcome those activities and encourage Europeans to play 
their full part in them,  not only here  in Europe but  worldwide. 
Second,  we  must  maintain a  European network of  social support  set at a 
level  that  we  can  sustain and  pay  for  over  the  long  term  :  that  is the 
human  face  of  our  economy. 
- 104  -Third,  we  need a  more  effective policy to integrate developing countries 
into the new  world order.  Their  share of  world trade and  investment is 
slight  and  risks  stagnating.  This  plight  will  worsen  if  we  do  not 
increase our efforts to ensure that the developing world is plugged into 
the new  economic networks.  Development policy will acquire a  set of fresh 
objectives. 
(iv)  Coordinating Policies 
If  these are the rules  for  success,  how  can we  make  sure that we  follow 
them  ?  Europe cannot align itself passively on trends set elsewhere.  Our aim 
must be to shape future world trends,  to develop with our partners the policies 
that suit all our economies. 
How  can we  do this ?  First,  we  must be first.  We  must develop in Europe 
the policies  that matter,  sell  them  to  our  partners  and  agree  worldwide  how 
best to put them  into practice.  The  Single Market experience showed the way  to 
do this  :  by grasping the nettle  of regional integration,  the Community  had a 
head start on the rest of  the world. 
But  good  ideas  need  more  than  our  own  enthusiastic  advocacy.  Having 
initiated  policy  debate,  s.ound  and  internationally  recognized  independent 
evaluation  is  essential.  The  analytical  capabilities  of  international 
institutions  must  be  kept  in  trim.  The  OECD  Secretariat  is  a  good  example. 
Non-governmental  contributions  are  also  valuable,  whether  from  single-issue 
expert groups,  business,  organized labour,  academia or any  combination. 
Beyond  such  government  activities,  dialogue  between  economic  players 
themselves is important.  The  annual meeting of  industrialists and politicians 
at  Daves  is  a  very  useful  example.  There  are  many  similar  institutions 
designed to foster relations between businessmen in two or more major economies. 
While  informality  favours  the development  of  ideas,  it does  not  always  ensure 
that those ideas are delivered to decision-makers.  But when  industrialists find 
a  way  through  to politicians  and  bureaucrats,  the results  can  be  impressive. 
In the Uruguay Round,  there is certainly a higher degree of trade liberalisation 
in  sectors  where  EC,  US,  Japanese  and  other  industrialists  took  an  active 
interest in the outcome  of  the  process  than elsewhere.  Chemicals  is just one 
example  of this. 
Once the need for a  new  international policy and the broad lines to follow 
begin to emerge,  rule-making may  (but will not always)  be needed.  Long-winded 
and  bureaucratic  though  they  may  seem,  multilateral  institutions  bringing 
together  from  20  to  120  national  governments  are essential  to  creating  world 
rules. 
I  have mentioned OECD  already  :  its role,  like its membership,  must grow. 
Regional  economic  organisations  must  also  help.  But  we  need  a  single 
overarching organisation to ensure that regional initiatives remain consistent 
with open world trade. 
The  Multilateral  Trade Organisation,  successor to the  GATT,  will  become 
the kingpin of trade policy worldwide.  It will need  continued support from  the 
IMF  and  World  Bank.  The  relationship  between  this  Big  Three  needs  to  be 
clo~:er. 
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objective  ?  Primarily, to pursue further the progressive reduction of obstacles 
to international economic relations,  as has been the objective of Europe since 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome.  The  means  to this end have changed somewhat. 
Tariff  reductions  are not  enough.  The  essential now  is to achieve  agreement 
at international level on the proper shape and level of regulation in new  areas. 
That  is really  required before  Europe  or  other players start  to  legislate on 
their  own.  "Regulatory  convergence"  of  this  sort  can  avoid  the  creation  of 
technical barriers to trade,  and sometimes even produce better domestic policies 
than individual players would have  produced on  their own. 
Without  such  convergence,  national  initiatives  can  be  very  damaging  to 
European interests, as we  have seen clearly on many  occasions.  In the aftermath 
of Chernobyl,  for  example,  many  of our trading partners  imposed  zero tolerance 
for  background  radiation  in food products.  The  result was  a  series of  import 
bans  on  products  that  were  produced  and  sold  in  Europe  and  that  were,  in the 
judgment  of  competent scientists,  perfectly safe.  It took  the  EC  many  months 
to negotiate  a  way  through  these  unreasonable  obstacles  to  our  exports.  The 
result was  lost sales,  lost jobs in Europe,  and all for no  improvement in health 
protection in the other countries concerned. 
Another  example  arises  in the  field of  competition policy.  Competition 
is traditionally seen as a  prerogative of national policy.  In an interdependent 
world,  dangers  to  fair  competition  in  national  markets  can  result  from 
activities  initiated  beyond  national  borders.  In  order  to  deal  with  this 
threat,  those  dealing  with  competition  policy  in  the  European  Community  and 
elsewhere have inevitably been led to assert jurisdiction over those acting in 
another country whose action has the effect of damaging competition within their 
own  territory.  There  is  bound  to  be  a  risk  of  serious  conflict  if  both  the 
country  in which  an action took place and  that where it has  its effect assert 
the  right  to  deal  with  what  has  occurred,  all  the  more  so  if  they  take  a 
different view as  to whether  the conduct concerned  was  objectionable. 
In order to deal  with this problem,  the first step is to seek agreement 
on a  system of mutual consultation and co-operation with Competition authorities 
elsewhere,  in order to forestall potential conflict.  We  have reached such an 
agreement with the United States and are in the advanced stages of negotiating 
such an  agreement with Canada. 
But cooperation and consultation cannot always resolve the problem.  Even 
after mutual  consultation there may  remain  a  genuine difference of  opinion as 
to who  should be responsible for handling a  problem and what the solution to it 
should be.  We  need a  set of  international rules  for handling such competition 
cases,  going  beyond  consultation and  co-operation.  Achieving effective rules 
of this kind will be difficult and time-consuming,  but it is high time to begin 
the process. 
The  MTO  should  certainly  include  restrictive  business  practices  and 
cartels on its immediate agenda.  The  aim should be to draw up common  rules,  lay 
down  the principle that restrictive arrangements are not enforceable at law and 
that Governments are responsible internationally for the implementation of these 
rules  and  procedures.  The  right  of  recourse  to  GATT  panels  should  be 
strengthened,  as should the effectiveness of their adjudications.  For mergers, 
common  rules  should  also  be  established,  as  well  as  a  common  commitment  to 
enforce  them. 
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environment  and  a  further deepening  of  international  investment  rules.  It is 
an  earnest  of  my  faith  both  in  the  December  deadline  for  dealing  with  the 
current  GATT  agenda  and  in  the  need  for  urgent  action  on  all  these  issues 
thereafter  that  the  Commission  is  already  laying  the  groundwork  for  these 
negotiations with key  trading partners and in OECD. 
(v)  Conclusion 
To  conclude.  National  economies  are  linked with  one  another  by  a  wide 
range  of  transnational  business  activities.  This  means  that  there  are  many 
areas  where  their interests coincide.  At  the  same  time  economic operators vie 
with each other for advantage in an increasingly global business arena,  helped 
or hindered as  the case may  be by  national  governments. 
In these circumstances economic nationalism is not an option. Cooperation 
in areas where  common  rules and policies are effective is perfectly compatible 
with national efforts to boost growth and flexibility at home.  But since we  all 
gain from  a  growing world economy,  governments must act together to provide the 
competitive environment  which promotes  wealth creation.  The bigger the cake, 
the  more  for  everyone.  At  times of  recession and  of  global political change, 
this message of  trust and  cooperation can sound naive.  It is not.  And  in the 
global economy a contrary policy of unfair or beggar-my-neighbour policies would 
leave  us  all  worse  off.  As  one  famous  Anglo-Saxon  freedom  fighter  argued, 
rallying his  colleagues at a  critical moment,  if we  do  not  hang  together,  we 
shall assuredly be  hanged  one  by  one.  A grim  message,  but  a  useful  remainder 
of  what  mutual  dependence  means. 
- 107  -Primary discussants: 
1.  Drs  T.J.  van  HEESCH,  Director  of Philips  International  BV,  Eindhoven 
(NL) 
Mr.  Chairman,  Sir Leon,  Honourable Members  of European Parliament,  Ladies 
and Gentlemen, 
Representing  Philips  Electronics,  my  first  duty  is  to  thank  you  for 
inviting us  to participate in this Hearing and  to present our views. 
Philips,  as  you  know,  has  been  and  still is very  much  involved  in  the 
Single Market  concept  and its implementation,  for  the  simple reason that  two-
third of  our business  takes place in Europe,  that about half of  our  factories 
are in Europe,  and that the bulk of our Research and Development activities take 
place here. 
At  the  same  time,  Philips  is  very  much  involved  in  global  market 
developments: First of all because the remaining one-third of our business takes 
place outside the  Community.  Secondly  because-many  of  our subcontractors,  our 
purchases  and  some  of  our.technology  comes  from  outside Europe.  Global  market 
developments  have ·therefore an increasing impact  on our European business.  The 
subject of  today is therefore close to our hearts. 
We  have read with interest your discussion paper and like to congratulate 
you on the quality of your analysis.  We  also agree largely with your conclusions 
at least on a  conceptional  level. 
Sir Leon has,  in his excellent speech,  said that we  in Europe must develop 
the policies that matter, sell them to our partners and agree worldwide how  best 
to put  them  into practise.  In very  many  ways  the  Community  and  the  thinkings 
of Sir Leon is being presented as an example of more  far reaching multilateral 
arrangements.  There is a  message here:  The  EC  as an example  for the rest of the 
world. It might therefore be useful today to elaborate on the actual implementa-
tion aspects of the Community's policy with regard to liberalisation. Liberali-
sation  is rightly  a  key  issue  in  the  discussion  paper,  and  we  are  very  much 
supportive of this.  However,  as a  private company  we  are confronted daily with 
implementation problems  that  go  beyond  our  reach,  requiring political actions 
by governments.  In the rare cases that we  succeeded in triggering such actions, 
the result is generally too little too late. What  really matters,  at the end of 
the day,  therefore, is the effectiveness and the efficiency of Community actions 
in implementing Community  policy without  disputing its overall  objectives.  My 
remarks  may  sound rather critical but are meant  to be constructive. 
In creating the Single Market it was  clear  from  the beginning that this 
market  would  be  of  interest  and  benefit  not  only  for  European  companies.  To 
defuse  the  threatening concept  of  the  Fortress  Europe,  market  access  by  non-
European companies was  based on the concept of reciprocity.  This sounds good in 
theory  but  is very difficult to  implement.  Apart  from  technical  problems  like 
differences  in market  structure  and  regulatory  environment,  our  main  trading 
partners  do  not  show  a  great  enthousiasm  for  this concept.  Their  governments 
apparently do  not  see great  advantages  in opening up  their markets  as  long as 
they see that non-European companies are quite welcome  in the Community  without 
their governments fulfilling this condition of reciprocity. In fact,  the current 
atmosphere  in  the  US  is  to  become  more  discriminatory  in  applying  "national 
- 108  -treatment",  as  illustrated  by  the  Manton  amendment  which  would  provide  a 
restricted  access  to  government-sponsored  R&D  programmes  by  non-American 
companies.  I  can  assure  you  that  we  would  be  severely  restricted  by  this 
amendment  would it really come  into force  in the United States  . 
....  Consequently  the  "miracle"  solutions offered by  the European  Commission 
to protect  the interest of  European  companies  turns out to be  ineffective and 
powerless.  For  example,  the  Community  has  so  far  been  unable  to  harmonise, 
streamline  and  speed  up  its decision-making  procedures of  commercial  defence, 
despite the unrelenting pressure of  the REX  Committee. 
I  think business realises that this lack of power  cannot be blamed on the 
European  Commission  as  it relies  on  the  Member  States  for  clear  and  strong 
mandates in negotiations.  What  can be said is that the European  Commission has 
overestimated  the  willingness  of  the  Member  States  to  delegate  its  trading 
powers  to the Commission.  In fact,  the political reality of  today  is that the 
responsible Commissioners have to fight harder with the Member  States than with 
their  trading partners.  And  as  this entire process  is transparent  they  stand 
even  to  lose  authority  in  subsequent  negotiations.  As  a  consequence,  the 
Community  cannot  respond  in  any  meaningful  way  to  for  instance  unilateral 
sanctions by our main trading partners as shown in the recent steel-dumping case 
with the US.  The  recent monetary chaos,  which by  the way  has caused us to write 
off  in  1992  150  MECU  of  our  bottom  line,  serves  as  another  example,  where 
economic  interdependence  has  no  meaningful  translation  into  multilateral 
regulations  and policy coordination. 
European  industry is thus  very exposed  to global  competition.  Moreover, 
European industry is vulnerable.  To  take advantage of the Single Market,  it has 
to restructure its operations  which,  certainly in the case of  the electronics 
industry,  were  initially national in scale and  scope.  Philips for  instance had 
to go  through a  process of  concentration of  its manufacturing activities which 
implied the closure of about half of our factories in Europe and the scaling-up 
and  modernisation  of  the  remaining  sites.  The  costs  of  such  restructuring in 
Europe  are  - for  obvious  reasons  - enormous  and  have  weakened  many  European 
companies  financially.  Philips  alone  has  spent  some  4  billion  ECU  on 
restructuring activities in the period  1980-1990.  If  only  we  could have  added 
this  enormous  expenditure  to  our  bottom-line!  At  the  same  time,  non-European 
companies  are  penetrating  the  open  Single  Market  without  the  burden  of  such 
restructuring.  They  are sometimes  even subsidised with Community  money  if they 
set up factories in certain less-developed regions. It could well be argued that 
the  Community's  policy  of  a  level  playing  field  as  a  condition  for  fair 
competition should take account  of  such disparity in starting conditions. 
Finally,  Community policy has developed into a set of "vertical policies", 
addressing various aspects of society.  Everybody will agree that these policies 
have interlinkages.  In fact,  it is more  and more  recognised,  that a  "policy for 
industry"  (to  avoid  the  expression  of  "industrial  policy")  should  embrace  a 
whole series of policies like for instance environment,  social,  competition and 
trade policy.  Probably because of the "vertical" structure of the Community  in-
stitutions,  the Commission has not yet  succeeded in presenting a  comprehensive 
and balanced policy and in providing industry in Europe with the kind of predic-
table  conditions  that  bring  about  economic  growth  and  employment.  Admittedly 
"verticalisation"  is a  problem  at the  national  scale as  well,  as it is  - for 
that matter - for large, diversified companies.  That however  is poor justifica-
tion and should certainly not be seen as an example to follow.  Economic interde-
pendence is a  very  complex  and  many-facetted area  that needs  to be  approached 
- 1  Q9  -in a  comprehensive way.  If the Community  wants  to serve as an example  for  more 
far-reaching multilateral arrangements and  policy coordination,  there is still 
a  lot to do. ·In fact  we  do  worry:·  we  are discussing multilateral arrangements, 
yet national  interests seem  to be  on  the winning hand. 
I  thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns about  the current 
developments within the Community  and between the Community  and the rest of the 
world.  Our  view is of course biased as it is an industrial and not  a  political 
view.  If we  were critical of certain aspects of policy by  the Community  insti-
tutions  or  by  other multilateral  institutions,  it is because  we  would  like to 
see a  Community  as  well  as  other multilateral organisations that can act with 
authority, sacrificing its internal disputes to overriding common objectives and 
being strong  and  respected parties  on  a  global  level.  The  coming  months  will 
show  whether  this is a  dream  or reality.  The  Community  in that respect  should 
get  its  act  together.  We  have  no  time  to  lose.  If  we  do  not,  economic 
interdependence  - as  far  as  Europe  is  concerned  - will  become  economic 
dependence. 
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of Japan  to the United Kingdom 
I  am  very happy that I  have been  invited on behalf of  my  country to take 
part  in this  intellectual exercise.  After all,  this  sort  of  exercise is very 
necessary  for  the  world  to  see  what  it is like  and  what  should  be  done.  The 
necessary  stimulation  and  provocation  has  been  amply  provided  by  Prof. 
DORNBUSCH's  paper.  I  think  there  are  many  points  which  I  would  like  to  talk 
about but I  shall - since I  am  one of the principal discussants in the afternoon 
- leave it to the afternoon,  maybe  in the  absence  of  the Professor.  I  hope he 
will  forgive  me  in that case. 
I  would  like  to  say  that  there  are  certainly  some  problems  caused  by 
Japan..  I  can  say  this because  I  am  not  an  ambassador  any  more,  only  a  former 
ambassador.  I  will first admit that our rice policy is not to my  liking.  In fact 
I  am  a  consumer  in Japan and  I  also belonged to the  foreign  service which was 
trying  very  hard  to  do  something  about  it.  So  having  given  you  my  personal 
sympathies  I  would agree to a  certain extent with Prof.  DORNBUSCH's  arguments. 
But  as  concerns  the analysis  which  he presents  about  the closed nature of  the 
Japanese  market  it  seems  that  the  light  concentrated  on  it  is  a  bit  too 
blinding,  and makes  one  not quite sure what  is really wrong  with us.  In  fact, 
his analysis is a  bit strange for one of an oriental heritage but also educated 
in the  West  (Mr  DE  CLERCQ  knows  very  well  as  we  were  together as  students  in 
America,  alas  40  years ago).  Anyway,  the logic seems  to be,  I  am  afraid to say, 
not  impeccable,  especially when  the nature of  Japanese  'protectionism'  or  the 
closed nature of  our  market  seems  to be  very  abstract.  In  a  sense  that it is 
like an onion,  you  peel it and you  find only a  void at the centre,  maybe  it is 
a  very  pungent  void  but it is  not  logical.  we  have,  as  I  said earlier,  many 
problems  but  so  has  everyone  else,  we  have  our  special  interests and  so  have 
other countries,  so  have  the  EC.  Rather  than  point  out  Japan  as  some  sort of 
Pariah which does not fit into the world,  I  think the better approach would be 
to try to analyse it a  bit more  rigorously and try to find out what  is causing 
this  great  surplus  of  the  Japanes  foreign  account.  What  is  going  to  be,  for 
instance,  the  effects  of  the  very  drastic  appreciation  of  the  Yen  which, 
unfortunately,  in the paper seems  to be considered as a  little blip,  of course 
I  must say,  the Professor does not use those terms,  but I  think that is what he 
implies.  It is having a  very drastic effect on  us  and if he  had  looked at the 
Japanese  trade  figures,  . not  in  Dollars  but  in  Yen,  you  can  see  that  the 
surpluses are going down  at a  very quick rate.  The  Yen  is not  an international 
currency but nevertheless when it comes  to Japanese companies who  operate in the 
real  economic  world  it is  a  cause  for  great  alarm  and  restructuring  is  now 
actually  starting.  Maybe  you  have  heard  that  even  the  so-called  sacro-sanct 
lifetime employment  (I suspect this is an invention by Western Journalists)  is 
at stake. 
In conclusion,  I  would  like to emphasise that,  first of all,  we  are not 
different  from  you,  with  similar  problems,  which  sometimes  get  out  of  hand. 
Basically we  have weak sectors in our economy  which are protected,  we  have weak 
producers  who  have  to  be  provided with  a  safety net  and  this  is not  uniquely 
Japanese.  Europeans and Americans will recognise their own  visage in the mirror 
held up  in this manner.  Secondly,  though  I  can understand the exasperation of 
the  Americans,  especially  in Congress,  which  Prof.  DORNBUSCH  very  faithfully 
reproduces,  I  am  alarmed when  he  says that the  EC  and the United States should 
join, in  - he  does  not  use  the  word  "force",  but  I  think  he  implies,  forcing 
Japan to open up.  This,  of course,  is a  rather dangerous course even if it were 
argued  very  impeccably  - which it is not,  unfortunately.  So  if  you  give  some 
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late nineteenth century when  the Europeans and alas,  even the Americans engaged 
in so-called gunboat-diplomacy.  This  argument will not  touch Japan alone,  but 
also the rest of Asia,  as I  think Mr  CHO  mentioned China and America as possible 
candidates for trade friction earlier.  As  China is bigger than Japan,  this sort 
of argument  will not  just stop with Japan. 
I  want  to  thank  you  again  for  allowing  me  to  let  off  some  steam  this 
morning.  I  said at that time that I  will try to give a  more  detailled critisism 
of the DORNBUSCH  paper.  In the afternoon I  will not do so,  both in the interest 
of  time and also that the heat of the battle has gone out of  me  with the steam. 
I  think we  all realise that interdependence is now  something which is very real, 
almost  tangible.  We  see it every  day,  especially  in the  private sector,  when 
even the most  obscure company  in Japan does  have business dealings with Korean 
companies  or  Thai  companies,  for  example,  Sir  Leon  has  just pointed  out  the 
enhanced  role  of  medium  and  small  enterprises  in  the  international  field.  I 
think this is happening all over  the world. 
The paper which has been presented by the - should I  say the Commission?  -
I  am  quite  a  newcomer  to  the  thicket  of  European  bureaucracy,  so  I  hope  you 
forgive me  if I  make  any mistakes.  This paper when  shown  to my  friends in Japan 
- both in the private and the public sectors  - the unanimous  Japanese reaction 
was:  "This  is  too  good  to  be  true!".  And  people  wanted  to  know:  Was  this  a 
Commission  paper  or  was  this  commissioned  by  the  Parliament,  or  was  it some 
private person who  had written such a  marvellously good paper!  People took this 
as a  snapshot  of  the Europeans without horns  on  their heads  anymore. 
The  speech by Sir Leon  combined with this paper is,  I  think,  a  very good 
example  of  the  high  level  of  the  European  intellectual  application  to  the 
problems  of  the world  today.  I  think we  in Japan have  to learn a  lot  from  the 
Europeans;  notice that I  am  not talking about the Americans,  because that is not 
in my  brief.  But  the  Americans,  of  course,  are a  very  important entity in the 
world.  I  would like to think of three pillars,  the Americans,  the Europeans and 
the East Asians  (not  just the Japanese),  holding up the world economy  as we  go 
into the  twenty-first  century.  Eventually new  players will  emerge,  we  already 
have  talked  about  the  Chinese,  the  Indians  and  perhaps  the  Russians  as  well 
today,  but  we  the  three pillars do  have  the responsibility.  The  three pillars 
are very different  from each other and  they do  have lots of quarrels with each 
other,  certainly.  But  I  do  think  that  it is  almost  an  established  fact  that 
nobody else would be capable of holding up the world.  I  believe that this paper 
which you have produced and Sir Leon's talk is very much  in the right direction, 
pointing towards  the twenty-first century. 
I  would  like to add that from  the Japanese point of  view,  maybe  you  find 
this hard to believe,  but there is a  strong feeling amongst  those who  count  in 
Japan,  that our collaboration or cooperation with Europe is a  matter of our own 
interest. It is not just a  matter of convenience,  it is indeed a  vital interest 
for  Japan that we  have  a  good working  relationship with  Europe.  Otherwise  the 
three pillars will not be able to  function.  The  times  which  we  are now  facing 
together  are  very  difficult  times.  Some  countries  have  gone  into  recession 
earlier and,  therefore,  coming out a  bit earlier.  But Japan is right now  in the 
middle  of  it  and  in  unprecedented  type  of  economic  downturn.  This  is  very 
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details but  more  than  anything else,  more  than  any  Japan bashing or  more  than 
any pressure put by  eminent statement the world over,  this economic downturn is 
changing our economy.  It has indeed changed our politics, although it is not yet 
so  noticed.  May  I  just  give  you  a  very  brief  description  of  the  HOSOKAWA 
Cabinet,  which  is  a  very different  animal  from  the  previous  Democratic  Party 
government.  It is,  however,  basically a  conservative but a  moderate regime even 
if it does  include the Socialists and  some,  if I  may  say so,  die-hard lefties. 
The  latter  are  there  because  - and  I  hope  you  will  not  accuse  me  of  being 
cynical  - power  is sweet.  The  people still yet in the first months  now  of their 
new  coalition  are  holding  on  to  power  and  holding  down  various  diverging 
opinions.  I  don't  know  how  long  this will  last,  but it still and  I  therefore 
characterise the HOSOKAWA  Cabinet as a  kind of national unity government,  which 
may  or may  not be  going to last a  very  long  time.  They  are capable however at 
this moment  of initiating changes;  whether they will carry it through,  both in 
the  political  or  economic  domains,  I  don't  know,  but  they  are  at  least 
confronted with  'a window  of  opportunity'. 
One  more  thing is we  are now  having a  generational change in the Japanese 
political  world.  This  again  is reflected although  not  intentionally or  even 
knowingly in the economic  world.  The  structures of the companies  are changing 
very rapidly under the surface.  The  so-called 'life-time employment  system'  is 
being  very  swiftly  eroded  behind  the  scenes  by  the  appreciation  of  the  yen. 
Another  aspect  is  that  companies  in  Japan  are  ditching  their  old  'Keiretsu' 
suppliers.  This setup,  according to the western picture of  'Japan Inc.',  is as 
right  as  a  Macedonian  phalanx,  is  now  very  quickly  disintegrating,  like  the 
phalanxes disintegrated before  the Roman  legions.  People  are now  buying  from 
foreign  companies  if  the  price  is right  and  the quality  is not  too  bad.  Of 
course  there is the question  of  'after care'  and  that  sort  of  thing,  but  the 
change is happening very quickly now.  Although many  people do not realise it, 
even in Japan. 
We  who  are now  engaged in such change have no  choice but to go whole hog. 
I  mentioned rice is our politics this morning.  I  am  sure the system will have 
to  change  before  long.  In  fact  with  the  very  bad  weather  this  year,  we 
anticipate a  great shortage of rice,  and  therefore our Ministry of Agriculture 
is quietly starting talks with the American Department of Agriculture and other 
authorities  on  the  problem.  A tremendous  amount  of  change  is  going  on;  since 
these  changes  are  shared  by  everybody  in  the  world,  we  should  be  better off 
hanging  together  than hanging separately.  The  first order  of  business,  as  Sir 
Leon  has correctly pointed out,  is to make  the Uruguay  Round  a  reality.  This 
of course is easier said than done.  But unless we  can do  that all this talk of 
the three pillars collaboration and  cooperation will just go  up in smoke.  We 
believe that the three pillars should not quarrel with each other but  compete 
with each other.  They  should not  try to  impose  their views  on  the developing 
world but should be cooperative in a  far-sighted way,  and this I  hope is coming 
to pass. 
I  will  finish by  g~v~ng you  some  private thoughts.  The  Asian region is 
still buoyant and  I  think in the European region you  have  the Eastern European 
countries with their great unsatisfied demand,  but  they  do  not  have  the  pump 
priming necessary for this demand  to manifest itself.  In the long run perhaps 
the European Community  and Japan and of course the Americans  can co-operate in 
aiding the Eastern Europeans  in a  judicious way  not  just throwing money  into a 
black  hole,  in  order  that  demand  to  become  a  reality  and  therefore  the 
Europeans,  the Americans,  the Japanese and the other Asians can export to - and 
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but it is one possibility.  I  have privately talked to the Japanese  government 
people in charge concerning the above-mentioned aid,  who  said under our laws and 
regulations no such provision exists.  You  can see that to solve the problem we 
will  have  to change  things  in Japan  itself.  But  please  be  reassured  that in 
Japan  we  do  not  regard  the  European  Community,  or  the  enlarged  Europe,  with 
dread anymore  or with enmity at all.  We  still think even though we  are bashed 
once  in  a  while,  even  though  the  Americans  do  bash  us,  after  all  our  best 
friends are the Europeans  and the Americans,  and I  am  not  joking - I  am  told -
we  Japanese are not  supposed  to have  a  sense of  humour.  Anyway  my  message  is 
that we  shall read your paper again,  we  shall reread Sir Leon's talk and try to 
come  out with a  wiser way  of doing things  together with  you.  Thank  you. 
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Geneva 
The  tidal wave  of papers,  books,  and conferences on the globalization of 
the economy,  on international economic interdependence,  and on the helplessness 
of  governments  is washing over us. 
The  three  "C's"  of  capital,  Companies,  and  Commodities  are  to  be  freed 
from  any  social accountability or control  in the  name  of  economic  progress.  A 
token nod is made  in the direction of  the environment but accelerated economic 
growth and trade are to come  about by  lifting barriers or regulations governing 
the three "C's". 
The  way  forward is to de-regulate,  privatize, surrender national controls 
over  economic  matters,  and  specifically  in  the  case  of  Europe,  cut  wages, 
welfare,  and  worker protection. 
The  Financial Times  informs us that EC  Commissioners have seen the future 
and it is more work for less pay.  At  a  private conclave early in September  1993, 
"Mr  Bangemann  (Industry)  urged  more  short-term  employment  contracts  . . .  Mr 
Schmidhuber  (Budget)  and  Mr  Matututes  (Energy  and  Transport)  said  Europe' s 
welfare system discouraged people for working,  while Sir Leon Brittan  (Trade) 
said there was  nothing wrong  with  lower  wages."2 
At  least  these  gentlemen  are  honest.  This  is  the  first  time  in  20th 
century,  possibly world,  history when  political leaders offer the prospect  of 
a  worsening of life to their subjects,  not as a  result of war  or geo-political 
revolution but as  a  conscious act of policy. 
It is little wonder  that faced with this kind of language the citizens of 
Europe become deeply unhappy about the European project and vote against men  and 
ideas that offer a  worse  not better life,  and  a  reduction not  a  strengthening 
of  the thin and ungenerous  social system currently in place. 
For while the three "C's" of Capital,  Companies  and Commodities are given 
greater rights,  freedoms  and  power  to  move  and  act  as  they  wish,  it is often 
forgotten that a  fourth  "C"  exists - that of  the Citizen who  casts a  vote and 
thereby also has  a  voice. 
And  unless the new  world order of economic integration and interdependence 
brings with it an institutional network that connects to the citizens of Europe 
(or in the United States vis-a-vis NAFTA)  in a  positive sum  way  the chances are 
that  a  retreat  back  to  the  nation or  indeed  the  tribe will  accelerate.  This 
movement  hacia a  dentro or turn to Heimat  is accelerating in proportion to the 
2, 
This  pos1tion paper was  prepared for subm1ssion to the European  Parliament hearing on  the 
subject of "Economic  Interdependence- New  Policy Changes"  held in Brussels,  28  September 
1993.  It  should  be  read  in  conjunct1on  with  the  Act1on  Programme  1993-1997  of  the 
Internat1onal  Metalworkers  Federat1on  adopted  at the  IMF  Congress,  Zurich,  June  1993 
FT  3  September  1993.  The  confusion  of  debate  on  this  issue  is  summed  by  an  FT  report  a 
week  later  which  began  "European  industry  needs  urgently to change  its costs  structure 
to compete internationally and  preserve JObs,  even though  many  thousands  of jobs will  go 
as  a  result of such  a  reappraisal."  (10  Sept  1993)  We  had  to destroy  JObs  to  save  them, 
as  the  US  general  in  V1etnam  m1ght  have  saidl 
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economic  order. 
The  European  Social Charter is a  modest  attempt  to involve  the citizen-
employee in the post-nation economic project but is itself the result of lowest 
common  denominator  negotiation  and  scorned  by  Europe's  most  powerful  global 
trading  (not  the  same  as  producing)  economy,  the  UK,  as well  as  by  all  US  and 
Japanese,  as well  as many  European companies. 
These  points  are  well  made  in  the  discussion  paper  "International 
Economic  Interdependence"1  which  is  the  spur  to  current  discussion.  Four 
disturbing  conclusions  emerge  from  this  tightly  argued  and  highly  realistic 
document 
( 1 )  "The institutional means for managing international economic activity, 
for  addressing its social,  environmental  and  other consequences  and  for 
assuring the international cooperation,  public and private,  necessary to 
make  the  most  of  the  new  possibilites  offered  by  scientific  and 
technological progress,  are not  in general  adequate to the task." 
(2)  "The present unequal distribution of  the world's wealth  - 80  % of it 
is  concentrated  in  the  hand  of  the  industrialized  countries,  which 
together account  for  only  20  % of  the global  population  - represents  an 
enormous potential danger for all ... At  the international  level,  a  more 
intensive concerted effort is called for to address  the  imbalance in the 
global distribution of wealth.  At  the domestic level, this action involves 
such  measures  as  education  and  retraining,  creation  of  alternative 
employment  opportunities,  social welfare- provisons etc." 
(3)  "Deregulation at  the national  level,  which  lies at  the heart  of  an 
economy  open  to  international  trade,  investment  and  other  forms  of 
transnational interchange has to be accompanied by multilaterally agreed 
minimum  rules and practices,  i.e.  by  international regulation." 
(4)  "A  new,  less adversarial  approach  to global questions,  based on  the 
recognition  of  interdependence,  should  therefore  be  fostered  in  all 
countries. This implies launching a  systematic long term dialogue with the 
US,  Japan  and  other  industrialized  and  developing  countires,  both 
bilaterally and  in multilateral forums." 
Each of these points needs to be addressed not separately but together at 
all levels of economic,  social and political activity.  Thus wealth distribution 
between  North  and  South  is  also  a  question  of  wealth  distribution  within 
individual  societies.  The  term  de-regulation  at  national  level  is  often  a 
misnomer.  What  has  happened  are  not  fewer  rules  but different  rules.  British 
trade unions for example have "enjoyed" no  fewer  than seven new  laws since 1980 
which  have  re-regulated  their  scope  of  action  in  favour  of  capital  and 
employers. 
It is little use calling for  "a new,  less adversarial approach to global 
questions"  when  the  consensus  and  compromise  that  has  governed  relations 
domestically is being torn  up  in favour of  the hammer  blows  of  government  or 
employer change being imposed unilaterally on workers or poor people. The German 
economic minister Rexrodt proposes to tear up the carefully constructed social 
market  state developed  over  40  years  of  conflict  and  compromise.  How  in this 
DG  for  External  Economic  Relat1ons,  17  May  1993 
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and dialogue be heard? 
Internationalism,  like charity,  begins at home.  In the specific home  of 
the  EC,  the need  for  enhanced dialogue  and policies that reflect domestically 
what is sought internationally are necessary.  The  politics of  "Do  as I  say,  not 
as  I  do"  are counter-productive when  appeals to international co-operation and 
agreement  are contrasted with  the me-first  and winner-takes-all  style of  much 
domestic political economy. 
What  then are the ways  out of  the present  impasse? 
Three  suggest  themselves. 
Firstly,  to  learn  from  history  and  current  experience.  Thus,  we  may 
examine  periods  of  world  growth  in  GDP  and  trade  in the  20th  century  and  ask 
what  conditions existed in period of  high growth  in GDP  and trade. 
in tabular  form it may  be presented thus: 
Year 
1961-70 
1971-80 
1981-1992 
.... 
% Growth 
in 
World  GDP 
5.3 
3.9 
2.6 
%Growth  in 
World Trade 
7.7 
5.3 
4 
Prevailing Political 
Economic Policy 
Currency 
control/stability. 
Expanding social welfare. 
Full employment  as policy 
goal.  Open  immigration. 
Unionized collective 
bargaining.  Civil society 
in economic  sphere 
develops.  Social 
ownership. 
Dollar floats.  MNCs 
develop off-shore 
production.  LDCs  given 
massive  loans. 
Immigration stops.  State 
pay policies. 
Confrontationary human 
resource management. 
Free movement  of capital. 
Privatization transfers 
power  to capital.  Unions 
attacked in UK,  USA,  and 
Poland.  Marked  wealth 
transfer to rich.  Loan 
repayment crisis. 
Employment  sacrificed as 
policy goal . 
Source  (for stats)  Eurostat,  GATT 
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socially responsible and ownership-diversed economic policies obtain.  This,  to 
any policy-maker,  should provide clues as to what  needs to be argued for in the 
new  global  economic  paradigm. 
Serious  analytical  research  needs  to  be  undertaken  to  ask  whether  the 
welfare state is the result of economic growth or the cause of economic growth. 
Europe after  1945  developed its political economy  on  the premise  that certain 
social rights  would  be  incorporated.  The  fears  of  unemployment,  homelessness, 
and ill-health that disfigured Europe in the first half of the 20th century were 
not  to be repeated. 
The production of welfare guaranteed the welfare of production. Relations 
of  commerce would replace relations of power.  This was  the new  synergy between 
social and  economic  Europe that lay at the heart of  European success,  not  just 
of  EC  member  states but of all democratic Europe.  Now  instead of being partner 
there is an attempt to divorce society from  the economy  and to sacrifice social 
relations to the profit of  economic ones. 
The  second  line to  follow  would  be  to  examine  which  economies  in recent 
years have met  the target of  growth,  full employment  and no decrease in living 
standards.  If the single target of  job creation is taken then the  US  comes  out 
on  top.  But  when  we  look  a  little deeper  and  ask  two  further questions  - what 
kind of  jobs and what kind of society has emerged comcomitant with this employ-
ment  creation  - then  the  automatic  reference  to  the  us  example  becomes  less 
clear. 
In  terms  of  what  kind  of  jobs,  the  economic  life of  the  US  citizen has 
become more brutish,  more nasty,  and in terms of working hours  not any shorter. 
While  real  GOP  in the  US  has  grown  by  56  per cent over  the last 20  years there 
has  been  a  16  per cent decline in real hourly wages. 
Since  1973,  the  time  necessary  for  an  American  worker  paid  the  average 
hourly  wage  to  earn the  average  household's  yearly  expenses  has  grown  43  per 
cent;  to buy  the average  new  house  45  per cent;  and  to  pay  for  a  year  at  the 
University of  California by  75  per cent.  1  The  World  Bank  noted earlier this 
year  that if the black population of  America  was  treated as  a  nation in terms 
of  economic  wealth and  living standards,  it would  be  placed  in the  upper half 
of  third world countries.  The  US  model  creates more  jobs  than in the southern 
EC  states  but at  the  price of  social  dislocations  (37  million without  health 
insurance,  growing crime,  poverty and drugs,  city centres that no-one dares walk 
in)  which would  be difficult to  impose  on  Europe. 
Instead,  Europeans  might  look  at  successful  European  economies  such  as 
Austria or Norway  or Sweden  (before  the recent nee-liberal government  decided 
that  the  way  forward  for  Sweden  was  to  increase  unemployment  and  resultant 
transfer payments). 
Thirdly,  if  we  look  at  the  dynamic  Asian  economies  what  features  do  we 
see.  Firstly,  narrow  wage  differentials.  Secondly,  massive  investment  in 
education (Singapore). Thirdly, public ownership of land  (Hong  Kong).  And at the 
same  time,  a  big  explosion  in  pay  (  up  250  per  cent  in  five  years  in  South 
Korea)  if democracy  is permitted. 
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e.g.  the total ban on union membership for all 130,000 electronics workers in 
Malaysia)  or keep  10  million in forced labour camps  pour decourager les autres 
(as  :rn  China)  but  if  that  is  the  desired  means  to  the  end  of  economic 
competitiveness of those who  wish to dismantle EC  wage,  welfare and union levels 
~hen it would be more  honest if they were  to say so. 
Instead,  Europe  might  consider  taking  a  world  lead  in arguing  for  a  new 
social-economic model  that would  take  into account  the following: 
technology has outstripped the need  for  labour 
caring should not be  reduced to domestic service 
human-centred economics delivers better than money-centred 
monopoly  systems  of  ownership need to be pluralized 
international  economic activity should be  the servant  not  the master  of 
international civil society 
/ 
There are examples from  each EC  member  state that can provide clues as to 
ways  forward. 
Britain,  for example,  shows  the possibility of  lifting health-care costs 
from  the backs  of employers  through its centrally-funded National Health 
Service.  British  representatives  should  be  encouraged  to  promote  the 
virtues of their NHS  in terms of its contribution to economic efficiency. 
The  training  of  workers  in  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  is  a  model  for 
improving the supply side of  the  labour  market. 
The  current discussion between governments  in France and Spain and  their 
trade  unions  about  new  social-employment  plans  shows  how  the  workplace 
civil society incorporated in unions  can play a  positive role. 
Worker and union representatives will sit on the supervisory board of the 
recently merged Renault-Volvo auto company  - another pointer to a  European 
solution to current dichotomies between economy  and society. 
In  summary  form,  the  increasing  global  and  regional  economic 
interdependence requires the following reaction from policy-makers.  They should 
seek to: 
(1)  Re-insert full  employment  as policy goal; 
(2)  Link social issues to economic growth via social clause in GATT.  The call 
for  a  "world Social  Charter"  by  the  UK  Employment  Minister,  David  Hunt, 
is  interesting  in  this  regard.  A  10-point  World  Social  Charter  may  be 
found  the  International  Metalworkers  Federation  Action  Programme  1993-
1997; 
(3)  Strenghten economic citizenship transnationally, notably through European 
Works  Councils; 
(4)  Research  new  products  and  processes  harnessing  knowledge  adn  skills  of 
production and service workers; 
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other institutions of  European civil society such as  ETUC; 
(6)  Seek  to  strengthen  unions  as  essential  pillars  of  international  civil 
society  based  on  contribution  that  unions  have  made  in  Poland,  South 
Africa,  South Korea; 
(7)  Define negative and positive freedoms  in economic sphere; 
(8)  Move  from passive to active society policies in line with speech made  by 
EC  Commissioner,  Padraig Flynn,  to TUC  Congress,  UK,  6th September  1993; 
(9}  Open  borders and  institutions to East Europeans; 
(10)  Put  civil  society,  social  movement  protection  into  all  EC  trade 
agreements; 
(11}  Take  advantage  of  window  of  opportunity  for  social  issues  (Clinton  Jobs 
summit,  ILO  75th anniversary,  OECD  employment  studies,  UN  Social Summit} 
to argue  for  European model; 
( 12)  Proclaim  European  diversity  in  unity  and  have  political  faith  in  the 
European project instead of endlessly seeking to impose American or Asian 
economic-social relations on Europe.  Draw  instead from the positive aspect 
of  the  US  and Asia,  instead of  a  wholesale transfer of  US/Asian  model. 
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.  - 121  -1.  TRADE  AND  THE  THIRD  WORLD- PRIORITIES  FOR  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
C.  Aid,  Oxfam,  the catholic Institute for International Relations World 
Developuent Jlfovement 
(i)  Introduction 
Trade  is vastly  more  important  to  developing  countries  than  aid.  Aid 
accounts  for  only  five  per  cent  of  the  income  of  the  Third  World;  trade 
represents  more  than  80  per cent.  For  many  Least  Developed  Countries,  the  EC 
market  accounts  for fifty percent or more  of total exports. 
Yet  the present structure of  EC  trade with the Third World prevents  them 
developing  their  export  potential.  According  to  UNCTAD,  83%  of  manufactured 
exports  from  the  Third  World  to  the  EC  encounter  trade  barriers.  Such 
restrictions are estimated by the World Bank to reduce poor countries'  earnings 
by  3%  a  year. 
The  1992  World  Bank  report  "Global  Economic  Prospects  and  Developing 
Countries",  estimated  that  a  50  per cent  reduction  in  the  trade barriers  of 
Europe,  Japan  and  the  US  would  increase  developing  countries'  exports  by  $50 
billion per year  - just less than the annual  $57  billion aid they  receive. 
Recession  and  unemployment  within  the  EC  are creating serious  pressures 
on member countries to adopt protectionist measures.  Such measures not only harm 
poor  people  in  poor  countries  - they  also  serve  to  prolong  the  worldwide 
recession.  Only if poor countries can sell their goods  to the EC,  will  they be 
able to afford to buy  the EC's  goods  and services. 
Through  their  work  with  partner  organisations  in  the  Third  World, 
development  NGOs  throughout the  EC  have  become  increasingly concerned that all 
too often the  EC's  trade policies directly and  indirectly harm  the struggling 
economies  of poor countries. 
With  the  GATT  negotiations  coming  to a  crucial point,  the  future  of  the 
Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  still  unresolved,  and  the  EC  looking  at  the 
implementation of the second phase of Lome  IV,  the EC  must take this opportunity 
to  improve its trading relations with the Third World. 
(ii)  The  Third World and Maastricht 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  strikes  an  encouraging  note.  It  writes  overseas 
development  into  the  European  Treaty  for  the first  time.  In Article  130u it 
commits  Europe  to a  development policy that will  foster: 
the  sustainable  economic  and  social  development  of  the  developing 
countries,  and  more  particularly the most  disadvantaged among  them; 
the  smooth and  gradual  integration of  the developing countries  into the 
world economy; 
the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. 
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policy set out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Article  130v of  the Treaty is therefore of  the  utmost  significance.  It 
commits  the  Community  to  take  account  of  the  specified  objectives  for 
development  policy  'in  the  policies  that  it  implements  which  are  likely  to 
affect developing countries'. 
This  commitment  was  underlined last December  in a  declaration by  the  EC 
Ministers  of  Development  Cooperation:  the  EC  "recognises  the  linkages between 
development cooperation policy and othe+ Community policies.  It also recognises 
the need  to take account of their impact  on  developing countries,  which can be 
significant.  "1 
Now  that  the  Community  recognises  the  linkage  between  its  development 
cooperation policy and other policies,  it should  take action. 
This  submission  examines  the  impact  on  developing  countries  of  the 
following  EC  policies: 
(a)  The  common  tariff policy; 
(b)  Textiles and clothing policy:  the Multi-fibre Arrangement. 
(c)  The  Common  Agricultural Policy. 
This  submission: 
assesses the  impact  of  these policies as  they currently operate; 
outlines  why  recent  and  anticipated  reforms  are  inadequate  to  achieve 
coherence  with the stated objectives of  EC  development  policy; 
makes  recommendations  for  policy reform. 
{iii)  Summary  of recommendations 
1.  Overall trade policy 
The EC  should review its trade policies to ensure that they are consistent 
with the development  policy objectives set out  in the Maastricht  Treaty. 
2.  Tariffs 
The  EC  should  remove  tariffs  that  rise  according  to  the  level  of 
processing. 
Declarat1on of  the  Council  and  of  Representatives  of  Governments  of  member  states 
meeting  in  the Counc1l  on  aspects of development  co-operati.on  pol1cy  1n  the  run-up 
to  2000. 
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The  EC  should: 
i.  Start phasing out  the  MFA  immediately,  lifting first and  fastest  quotas 
on  the poorest countries,  with all barriers  removed  by  the year  2003  by 
the latest. 
ii.  Take Bangladesh,  as  the only Least Developed Country within the MFA,  off 
the EC's list of  MFA  exporters  immediately. 
iii.  Promote  basic  worker  rights  in  the  countries  with  which  it  trades, 
particularly the rights to organise and to free collective bargaining. 
4.  Common  Agricultural Policy 
The  EC  should establish a  unit  in the  DGVI  to monitor  the  impact  of  the 
CAP  and changes  to it for  Third World  countries. 
- Beef  Sector 
The  EC  should: 
i.  Abolish subsidies on  beef exported to west  Africa. 
ii.  Investigate the impact of subsidised exports to other developing nations. 
iii.  Increase aid to the livestock sector in west Africa. 
- Sugar Sector 
The  EC  should  reduce  sharply  domestic  production  while  protecting  the 
interests of  the  ACP  states signatory to  the  Sugar  Protocol.  The  main report 
contains detailed recommendations covering Subsidised Exports; Financial Aid for 
Diversification Trade Restrictions;  Freight Costs;  the Portuguese Market. 
- Cereals Sector 
The  EC  should: 
i.  The  withdrawal  the price support  and other payments  linked to levels of 
production in excess of  Community  demand. 
ii.  A  commitment  to  phase  out,  over  a  five-year  period,  all  direct  and 
indirect export subsidies. 
iii.  Support less intensive,  more sustainable forms of agricultural production 
in the  EC,  based on  lower  levels of output. 
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(a)  Common  tariff policy 
The  world's poorest countries rely heavily on  a  small  number  of  primary 
commodities,  the price for which has been plummeting.  The  World Bank  commodity 
index fell  30  per cent in the  1980s  (ie purchasing power  was  cut  by  a  third). 
For sub-Saharan Africa the fall was  50  per cent. 
Throughout the 1980s the economic adjustment programmes prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World  Bank,  and adopted by  many  Third World 
countries,  encouraged  the increased production of  traditional primary  product 
exports.  These  programmes  are  based  on  the  idea  of  'comparative  advantage'  -
developing countries should grow tropical products,  and use the foreign exchange 
earned to  import  cheap  food  produced by  subsidised farming  in the North. 
Producing more of the same is no  solution to these countries'  crises.  For 
60%  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa's  exports  demand  elasticities  are  so  low  that  an 
increase  in  the  volume  of  exports  actually  leads  to  a  fall  in  earnings.  In 
Ghana,  for  example,  a  50  per cent increase in production of  cocoa between  1983 
and  1989  was  accompanied by  a  fall  in foreign  exchange  receipts. 1 
A way  out  of  the commodity  trap is to tap the greater profits to be  made 
from  processing,  packaging  and  marketing.  However,  the  EC's  tariff  structure 
works  to  stop Third  World  countries  developing  processing  industries,  and  to 
maintain their dependence  on  primary commodity  expo'rts. 
While  raw  materials  may  be  allowed  in  duty  free  to  the  EC  market, 
processed products face significantly higher barriers.  The  greater the degree 
of processing the high the tariff.  For example,  the.EC duty on cocoa beans,  is 
three per cent,  on cocoa butter  12  per cent and  on  chocolate  16  per cent. 
Prospective Reforms 
The  GATT  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  have  not  yet  focused  on  this  area. 
The  danger is that it will be left until very late and tied up too quickly after 
the  log-jam between  the  superpowers  have  been  cleared.  One  of  the results of 
the  last GATT  negotiations,  the Tokyo  Round,  was,  for  many  tropical products, 
an  increase in tariff escalation. 
Frances  STEWART:  Are  Adjustment  Polic1es  1n  Africa  Cons1stent  w1th  Long-run 
Development  Needs?,  Deve1opment  Po1icy  Review,  Vol.  9,  1992. 
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The removal of tariffs that rise according to the level of processing. 
(b)  Textiles policy:  the Multi-Fibre Arrangement1 
Textiles  and  clothing  exports  are  of  central  importance  to  many  Third 
World  countries.  They  account  for  over  a  quarter  of  the  Third  World's 
manufactured  exRorts,  compared  to  less  than  5  per  cent  for  rich  countries. 
These exports have provided a  first step towards industrial diversification and 
away  from  dependence  on  commodities. 
The  Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  (MFA)  governs  the  bulk  of  textiles  and 
clothing  trade  between  rich  and  poor  countries.  It consists  of  a  series  of 
country-to-country limits on the annual shipments of clothing and textiles from 
the Third World  in each of  a  wide  range  of  categories. 
The  MFA  is  a  complete  'derogation'  from  GATT  rules,  being  based  on 
bilateral  trade  arrangements,  using  quotas,  and  allowing  rich  countries  to 
directly  discriminate  against  poor  countries'  exports  while  leaving  rich 
countries'  untouched. 
The  MFA  was  introduced  as  a  'temporary'  measure  allowing  industries  in 
rich countries to adjust to textile and clothing imports  from  poorer producers. 
However,  the real threats to textiles and clothing employment  in the EC  are from 
new  technology and imports  from  other rich countries.  For example,  over 80  per 
cent of  textile imports  to Britain come  from  other rich countries. 
Since its birth in  1974  the MFA  has  been  renegotiated three  times  until 
the present MFA  IV,  which has been twice extended.  Each renegotiation has seen 
the list of restrictions get longer and more  complex.  It represents a  serious 
barrier  to  poor  countries  attempting  to use  trade  in clothes  and  textiles  to 
build  up  their  economies  and  overcome  poverty.  Barriers  to  clothing  and 
textiles cost the Third World  an estimated E35  billion every year in lost trade 
-nearly as much  as all Western aid. 
Prospective Reforms 
MFA  IV  was  scheduled  to  finish  at  the  end  of  1992,  just  as  the  Single 
European Market came  into place and a  new  GATT  agreement was  expected to begin. 
However,  the  EC  missed  this opportunity  to start phasing  out  the  MFA,  opting 
instead to  'roll-over'  the present  MFA  quotas  until  a  Uruguay  Round  agreement 
is reached.  This  is highly unsatisfactory. 
Technically  the  EC  could  start  phasing  out  the  MFA  without  a  GATT 
agreement  in place.  Indeed,  despite the absence of a  conclusion to the Uruguay 
Round,  the  EC  has  already  started  a  five  year  phase-out  of  all  quota 
restrictions on Poland,  Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics,  with similar 
agreements coming into force next year with Romania and Bulgaria. The continuing 
delays to a  GATT  agreement should not be used as an excuse to prolong the life 
of  the MFA.  Instead the  EC  should follow the example of  Japan,  Switzerland and 
The  1nformat1on  conta1ned  in  th1s  section  1s  taken  from:  Towards  a  fa1r  trade  in 
c7othmg  and  textiles:  The  Mult1-fibre  Arrangement,  Europe  and  the  Third  World, 
Subm1Ss1on  to  the  EC  by  NGOs  from  Europe  and  Bangladesh,  1993,  and  Threadbare,  by 
Ben  JACKSON,  World  Development  Movement,  1992. 
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and clothing quotas. 
The draft textile accord in the Uruguay Round  Dunkel Text is "end-loaded", 
proposing  a  very  slow  phase-out  so  that  most  quota  restrictions  need  not  be 
lifted until the end of ten years.  This delays yet again moves  towards fairer 
trade for poor countries.  Nor  is it in the best interests of  EC  producers for 
whom  a  steady,  gradual  increase in competition would be  less disruptive that a 
sudden exposure  to greater competition at the end of  ten years. 
Recommendations 
The  EC  should start phasing out the  MFA  immediately,  lifting first and 
fastest quotas on the poorest coWltries,  with all barriers removed by the 
year 2003  by the latest. 
Bangladesh,  as the only Least Developed CoWltry within the MFA,  should be 
taken off the EC's list of  MFA  exporters immediately. 
The EC  should promote basic worker rights in the countries with which it 
trades,  particularly  the  rights  to  organise  and  to  free  collective 
bargaining. 
(c)  Common  Agricultural Policy 
Guaranteed  intervention  prices  allied  to  import  controls  have  greatly 
increased European self-sufficiency in agriculture,  so that substantial export 
surpluses have  emerged in most sectors.  Surpluses are transmitted on to world 
markets,  normally with the help of  substantial export subsidies. 
These subsidised exports deprive developing countries of foreign exchange 
by  reducing  their  market  shares  and  depressing  world  prices.  They  also 
undermine Third World  food  systems by  flooding local food  markets with heavily 
subsidised EC  surpluses.  This depresses prices,  reduces  the household  incomes 
of  staple food  producers  and discourages  investment  in agriculture. 
Although  the  EC  has  agreed  a  major  package  of  CAP  reforms  covering 
cereals,  beef  and  butter,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  reforms  will  be  in  the 
interest of the Third World  On  the contrary, desire to minimise change in the 
current balance of benefit for the EC  interest groups affected by the CAP  means 
that,  if European  policy makers  are forced to take difficult decisions,  there 
will  be  a  tendency  for  the  burden  of  adjustment  to  be  transferred  whenever 
possible on to Third World countries, because they cannot retaliate effectively. 
There  is  currently  no  coordination  of  policy  between  the  Directorate 
General  for  Agriculture  in  the  European  Commission  (DGVI)  and  that  for 
Development  (DGVIII).  We  recommend: 
the establishment of a  unit in the DGVI  to monitor the impact of the CAP 
and changes to it for Third World  coWltries. 
The remainder of this section examines the trade and food security effects 
of the CAP  on developing countries in three sectors of special interest to them: 
beef,  sugar,  cereals: 
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Problems for the Third World 
Over the last ten years,  the EC  has greatly increased its beef production, 
generating enormous  surpluses.  Because of  the high costs of storage,  surpluses 
are sold outside the Community  with the help of large subsidies.  The  EC  has now 
become the world's largest exporter of beef,  taking over a  quarter of the global 
market.  The  Middle  East,  eastern Europe  and Africa are the  main destinations 
for  this  subsidised beef.  The  export  of  these  surpluses  can  have  a  profound 
impact  on  local economies  and agriculture. 
Undermining EC  Aid Policy 
In  the dry-lands  on  the  southern  fringes  of  the  Sahara  desert,  fragile 
soils and uncertain rainfall mean  that people cannot rely on cropping.  Instead, 
millions of people in Mali,  Niger and Burkina Faso rely on extensive livestock 
production to provide for their economic needs.  Traditionally they sold their 
animals to the wealthier coastal countries like Cote d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  Togo  and 
Benin. 
However,  since  the  mid  1980s  large  quanti  ties  of  heavily  subsidised 
European beef have been arriving in the region.  This EC  beef  (subsidised to the 
tune  of  two  ECU  per  kilo)  is  up  to  two-thirds  cheaper  than  locally-produced 
beef,  and thus destroys the market for African farmers.  Since 1984,  the EC  has 
spent more  than 400  million ECU  in export subsidies to dispose of  beef  in west 
Africa. 
This  EC  beef  dumping  not  only  undermines  the efforts of  millions  in the 
region to survive,  it also undermines the aid policies of the EC  and its member 
states, which spend considerable sums  on livestock support and other aid to west 
Africa.  Practically all west African countries have received support,  ranging 
from refrigerated abattoirs in Quagadougou and Bamako  and improvement of cattle 
breeds  in Mali,  Gambia  and  Senegal,  to fattening units  and disease control  in 
Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. 
The  amounts  of  beef  involved are large for  west  Africa.  But  they are a 
tiny portion  - less than  a  half  of  one percent  - of  total  EC  production.  The 
trade could be stopped with little or no  impact on  EC  farmers,  with big savings 
for  EC  budgets,  and  with enormous  benefits for  the people of  the Sahel. 
Recent  and prospective reforms 
It is unlikely  that  the  current  CAP  reform  will  do  much  to  bring  beef 
surpluses  down.  While  the  May  1992  reform  package  attempts  to  reduce  beef 
production,  pigs and poultry may  get cheaper,  thereby reducing beef consumption 
in  Europe  and  actually  increasing  exports.  Meat  and  livestock  Commission 
figures  suggest  that there will be  a  surplus of  960,000  tonnes  for  storage or 
export in 1993,  even if Europeans eat more  meat.  2 
2 
Petter MADDEN:  Information given here 1s taken from  Brussels  Beef Carve-up:  EC  beef 
dumping  in  West  Afr1ca,  V1ewpoint,  a  Chr1stian  Aid  PoJ1cy  Unit  publication,  Apr1l 
1993. 
Martin  PALMER:  The Outlook for Meat  and  Livestock,  Martin  PALMER,  Meat  and  L1vestock 
Commission,  Agra  Europe  1993. 
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accords,  would  have  a  more  significant impact  on  beef exports.  The  agreement 
implies  a  reduction in the volume  of subsidised EC  beef exports'of  21  per cent 
and  a  reduction in the budgetary outlay for export subsides. 
However,  even with that reduction the EC  still estimates that there will 
be  800,000  tonnes  of  beef  a  year  available  in  the  short  term  and  300,000  to 
400,000  additional  tonnes available by  the end of  the century. 
If the current level of exports to west Africa went  down  by  21  per cent, 
some  40,000  tonnes  of  beef  would still be dumped  there in  1999.  Moreover,  in 
the short term pressure to get rid of existing stocks will be very high,  which 
could mean  an  increase in the amount  of  beef sold in west Africa. 
Recommendations 
Abolish subsidies on beef exported to west Africa. 
Investigate the impact of subsidised exports to other developing nations. 
Intensify aid to the livestock sector in west Africa. 
2 .  Sugar Sector  1 
Problems for the Third World 
J 
The  EC's  share of  world  sugar exports  rose  from  less than  9  per cent  in 
the  1960s  to  more  than  20  per  cent  in _the  1980s,  making  the  EC  the  world's 
largest exporter in 1982.  In making this transition,  the EC  contributed to the 
collapse of the International Sugar Agreement  in the early 1980s,  which in turn 
set the scene for a  protracted slump  in prices.  Trade diversion to the  EC  has 
had  serious  implications  for  the  Philippines,  Brazil,  Cuba  and  the  Dominican 
Republic.  The Community  now  holds more  than half the world's white sugar market 
and accounts  for  some  25  per cent of  the total free market. 
Producers  in the African,  Caribbean and Pacific  (ACP)  group of countries 
have  been partially protected  from  these external effects by  guaranteed quota 
access  to  the  EC  market  under  the  terms  of  the  Sugar Protocol  attached to  the 
Lome  Convention.  These exports  to the  EC,  prices  for  which are  linked to  CAP 
intervention prices for sugar beet,  are vital to the survival of  the economies 
of  several of  the  ACP  states. 
They  are of particular  importance  to the relatively high-cost producers 
in the  Caribbean,  which  would  be uncompetitive  in what  has  been  a  chronically 
depressed market for almost a  decade.  In Guyana,  a  country in which 75  per cent 
of  the population live below the poverty line,  the sugar industry accounts  for 
37.5 per cent of  total export earnings and  supports  around  125,000 people. 
Even  in Mauritius,  where  state revenue  from  sugar  exports  to the  EC  has 
played a  vital role in financing the emergence of a  highly competitive textile 
industry,  sugar  still  accounts  for  approximately  79  per  cent  of  total  net 
The  informat1on  g1ven  in  th1s  sect1on  is  taken  from  The  Report  of a  CIIR  Seminar: 
Reform of the EC  Sugar Regime:  !mplicatTOns for Develop1ng Countries,  CIIR,  November, 
1992. 
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In  1979  it  imposed  a  'voluntary  export'  restraint  agreement  on  Mauritius, 
because her  1.4 per cent of  EC  clothing imports  were  seen as  a  threat. 
This example  from  Mauritius gives  some  indication of  the difficulties of 
diversification in the ACP  sugar exports.  It points to why  it is vital that the 
EC  honour the Maastricht commitment to foster the smooth and gradual integration 
of  the developing countries  into the world  economy. 
Likely Reforms 
Proposals for the reform of the EC  sugar regime were expected from  the EC 
Commission in September 1992,  for implementation in July 1993.  In January  1993 
it was  decided  to roll over  the existing regime  for  one  year.  Agreement  must 
be reached by the  EC  Council of Ministers by  1  January  1994. 
Given the nature of the reforms agreed for the CAP  in May  1992,  price cuts 
are  a  likely  outcome  of  the  review,  threatening  the  viability  of  the  Sugar 
Protocol.  Sugar beet is a  major arable rotational crop,  the effective support 
price  for  which  is now  substantially  above  that  for  cereals,  leading  to  some 
pressure for  sugar beet price cuts.  With  a  GATT  agreement,  price cuts can be 
expected to be  larger,  probably  in the region of  12-20  per cent. 
According to Mr  Stendevad,  Head  of  the Sugar  Division in DGVI,  there is 
a  'limited risk of  compensation'  for  price cuts  and,  without  compensation  for 
EC  producers,  there  will  be  no  direct  compensation  for  price  cuts  for  ACP 
suppliers.  While  superficially  this  may  appear  even  handed,  it obscures  the 
different realities which  face  the two  sets of  producers. 
Although  EC  farmers  may  not  receive  any direct compensation  for  changes 
in  the  sugar  regime,  they  are  nevertheless  receiving  an  overall  package  of 
compensatory payments for changes to the CAP  agreed in May  1992.  The  intention 
of  this  compensation is to ensure  that  they  stay  in business  and  continue  to 
prosper. 
Recommendations  1 
The  aim  of  the  sugar  review  should  be  to  reduce  sharply  domestic 
production while protecting the  interests of  the ACP  states signatory to  the 
Sugar Protocol.  To  this end we  propose the following measures: 
Subsidised Exports:  The  withdrawal  of price support for  any  sugar beet 
production  in  excess  of  domestic  self-reliance  minus  the  preferential 
imports provided by the ACP  countries - equivalent to around 9.5 million 
tonnes.  This reduction should be achieved over a  five-year period through 
the abolition of B quota support and a  1 . 3 million tonne reduction in the 
A quota. 
Financial Aid for Diversification:  The creation of a  financial mechanism 
to compensate ACP  exporters for price cuts introduced as a  result either 
of CAP  reform or a  GATT  Uruguay Round agreement.  The aim of the mechanism 
should be to facilitate investment designed to raise the competitiveness 
These  recommendat1ons  were  made  by  CIIR,  Oxfam  and  Chr1st1an  Aid  1n  November  1992 
in  The  Report  of a  CIIR  Seminar:  Reform  of  the  EC  Sugar  Reg1me:  lmp1Jcat1ons  for 
Developing  Countr1es. 
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and· into other economic activities. 
Any  compensatory  package  should  be  made  conditional  on  commitments  by 
governments  to  implement  programmes  designed  to protect  the poorest and  most 
vulnerable  sugar  producers  from  the  effects  of  price  cuts.  This  could  be 
achieved  through  the  participation  of  local  trade  unions,  associations  of 
agricultural producers  and  NGOs  in the conn  try concerned. 
Trade  Restrictions:  Urgent  examination  of  trade  restrictions  the 
Community  imposes  through  tariff  escalation,  quotas,  m1m  .. mum  price 
controls and rules of origin criteria in sectors where ACP  exporters enjoy 
a  competitive  advantage.  We  note  with  concern  that,  despite  Lome 
preferences, many Caribbean conntries continue to find it easier to export 
horticultural products and textiles to the US  markets than to the EC. 
Freight Costs:  The creation of  a  freight assistance fund to compensate 
ACP  exporters for  the high transport costs incurred in supplying the EC 
market. 
The Portuguese Market:  The extension of guaranteed price support to the 
75,000  tonnes  provided  by  the  four  ACP  suppliers  to  Portugal  (Cote 
d'Ivoire,  Malawi,  Swaziland,  Zimbabwe);  the addition of 45,000 tonnes to 
the ACP' s  guaranteed quota,  the balance of 150,000 tonnes required by the 
Portuguese refining industry to be allocated on a  preferential basis to 
Third  World  suppliers,  giving special  consideration to  the position of 
Cuba  in view  of  the  losses it incurred  following  the extension of  the 
common  sugar regime to East Germany. 
3.  Cereals Sector
1 
Problems  for the Third World 
Around  a  quarter of  EC  cereals production is exported.  Currently the EC 
pays  farmers  around  $235  a  tonne  for  wheat  which it sells on  the world market 
at approximately  $120  ton. 
The  most  visible victims  are efficient agricultural exporters operating 
without the use of export subsidies.  These include Third World exporters.  Fo~ 
example,  in the 1980s one of the most severely affected countries was  Argentina. 
Prices for  the cereals and oilseeds,  which account  for over half the country's 
export  earnings,  fell  by  40  per cent  between  1980  and  1987  because  of  export 
dumping  by  the  United  States  and  the  European  Community.  Translated  into 
financial terms,  this wiped an estimated $3bn per annum  off Argentina's foreign 
exchange  earnings  - equivalent  to  around  half  the  country's  debt  service 
payments. 
Peasant  producers  of  staple  foods  in  Third  World  cereal  importing 
countries also suffer from EC  cereals policy.  Subsidised EC  exports flood local 
food markets,  depressing prices,  reducing the household  incomes  of staple food 
producers  and  discouraging  investment  in  agriculture.  During  1986,  for 
Kevin  WATKINS:  The  examples  conta1ned  in  this  sect1on  are  taken  from  F1xing  the 
Ru1es:  North-South  1ssues  in  internat1ona1  trade and the  GATT  Uruguay  Round,  CIIR, 
1992  .. 
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surpluses in west African countries such as Mali  and Burkina Faso at prices as 
lo~ as $60  a  tonne - around a  third lower than equivalent production,  transport 
and·,marketing costs  for  locally produced cereals like sorghum  and millet.  In 
order to do so they were using direct and indirect subsidies of  $100  a  tonne to 
bridge  the  gap  between  domestic  support  and export  prices.  The  result  was  a 
fall  in rural  household  incomes  (as cheap  food  imports depressed  local  staple 
prices), falling investment in agriculture and in some cases,  migration from the 
land. 
Recent Reforms 
In the May  1992  CAP  reforms the EC  agreed to cut guaranteed cereal prices 
by  29  per  cent  over  three  years  and  to  compensate  growers  on  the  basis  of 
average regional yields. 
The  reform was  heralded as the most  radical overhaul of the CAP  in its 30 
year history.  This is because the new  compensation arrangements partially break 
the  link between  the support  paid to  farmers  and  the  increasing amounts  which 
price support incites them  to produce. 
However,  the  new  arrangements  still  sustain  the  profit  levels  of  the 
larger and  more  efficient-grain producers  at too  high  a  level  in relation to 
production  cost  to  deter  increased  production,  while  they  do  not  provide 
adequate curbs on increased production.  This means  that for the fifth of grain 
growers  who  produce  80  per  cent  of  the  Community's  output,  it will  still be 
profitable to produce beyond  the subsidy  limit.
1 
It has therefore been estimated that, by the late 
produce  nearly  25  per  cent  more  wheat  than  in  1991 
subsidise the export of at least half its surplus.2 
1990s,  the EC  will still 
- and  a  commitment  to 
Further Reforms  in Prospect 
A  GATT  Uruguay  Round  agreement  based  on  the  Blair  House  accords  will 
commit  the  EC  to a  reduction in the volume  of subsidised exports by  21  per cent 
relative to the average of  exports  in  1986-90,  by  the year  1999  (or  six years 
from  the beginning of  the agreement). 
Given that the EC  is likely to continue to maintain a  very high level of 
production of  wheat  and other cereals despite the reforms  of  May  last year,  it 
is unlikely that it will be able to conform to the subsidised export limitation 
without  further  reforms.  The  Community  will  therefore be  forced  to either:  1) 
cut its prices so as to eliminate the need to subsidise exports,  or 11)  cut its 
production so that its export potential does  conform to the limits. 
2 
It must  be  emphas1sed  that for  the  bas1c  average  production  (4.6  tonnes  a  hectare 
EC-12)  there will  be  no  reduct1on  in  return on  the 1992  level;  on  this  bas1s output 
the farmer  1s guaranteed the post-reform pr1ce plus the compensatory subsidy.  These 
two elements added together equal the pre-reform support price.  Thus cont1nued over-
payment  for  the  basic  supported  'quota'  will  subsidises  increased  product1on  and 
export  at  the  closer  to  world  prices  established  under  the  new  d1min1shed  price 
support regime.  Br1an  GARDNER:  The  EC  Animal  Feed  Sector 1993-98,  Brian  GARDNER, 
Agra  Europe  Specia1  Report  NO.  68. 
Brian GARDNER:  The  EC  Animal  Feed  Sector 1993-98,  Br1an GARDNER,  Agra  Europe Special 
Report  No.  68. 
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farmers  included  in  the  1992  reform  package  are  not  production  related  and 
therefore not subject to reduction.  If,  therefore,  the EC  does  go for option 1) 
while  maintaining  the  compensation  payments,  the  larger  and  most  efficient 
cereals  growers  who  produce  at  least  75%  of  the  Community's  grain  will  be 
capable  of  competing  at  a  post-GATT  world  price.  The  agreement  is  therefore 
unlikely to do  much  to help the Third World. 
Recommendations 
The  withdrawal  of price support  and  other payments  linked to  levels of 
production in excess of Community  demand. 
A  Commitment  to  phase  out,  over  a  five-year  period,  all  direct  and 
indirect export subsidies. 
Support  for  less  intensive,  more  sustainable  forms  of  agricultural 
production in the EC,  based on  lower levels of output. 
(d)  Conclusion 
In recent years  there has been a  great deal of rhetoric in the developed 
world concerning its obligations to developing countries.  Yet  this submission 
has  outlined how  the  EC's  agricultural policies  undermine  the rural  sector in 
Third  world  countries,  while  its  textile  and  tariff  policies  prohibit  the 
development  of  textile and  agroprocessing sectors which  are  commonly  regarded 
as the first step toward industrialisation.  What  we  are seeking,  therefore,  is 
a  similar improvement  in the quality of  EC  policy,  so that it actually matches 
the development policy rhetoric. 
In  order  to  insti  tutionalise  recognition  within  the  Community  of  the 
contradictions  between  EC  trade  policy  and  the  stated  aims  for  development 
policy,  it is  essential  that  the  Community  establish  appropriate  monitoring 
mechanisms. 
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EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  ON  THE  COMMISSION'S  DISCUSSION  PAPER  "INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE",  May  1993 
(i)  Introduction 
In recent years, world economy has faced increasing interdependence,  which 
has  radically  changed  in  degree  and  nature  from  both  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative point of view.  The globalisation of economic activity has concerned 
both goods  and services. 
Overall BEUC  supports the main conclusions of the Commission's Discussion 
Paper.  We  favour  a  stable and  open world  economy  where  competition forces  can 
play effectively.  We  also favour  the progressive liberalisation of trade.  But, 
in our  view,  it should be  clear~y recognised that  the new  context  should also 
benefit  the  consumer.  Economic  issues  have also gained in relative  importance 
from  the consumer  point of  view. 
Today,  consumer  interests are not  yet  fully  recognised by  the different 
parties concerned.  Moreover,  economic analysis -both micro and macroeconomic  -
is  too  often  incomplete  and  biased,  since  its models  and  estimations  do  not 
specifically  include  consumer  interests.  As  a  result,  economic  analysis 
underestimates  - and  even  ignores  - consumer  welfare.  In  such  a  context,  the 
consumer  is  rarely  aware  of  the  direct  and  indirect  implications  of 
international economic interdependence. The consumer usually has to pay for such 
implications. 
Furthermore,  consumer  consultation  at  national,  Community  and 
international level is totally insufficient. Even if the economic analysis could 
face the above lacunae,  the consumer voice is still not heard. Priority is given 
to enterprises  facing strong external competition and  to sectorial problems. 
Therefore,  BEUC  strongly supports the view that consumer interests should 
be added in this global context,  where all parties involved are called to play 
a  new  active role. 
( ii)  International trade and the consumer 
From  the  consumer  point of  view,  the first and  more  important  aspect of 
international economic  interdependence is foreign  trade.  In recent decades,  we 
have  witnessed  a  rapid  expansion  of  world  trade  and  radical  changes  in  its 
relative  composition  and  geographic  distribution.  Industrialised  countries 
continue to dominate  international trade activity. 
On  this point,  BEUC  recently called for  an  overhaul  of  EC  trade policy. 
The  conclusions  of  the  NCC  report  on  world  trade
1
,  published in Mai  1993,  are 
that EC  trade policy is not geared to improving the well-being of consumers,  but 
rather to protecting sectorial and other special interests. 
We  concluded  that  over  the  last  decade  the  Community  has  become  more 
protectionist in a  more  protectionist world and that this attitude has  imposed 
significant costs on the Community's economy  and on its consumers.  Consumers pay 
International  Trade:  The  Consumer  Agenda,  National  Consumer  Council,  May  1993. 
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clothes,  shoes,  electronic goods  and  food. 
We  also stressed the need for much greater transparency and accountability 
in  the  way  Community  trade  decisions  are  taken.
1  Important  policy  papers  are 
not  usually  accessible  to  many  interested parties,  decisions  are  made  behind 
closed  doors  and  minutes  of  meetings  are  not  made  public.  In  addition, 
assessments  of  the costs and  benefits of  introducing trade policy measures  to 
the Community  are  inadequate,  and  the interests of  consumers  largely ignored. 
In our view,  the Community  should take the lead in moving to more liberal 
policies.  It  should  also  move  to  open  up  its  trade  policy  decision-making 
processes  to more  public scrunity and debate. 
The  report sets out  23  specific recommendations  for  action at national, 
Community  and  international  level,  including the following: 
proper,  open procedures for evaluating the likely impact of proposed trade 
measures,  along the lines of  the  OECD  checklist; 
EC  anti-dumping and safeguard regulations changed to provide full access 
for  consumer  representatives to non-confidential  information; 
an end to dubious Commission arrangements,  such as the EC/Japan consensus 
on cars  which  works  against consumer  interests; 
new  EC  mechanisms  to  be  set  up  to  ensure  that  consumers'  economic 
interests are effectively represented. 
(iii) Concentration and the consumer 
The recent proliferation of operations involving mergers and takeovers of 
enterprises in the majority of industrial sectors and in services has modified -
often irreversibly - the structures of such markets,  and has inevitably lead to 
new  types  of  corporate  behaviour.  As  the  Discussion  Paper  pointed  out,  this 
phenomenon is more and more international, so that most countries are concerned. 
The  current economic analysis has mainly  studied the supply viewpoint by 
underlining,  for  example,  the  different  perspectives,  strategies  and 
opportunities  offered  by  this  new  context  to  enterprises.  However,  this 
phenomenon  has  also clear  implications  for  the  consumer.  Indeed,  mergers  and 
acquisitions can have positive effects - gains in efficiency - but also negative 
effects  - creating or  strengthening  monopoly  power.  From  this point  of  view, 
they can become  an instrument aimed at reducing the number  of  competitors in a 
particular market,  and  this,  under certain conditions,  can  induce  an  increase 
in prices  and  in profit margins.  Mergers  and  acquisitions  may  also  encourage 
collusion,  this being all the more  likely where  the number  of enterprises in a 
given market is limited. 
More  generally,  this  movement  towards  oligopolistic  market  structures, 
coupled with the creation of  dominant  positions by  large multinationals,  can, 
at the end,  reduce  the choice and  increase the price offered to the consumer. 
1  See  also  BEUC's  press  release  (05/93)  of  6  May  1993. 
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and trade policies,  whose  effects,  from  the consumer point of view,  need to be 
analysed.  In  the  near  future,  new  forms  of  market  segmentation  and  partition 
could be developed  and  they could  represent  one  of  the major  obstacles to the 
free movement  of  goods  and services. 
Finally,  in such  a  context,  competition and  trade policies are more  and 
more  strictly  interrelated.  Economic  analysis  should  therefore  develop  new 
models  and tools in order to fully  take  into account this fact. 
(iv)  Financial markets and the consumer 
International  economic  interdependence also concerns  financial  markets. 
This relatively new  aspect of international economic interdependence has not yet 
been analysed  from  the consumer point of view.  In the EC,  the free  movement  of 
capitals is effective as  from  1st January  1993,  for enterprises as well as for 
individuals. 
In the first instance,  we  can state that the globalisation of  financial 
markets  should also bring clear benefits to consumers.  They  should be  free  to 
move  and invest their financial capitals,  particularly where  market conditions 
are the most  advantageous  and attractive.  However,  little effort has been made 
so  far  in  order  to  make  financial  markets  fully  transparent  and  thus  really 
competitive.  For the consumer,  the information on these markets is too often not 
easily accessible,  or accessible at too high costs. 
Moreover,  consumers  can only  really benefit  from  open  financial  markets 
if  some  supplementary  conditions  are  respected  - for  example,  if  they  are 
legally protected against the bankruptcy of  financial institutions entitled to 
collect private savings or to invest money.  International rules should therefore 
be  fixed  in order to open the financial  markets  to more  effective competition, 
and to create a  global environment where consumers are entitled to play a  role. 
(v)  Conclusion 
We  welcome  the  Commission's  Discussion  Paper  on  international  economic 
interdependence.  Overall this paper analyses this new  concept and its practical 
consequences  which  affect  the  world  economy  as  a  whole.  Certain  aspects  of 
interdependence,  such as foreign trade,  foreign trade investment,  globalisation 
of technology and financial markets,  are therefore described in the light of the 
latest economic  research,  with particular attention on  those related to areas 
of  Community  competence. 
However,  one  major  limit of  the paper  is the fact  that  no  consideration 
is given to consumer interests.  In our view,  any evaluation of the implications 
of economic interdependence for both external policies and Community priorities 
should clearly  include  the  consumer  as  an interested party.  As  a  consequence, 
any assessment of the costs of  inadequate policy responses should also be based 
on  the direct and indirect costs borne  by  the consumer. 
We  strongly support  the view that consumers  should benefit  from  an  open 
and stable world economy.  Any  economic analysis -both theoretical and empirical 
- should clearly include and evaluate the consumer interests.  To  this end,  new 
economic concepts and  tools should be elaborated. 
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improved at national,  Community and international level.  International trade is 
one concrete area where  such  improvements are imperative. 
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European business people have  to operate  in a  world  undergoing  profound 
change  with  globalisation  of  markets  and  the  emergence  of  ever  sharper 
competition.  If companies  are to survive and fulfil their role as creators of 
jobs  and  wealth,  their  competitiveness  must  be  improved  relentlessly  in  the 
framework  of  intensifying  international  competition.  In  this  context,  the 
Community's  commercial  policy,  which  governs  commercial  relations between  the 
Community  and  third countries,  must: 
see  that  international  trade  rules  are  complied  with  by  all  trade 
partners, 
improve access to third-country markets, 
increase the stability of  the environment  in which  companies  operate,. 
help to strengthen European competitiveness. 
An  open multilateral trading system,  based on clear and efficient rules, 
is the essential complement  to the internal market. 
A strengthening of the GATT  multilateral trading system and acceptance of 
its rules by the largest possible number of countries must be the first priority 
of  the  Community's  commercial  policy.  According  to  estimates  made  by  GATT 
economists,  in 1992  the Community  was  the world's largest importer and exporter 
with around 20 % of world exports  (by value and excluding intra-Community trade) 
and  21.5%  of  world  imports.  The  corresponding  figures  for  the United States 
are  18  and  19  %,  and  for  Japan  12  % and 8  %. 
UNICE  expects  the Community  to use its weight as  the world'smajor 
trading partner to obtain a  global and balanced conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
Such an outcome would help to stem protectionist tendencies worldwide,  to 
limit  discriminatory  bilateral  arrangements,  and  to  restrict  recourse  to 
unilateral measures  and  managed  trade.  To  this end,  UNICE  would  like GATT  to 
be  developed  into  a  multilateral  trade  organisation,  the  dispute  settlement 
procedures to be unified and unilateral measures  to be abandoned. 
When  the  rules  of  international  trade  are  not  respected or  when  import 
surges threaten to cause serious economic disturbances, it is essential that the 
Community  be  able  to  defend  its  legitimate  interests  as  rapidly  and  as 
effectively as its trading partners.  To  this end, it should not hesitate to use 
its  commercial-policy  instruments,  within  the  framework  of  international 
obligations and procedures. 
It  must  be  possible  to  use  all  the  instruments  at  its  disposal  when 
circumstances  so  justify,  each  instrument  corresponding  to  a  clearly defined 
specific situation.  An  imbalance can be seen in the way  Community  trade policy 
instruments are currently applied. 
The  new  commercial-policy  instrument,  against  illicit  commercial 
practices,  and  the regulations on  imports are only very rarely used. 
The regulation against dumped or subsidised imports is the instrument most 
currently used and  is applied essentially in cases  of  dumping.  Its practical 
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the  instrument. 
To  remedy  this  unsatisfactory  situation  and  to  prevent  any  risk  of  an 
instrument  being  used  wrongly  instead  of  another,  improvements  designed  to 
ensure  greater  transparency  and  more  coherence  between  instruments  should  be 
made  to  the regulations  in force.  These  could be  introduced  in the  framework 
-of  implementation of  the results of  the  Uruguay  Round. 
In April  1990  UNICE  submitted specific proposals for  improvements  to the 
anti-dumping regulation.  These are still valid and will have to be reviewed in 
the light of the results of the Uruguay  Round.  It is prepared to submit to the 
Commission suggestions of  the same  order for all commercial-policy  instruments 
and  measures,  including  revision  of  the  Community's  generalised  system  of 
preferences.  A solution which  brings  an  end  to  the existing disorder  should 
also be  found  rapidly to the problem of national quantitative restrictions,  in 
the  framework  of  the internal market. 
For UNICE,  the conditions for an effective Community commercial policy are 
as  follows: 
sufficient  margin  of  manoeuvre  for  the  executive  to  act  rapidly, 
effectively and with a  determination in line with its economic weight; 
coordinated and unified approach  on  the part of  Member  States vis-a-vis 
third  countries  and  the  political  will  to  use  the  instruments  at  the 
Community's  disposal  when  the  situation  so  requires.  Such  an  attitude 
would  have  a  not  inconsiderable dissuasive effect; 
possibility for Community  industry to lodge complaints directly with the 
Commission  for  all  instruments.  This  is  not  currently  the  case  for 
safeguard measures.  This situation should be  brought  to an  end  rapidly 
to prevent excessive recourse to other  instruments; 
adoption of more precise and transparent procedures for commercial-policy 
instruments, based on objective criteria and reasonable deadlines for each 
stage  of  the  procedure,  including  decision-making  procedures.  It  is 
important to find appropriate provisions designed to prevent the absence 
of  a  Council  decision standing in the way  of adoption of  measures  which 
meet  the above-mentioned requirements; 
obligation for Member  States to justify their decisions and right for the 
plaintiff  to  know  the  arguments  put  forward,  within  the  rules  of 
confidentiality.  Such a  measure would help to limit the risk of political 
bargaining; 
sufficient  human  resources  at  the  Commission  to  monitor  and  implement 
commercial  policy and hold commercial negotiations with third countries. 
The  Uruguay  Round  negotiations have  revealed deficiencies of  this  kind, 
in particular with regard to services; 
genuine  partnership  with  the  business  circles  concerned  with  a  view  to 
defining the medium- and long-term objectives and priorities of Community 
commercial  policy  and  its  priorities,  and  to  developing  appropriate 
actions.  UNICE  wishes to be consul  ted on a  systematic and on-going basis. 
Such consultation would  have  the advantage,  among  others,  of identifying 
a  consensus  prior  to  negotiations  with  third  countries,  thereby 
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sectors  likely  to  be  affected  by  liberalisation  measures  to  take  the 
necessary adjustment measures,  as rapidly as possible and  in cooperation 
with Community  and national authorities. 
Given  the  growing  interdependence  of policies and economies,  it is no 
longer  possible  to  pursue  a  commercial  policy  without  taking  into  account 
developments  in other areas such  as  foreign policy,  competition,  environment, 
etc.  UNICE  calls  for  the  establishment  of  better  coordination  within  the 
Commission  between  the different  departments  concerned  in order  to  avoid  the 
Community  sending  several  messages  to  the  outside  world  or  recommending 
contradictory measures. 
At  international level, it is essential for the Community,  in its contacts 
with  its trading partners,  to  seek  to  strengthen  macro-economic  cooperation. 
European  companies  cannot  accept  that  sharp  and  uncontrolled  exchange-rate 
fluctuations should be able to undermine almost overnight  the benefits of long 
and difficult negotiations on market  access,  and the balances  thus obtained. 
UNICE  will  return  to  some  of  these  points  in  more  specific  positions. 
These comments  may  be modified in the light of the results of the Uruguay Round. 
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